Tag: Sagaing

Naga Analysis
Naga Analysis

Isak Chishi Swu (NSCN-IM), Thuingaleng Muivah (NSCN-IM) and Shangwang Shangyung Khaplang (NSCN-K) [from left to right]

Executive Summary
Myanmar’s Naga SAZ is shaped by three intersecting pressures: fragmented armed organisations, contested political authority and cross-border security and connectivity. The Naga SAZ – Lahe, Leshi and Nanyun is part of a wider Naga homeland of India and Myanmar. Isolation, conflict and disrupted supply routes heighten human-security concerns; cross-border access matters for livelihoods and essential goods. Six Naga organisations are reported active. They are NSCN-K-YA, NSCN-K-AM, NSCN-IM, its Eastern Flank, Naga PDF and ENNO/ENDA. Their relationships with Myanmar’s military diverge. NSCN-K-AM and NSCN-IM’s Eastern Flank have reportedly cooperated in operations, while Naga PDF and ENDA have fought alongside resistance forces against the military. NSCN-K-AM is pursuing ceasefire discussions with the military regime in Myanmar and India; NSCN-K-YA remains outside India’s ceasefire framework and has engaged in reported cross-border attacks. NSCN-IM’s central leadership continues negotiations with India under the 2015 Framework Agreement. KIO/KIA’s role can generally be understood as both a military partner and a political fault line. It has supported Naga PDF and ENDA with training, supplies and joint operations. Yet NSCN-K-AM has challenged KIA involvement in the SAZ. Disputes over personnel, territory and the proposed “Naga Unit” could sharpen disagreements over Naga autonomy, representation and Naga–Kachin relations. Sagaing Federal Unit’s 2025 constitution establishes a framework for shared powers, Naga self-administration, courts and a seven-member interim government in the region. Implementation remains uncertain: we observe that the SAZ administrative and judicial authorities have not been formed. ENNO/ENDA’s separate interim political arrangement and the unclear engagement of eight NLD MPs elected in the 2020 General Elections complicate institution-building; however, they hold decisive influence over the SAZ’s status within the Unit’s constitutional framework. India’s proposed border fencing and limits on the Free Movement Regime have drawn Naga opposition. India’s security cooperation with the military regime in Myanmar and interest in strategic resources may affect armed groups’ mobility, leverage and economic prospects.
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Who Are the Nagas?
Naga communities in Myanmar have historically inhabited the mountainous borderlands between north-western Myanmar and north-eastern India, where village-based societies maintained distinct customary institutions and cultural traditions. During British colonial rule, imperial expansion gradually brought parts of these territories under administration, while colonial classifications and frontier policies shaped how Naga communities were governed. In 1940, the Naga Hills Tract in Burma was upgraded to a district, although some Naga-inhabited areas remained outside direct administration (Kakati, 2025). Following Burma’s independence in 1948, the international boundary increasingly separated Naga communities across Myanmar and India, while cross-border connections and negotiations with state authorities continued. With the military-drafted constitution in 2008, Myanmar established the Naga Self-Administered Zone (N-SAZ). However, the zone does not encompass all Naga communities in Myanmar, whose historical experiences and political relationships extend beyond its administrative boundaries.
The N-SAZ is located in the northwestern part of Sagaing Region, Myanmar, bordering Nagaland State in India. The Naga people have historically inhabited a wider region known as Nagaland, which extends across north-eastern India and north-western Myanmar. Although the majority of the Naga population resides in India, substantial Naga communities also live in Myanmar. Scholars identify more than 40 Naga tribes across the two countries, while the Myanmar government recognises seven major Naga tribes: Tangshang, Tankung, Makury, Para, Konyak, Khiamniungan and Lainong. According to the Naga Literature and Culture Committee, approximately 400,000 people identify as Naga (Htar et al., 2020).
The N-SAZ covers approximately 5168.206 square miles (Oo, 2023), with a total population residing within three main townships and five sub-townships as of 2014: 116,828 (2014 Census Reports). It comprises three main townships and five sub-townships, with Lahe serving as the administrative centre.
Main Township
Sub-Township
Lahe Township
Htanparkway
Leshi Township
Mobaingluk
Sonemara
Nanyun Township
Donhee
Pansaung
Table showing the list of Townships and sub-townships in N-SAZ (Source: 2014 Census Report)
Naga communities also reside in Hkamti, Homalin and Tamu of Sagaing, as well as in parts of Kachin State. The zone is home not only to Naga communities but also to smaller populations of Shan, Kachin and Bamar people. With its isolated nature, the region faces significant public health and environmental challenges. According to the World Food Programme, it is highly vulnerable to natural disasters and disease outbreaks. In 2016, a measles outbreak reportedly killed more than 40 children across the Naga SAZ (Nang & Paddock, 2016). The N-SAZ’s geographical position along the India–Myanmar border also has important implications for regional connectivity and human security. The zone borders Homalin Township in Sagaing and areas of Kachin. Amid ongoing conflict and political instability, communities across these areas have faced significant restrictions on movement and access to essential supplies, particularly in areas affected by military checkpoints and blockades. These constraints have disrupted the movement of food and other basic necessities, increasing the vulnerability of communities in remote areas. In response, some communities in Sagaing Region have relied on supplies entering through the Naga border from India. Cross-border connectivity therefore remains an important factor shaping local livelihoods, access to essential goods and human security in the Naga region.
Armed Organisations
The National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) emerged on 31 January 1980, when Isak Chisi Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah and S. S. Khaplang established the organisation in opposition to the 1975 Shillong Accord, which sections of the Naga National Council had signed with the Indian government (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.-a). The NSCN pursued Naga self-determination and sought to unite Naga-inhabited territories in India and Burma with the vision of sovereign Nagalim or People’s Republic of Nagalim (Tajwar, 2026). According to Dahiya (2015), the NSCN split in 1988 when the Isak–Muivah faction broke away from the Khaplang-led faction amid deep mutual suspicions and a massacre in which approximately 140 Tangkhul and Sema cadres were reportedly killed by insurgents loyal to Khaplang, who were predominantly Konyaks. The resulting division gave rise to NSCN-IM, led by Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, and NSCN-K, led by S. S. Khaplang. The split also reflected regional and community-based divisions within the movement. The NSCN-K subsequently established a significant presence in Myanmar’s Naga-inhabited borderlands, which became an important base for its activities and its relations with other armed organisations operating in the region (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.-c).
Map of the Proposed Extent of Nagalim (Source: adapted from the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization)
Several Naga armed organisations are currently reported to be active in the Naga SAZ inside Myanmar, including
NSCN-K-YA (Yung Aung)
NSCN-K-AM (Ang Mai)
NSCN-IM (Isak-Muivah)
NSCN-IM (Eastern Flank)
Naga People’s Defence Force (Naga PDF)
Eastern Naga Defence Army (ENDA)
In addition to Naga armed organisations, armed groups associated with Meitei and Assamese insurgent movements have reportedly maintained a presence in Myanmar’s Naga-inhabited borderlands, which have served as bases for several Indian insurgent groups (The Irrawaddy, 2024). The operational alignments of these organisations vary. NSCN-K-AM and NSCN-IM (Eastern Flank) have reportedly conducted coordinated operations alongside the Myanmar military, whereas the Naga PDF and ENDA have reportedly carried out offensive operations against it (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021; KaPhe’ (In Burmese, ‘ကဖေး’), 2025). Since the 2021 military coup, three clashes have reportedly occurred among NSCN factions, reflecting continuing divisions and competition within the Naga armed movement (Mizzima, 2026a).
Reported Activity Areas Map of Naga Armed Organisations (Source: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies)
1. National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang (Yung Aung) [NSCN-K-YA]
The group is a Naga armed organisation led by Yung Aung and primarily based in Myanmar’s Naga SAZ. Its reported areas of operation include the Naga SAZ and territories along the India–Myanmar border. Sources estimate that the faction had approximately 400–500 cadres, although its current strength remains unclear (Hasnat, 2024). The organisation has continued its armed campaign for Naga self-determination and does not participate in India’s ceasefire arrangements. It has also been reported to maintain links with other armed organisations in Northeast India, including the United Liberation Front of Asom–Independent (ULFA-I) and Manipur’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Hasnat, 2024; Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2020).
The faction has also reportedly been targeted in cross-border military operations. On 13 July 2025, the Indian military was accused of conducting drone strikes against armed-group camps in Nanyun and Lahe townships, Sagaing Region, targeting NSCN-K-YA and ULFA-I positions (The Irrawaddy, 2025). On 20 October 2025, another reported drone strike targeted an NSCN-K-YA base in Lahe Township. According to Myanmar Now (2025), the attack struck Karm Way Lawri village and killed two people, including the 27-year-old son of an NSCN-K leader and an eight-year-old child. These incidents have raised concerns about the effects of cross-border military operations on communities living in the Naga SAZ.
2. National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang (Ang Mai) [NSCN-K-AM]
In January 2019, the Myanmar military seized NSCN-K’s headquarters in Taga village, Nanyun Township, amid allegations that the group supported Assamese and Meitei armed organisations opposing the Indian government (EastMojo, 2019; The Irrawaddy, 2019). On 6 November 2019, 11 NSCN-K members, including Ang Mai, were reportedly sentenced to two years’ imprisonment under Section 17(1) of Myanmar’s Unlawful Associations Act (Southeast Asia Journal, 2019). Colonel Than Naing, spokesperson for the Myanmar military’s Northwest Regional Command (Radio Free Asia, 2019), stated that
“It is a violation of the terms of the preliminary peace agreement reached with the regional government. The main reason is that they have been engaged in military cooperation with Assamese and Meitei armed groups that oppose India. Since this constitutes a breach of those terms, action has been taken against them.”
Reports stated that Myanmar authorities stated that instructed the group to dismantle its bases and continue negotiations within the framework of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (Mizzima, 2019). These events preceded the formation of NSCN-K-AM in 2023. The NSCN-K-AM is a splinter faction of NSCN-K led by retired Major General Ang Mai. The group separated from the Yung Aung-led NSCN-K faction on 2 July 2023 (CNI, 2025c). It operates primarily in Myanmar’s Naga SAZ and neighbouring areas along the India –Myanmar border. Its reported strength remains uncertain, although analysts estimate that the faction had more than 100 fighters in 2024 (Hasnat, 2024).
NSCN-K-AM has sought to strengthen its position in the Naga region while managing relations with other armed organisations and pursuing negotiations with authorities in Myanmar and India. In February 2025, the group reported that it had sent a letter to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), asking it not to enter or interfere in the Naga SAZ. According to CNI News, the faction’s peace committee chairman, U Chin Aung, stated that the group was seeking to maintain regional peace and stability while engaging in discussions with both the Myanmar military and the Indian government (CNI, 2025b).
The faction has also pursued parallel ceasefire initiatives. On 9 February 2025, The Morung Express reported that NSCN-K (Ang Mai) had entered what it described as a bilateral ceasefire process with the Government of India. According to a statement issued by the faction’s Ministry of Information and Publicity, the initiative aimed to create conditions for dialogue and advance the resolution of the Indo-Naga-Myanmar political issue (The Morung Express, 2025). Separately, CNI News reported that NSCN-K-AM had held meetings with Myanmar military representatives during 2024 and subsequently discussed a preliminary bilateral ceasefire agreement with the Sagaing Region government. The group indicated that it intended to retain its identity as a Naga armed organisation rather than transform into a militia or Border Guard Force. As of 5 May 2025, the proposed regional ceasefire had not been formally signed (CNI, 2025a).
Engagement with Myanmar’s military authorities continued in 2026. Myanmar’s Ministry of Information reported that the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) met a delegation from NSCN-K-AM in Nay Pyi Taw to discuss regional stability, socioeconomic development and long-term peacebuilding in the Naga region. The meeting also addressed potential ceasefire arrangements, liaison offices, future high-level talks and coordination with government departments (Ministry of Information, Naypyitaw, 2026).
3. National Socialist Council of Nagalim–Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)
Founded after the split of the mother organisation NSCN in 1988, the NSCN-IM is one of the principal Naga armed and political organisations. Historically led by Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, the organisation pursues Naga self-determination and the establishment of Nagalim, combining Naga-inhabited territories. The group primarily operates in the NE region of India, especially in Nagaland. It also maintains a significant presence inside the Naga SAZ of Burma (Singh, 2020).
The NSCN-IM maintains a hierarchical political and military structure under its central leadership, historically headed by Chairman Isak Chisi Swu and General Secretary Thuingaleng Muivah. Its political administration operates through the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN), comprising nine ministries: four principal ministries responsible for defence, home affairs, finance and foreign affairs, and five others covering education, information and publicity, forests and minerals, law and justice, and religious affairs. Administratively, its areas of influence are divided into 11 regions, extending governance to town and village levels. Its military wing, the Naga Army, reportedly comprises one brigade and six battalions, with an estimated 4,500 personnel, alongside specialised mobile units and local commands (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.-b).
In June 2026, the NSCN-IM Joint Council reaffirmed its collective leadership under Chairman Q. Tuccu, Vice-Chairman Tongmeth Wangnao, General Secretary and Ato Kilonser Th. Muivah, and Deputy Ato Kilonser V. S. Atem (Morung Express, 2026b). However, in July 2026, the Eastern Flank declared a provisional government under Ikato I. Chishi Swu, indicating significant internal divisions over leadership and the organisation’s political direction (NE NOW NEWS, 2026). On 3 August 2015, the Government of India and the NSCN signed the Framework Agreement to establish a basis for further negotiations towards a political settlement (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2015a). NSCN-IM’s published version refers to sharing sovereign power through negotiated competencies and an “enduring inclusive new relationship of peaceful co-existence of the two entities” (Singh, 2020). The organisation has also demanded recognition of a separate Naga national flag and constitution.
4. National Socialist Council of Nagalim–Isak-Muivah (Eastern Flank)
The Western and Eastern Flanks of the Naga Army were split in September 2019 with the aim of strengthening its military capacity amid pressure from the Government of India (GoI) to conclude negotiations without a separate Naga flag and constitution. The Eastern Flank later criticised the NSCN-IM’s central leadership for failing to take necessary political action during this period. According to a 2025 report, the group is operating in Yangnwe Village in Leshi Township.
Former leader Lt. Gen. (Retd.) H.S. Ramsan has had a complex relationship with India and other armed actors in Myanmar. A local news outlet covering the NE region of India claims that Ramsan was on a “most wanted list” by Indian authorities and to have operated in Myanmar after leaving India (Mirror Desk, 2026). In 2022, his faction reportedly cooperated with the Myanmar military in operations against resistance forces in Homalin and Tamu townships (KaPhe’ (In Burmese, ‘ကဖေး’), 2025). On 13 January 2025, a letter attributed to Lt. Gen. (Retd.) H. S. Ramsan, commander of the Eastern Flank, NSCN-IM Naga Army, expressed the faction’s willingness to cooperate with National Unity Government (NUG) Prime Minister Mahn Win Khaing Than and support the struggle against Myanmar’s military junta (Naga Voice – နာဂအသံ, 2025). However, the letter’s authenticity could not be independently verified, and no official NUG response was identified in the sources reviewed.
In April 2025, Ikato I. Chishi Swu, son of the late NSCN-IM co-founder Isak Chishi Swu, reportedly broke with the organisation’s central leadership amid growing internal tensions (Manipur Update, 2025a). The split became more explicit in July 2026, when the Eastern Flank appointed Ikato as chairman of a nine-member team tasked with forming a provisional government following a meeting, which the group named the “Extraordinary Joint Emergency Meeting” at Mt. Horeb Camp in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region (Morung Express, 2026c). The meeting was chaired by Lt Gen (Retd) Hs Ramsan. The meeting formed the “Provisional Government” in the following structure.
Organisational structure of the Provisional Government of NSCN-IM Eastern Flank (Source: Design created based on information from Morung Express)
The faction declared that the spirit of the 1997 ceasefire agreement with the Government of India had “ceased to exist” and criticised the central leadership for allegedly compromising the Naga political position in negotiations (Eastern Mirror News, 2026; NE NOW NEWS, 2026). Both the NSCN-IM (Eastern Flank) and the NSCN-K-YA use the name Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim (GPRN) for their administrative structures, although they use different logos to represent their respective organisations.
Alongside these political developments, the security dynamics surrounding the Eastern Flank, particularly the reported attack on its Mt. Horeb Camp, provide important context for understanding the faction’s evolving position. On 7 October 2026, India and Myanmar held their third Defence Cooperation Meeting in Guwahati, reviewing existing defence initiatives and discussing further cooperation in training, capacity-building and mutual security (The Economic Times, 2026). Four days later, the Eastern Flank alleged that drones had dropped approximately 60 bombs on Mt. Horeb Camp, damaging parts of the site. Although the faction initially reported no casualties, subsequent reporting indicated that three cadres were injured. The perpetrators have not been independently confirmed (Ukhrul Times, 2026; Rural Post, 2026).
5. Naga People’s Defence Force (Naga PDF) and PaKaPha
Naga PDF was formed on 20 June 2021 by the young people of Naga in collaboration with Shan, Chin and Bamar communities in response to Myanmar’s military coup (NPDF, n.d.). It is reported to operate as the No. 1 Battalion of Naga District under the NUG Ministry of Defence. In a March 2024 interview with Kachin News Group, NPDF official Bo Lin Yone stated that the force was fighting for federalism, equality and individual rights and had maintained an alliance with the Kachin Independence Organisation/Army (KIO/KIA) since December 2022. The group also participated alongside the KIA in fighting around Selzin. More recently, CNI Myanmar reported the opening of basic military training in the Naga region. Naga PDF operates alongside Naga People Defence Organisations (locally known as PaKaPha) of the NUG. PaKaPha are also active across townships within Naga SAZ (The Voice of Spring, 2026). Naga PDF is reportedly active in Hkamti Township in Sagaing Region and Hpakant Township in Kachin State.
6. Eastern Naga National Organisation (ENNO)/Eastern Naga Defence Army (ENDA)
The ENDA is the armed wing of ENNO. According to its General Secretary Eno Jimi Naga, the group was established on 4 November 2021 in response to the military coup in 2021 (Kachin News Group, 2023). ISP Myanmar Peace Desk claims that ENDA is a rebranded entity resulting from a joint initiative between former NSCN-K officials and Naga legislators from the NLD (ISP Myanmar Peace Desk, 2024). However, individuals close to ENNO reportedly stated that most of the NLD legislators subsequently ceased participating in the organisation (CNI, 2025d). The organisation’s political and military structures are commonly referred to in its public statements as the ENNO/ENDA Government (Eastern Naga Defence Army, 2023b).
The organisation was established under the leadership of R. S. Awng Sai, a former lieutenant colonel in the NSCN-K who was reportedly dismissed from that organisation. He was among the group of eleven NSCN-K officials who were imprisoned in 2019 under Section 17(1) of the Unlawful Association Act in Burma (Wai Mar Tun, 2019). Within ENDA, he is identified as a lieutenant general and serves as the force’s leader (Eastern Naga Defence Army, 2024). An ENDA statement dated 30 March 2023 reportedly confirmed that the organisation held a ceremony to arm its first batch of trained recruits in 2022 (Eastern Naga Defence Army, 2023a). The organisation is run by a central committee with departments operating under it. The reported officeholders include Eno Jimi Naga as General Secretary and San Waung Moses as the person responsible for media and information. The organisation has also established a central liaison office in Laiza, Kachin State, and reportedly receives weapons and ammunition support from the KIA. Its principal areas of operation include Hkamti Township and the Naga SAZ, where it has reportedly conducted operations against Myanmar’s military alongside the KIA and other resistance forces. Its current territorial reach and operational capacity, however, remain difficult to establish independently.
Beyond its military activities, ENNO/ENDA has articulated a political programme centred on ending military dictatorship, protecting ethnic rights and establishing a federal union. In February 2025, the organisation announced that it had prepared, since December 2023, the Interim Political Arrangement of Nagaland, a proposed framework to guide interim political arrangements in the eastern Naga region (Eastern Naga Defence Army, 2025). The arrangement was prepared within a month of the parliaments of Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay federal units enacting laws to establish interim political arrangements in their respective territories in late November 2023. Nevertheless, the content of the proposed framework and the extent of its implementation remain unclear, as ENNO/ENDA has not yet publicly released the document.
Border Dynamics and Naga Armed Groups
India’s plan to fence its 1,643-kilometre border with Myanmar has raised concerns among Naga communities whose social, cultural and economic ties span the border (Choudhury, 2024; Mohta, 2025). The Indian government cites security concerns, including insurgency and drug trafficking, while restrictions on the Free Movement Regime (FMR) have prompted opposition from Naga organisations (Press Information Bureau, 2024; The New Indian Express, 2025). On 26 August 2025, eleven representatives of the United Naga Council (UNC), the Naga Women’s Union (NWU) and the All Naga Students’ Association Manipur (ANSAM) met Indian central government officials in New Delhi to discuss border fencing and the Free Movement Regime (FMR). The talks ended without agreement, as the Naga delegation called for the restoration of the FMR and a halt to border fencing (The New Indian Express, 2025; IANS, 2025). No information on the participation of Myanmar-based Naga groups was found. At the Pansaung–Nampong crossing, which connects Nanyun Township of Naga SAZ with Arunachal Pradesh of India, the border market reopened on 30 July 2026 after more than six years of closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the military coup. Cross-border movement, however, remains restricted, with only 30 people per day permitted to enter India for shopping and visits (Mizzima, 2026b). Border fencing has also prompted opposition from Myanmar-based Naga organisations, which argue that it threatens Indigenous land rights and divides communities (Mizzima, 2025).
On 26 March 2026, the NSCN-K-YA claimed responsibility for an attack on a 10th Assam Rifles construction team reportedly engaged in border-fencing work along the Namgoi–Pansaung Road near Pansaung Pass, Arunachal Pradesh. The group claimed that three personnel were killed. However, Indian security officials disputed the reported fatalities, stating that one Assam Rifles personnel was injured and that no deaths had been confirmed (Ajum, 2026; B. Singh, 2026; Nagaland Post, 2026). The GoI signed the Framework Agreement with the NSCN-IM on 3 August 2015. In contrast, on 16 September 2015, the Indian government declared the NSCN-K an unlawful organisation for five years, citing its continued attacks on Indian security personnel from bases in Myanmar (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2015a, 2015b). Its faction – NSCN-K (AM), however, has reportedly pursued peace negotiations with both the Myanmar military regime and the GoI (CNI, 2026b; Kalita, 2026). By contrast, no comparable public reporting confirms that the NSCN-IM (Eastern Flank), the ENNO/ENDA, or the Naga PDF has participated in these formal peace talks. With that said, it should also be noted that India maintains security and defence cooperation with Myanmar’s military regime, particularly on border security and counterinsurgency. This cooperation could affect Myanmar-based Naga armed groups’ freedom of movement and cross-border operations, depending on its implementation.
Beyond border security, access to critical minerals is another important dimension of India’s strategic interests and its relations with armed actors along the border. India seeks to diversify its rare-earth supply chains and reduce dependence on China, which dominates global rare-earth processing. In this context, Kachin State’s rare-earth deposits could offer potential opportunities for India, particularly as the KIO/KIA exercises greater control over key mining areas, including Chipwi and Pangwa. The KIO/KIA influence over mining operations, taxation and exports could therefore have implications for future regional trade and India’s access to these resources. However, Myanmar’s rare-earth exports remain heavily oriented towards China, while alternative routes to India face logistical and security challenges (Banerjee, 2026; ISP-Myanmar, 2025). Although potential trade with India could diversify the KIO/KIA’s export markets and strengthen its financial position, no confirmed supply agreement has been established. India’s interests in border security and critical minerals thus illustrate two distinct but potentially interconnected dimensions of its engagement with Myanmar, with possible implications for armed groups’ economic resources and regional influence.
Political Parties in Naga SAZ
In the 2020 general election, the principal parties competing in Naga SAZ were;
National League for Democracy (NLD),
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and
Naga National Party (NNP).
The Union Betterment Party (UBP) also fielded candidates, which later dissolved itself by its founding chairman, U Shwe Man after the military coup in 2021. In the 2020 general election, each township of Naga SAZ (Lahe, Leshi and Nanyun) had one Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) constituency, for a total of three constituencies. In the Sagaing Region Hluttaw, each township was divided into two constituencies, for a total of six. It also includes Sagaing Region Constituency No. 12 for the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities).
The NLD won seven of the nine township-based constituencies examined in the Pyithu Hluttaw and Sagaing Region Hluttaw, while the USDP won two. In the Pyithu Hluttaw, the NLD won in Leshi and Nanyun, while the USDP won in Lahe. In the Sagaing Region Hluttaw, the NLD secured both seats in Leshi and Nanyun, as well as one seat in Lahe. The USDP won the remaining seat in Lahe Township. NLD won Sagaing Region Constituency No. 12 for the Amyotha Hluttaw. These results indicate that the NLD secured most of the seats across the township-based constituencies covered by the report, while the USDP retained representation in Lahe.
The NNP contested constituencies across all three townships and both legislatures but did not win any of the nine township-based seats examined. Nevertheless, its candidates received notable shares of the vote. In the Pyithu Hluttaw, the NNP received between 18.55 and 22.62 per cent of the vote across the three townships. In the Sagaing Region Hluttaw, its candidates received between 14.80 and 24.63 per cent across the six constituencies. After the 2021 coup and military crackdown on political parties, the NNP re-registered and later contested the junta-orchestrated 2025 election.
Junta-appointed Union Election Commission approved NNP registration on 30 May 2023 (Source: Ministry of Information, Naypyitaw, 2023)
The table summarises the election results in 2020.
Election Results in the 2020 General Elections (Source: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, National Unity Government of Myanmar, 2024)
Naga SAZ and KIO/KIA
The historical relationship between the KIA and Naga armed movements has been influenced by the shifting strategic interests of China, India and Myanmar. From 1966, the KIA facilitated Naga fighters’ journeys to China, where they received military training and weapons, and later provided some Naga armed groups with bases, training and arms. However, between 1990 and 1992, India’s intelligence agency reportedly supplied weapons to the KIA in exchange for its commitment to cease providing bases, weapons and training to Naga and other northeastern Indian armed groups. Following the KIA’s ceasefire with Myanmar’s military government in 1994, its support for these groups reportedly declined further (Bhaumik, 2009). More recently, the KIA has supported Naga resistance forces operating in Kachin State and Sagaing Region. The NPDF, formed in 2021, has conducted military activities in alliance with the KIA since 2022 (Kachin News Group, 2023).
Tensions over territorial authority became more explicit in February 2025, when the NSCN-K (AM) reportedly asked the KIA not to enter or interfere in the Naga SAZ. The faction argued that it was seeking to maintain regional stability while pursuing peace negotiations. These tensions were further highlighted in July 2025, when the Naga Students’ Organisation in Lahe demanded the release of 16 NSCN-K (YA) members reportedly captured by the KIA (Manipur Update, 2025b). In February 2026, the dispute intensified after KIA leader Lieutenant-General Gun Maw referred to a proposed “Naga Unit” as part of a wider strategy involving Kachin, Chin and other areas of Sagaing Region. The NSCN-K (AM) rejected the “Naga Unit” designation, arguing that the Naga struggle remains focused on achieving independence. It also expressed concerns about ethnocentrism and stressed that the Nagas and Kachins have historically lived together as brothers (CNI, 2026a). The proposed “Naga Unit” could therefore intensify disputes over territorial control and political representation by raising questions about who has the authority to govern Naga areas in Myanmar and represent Naga political aspirations. It could also deepen tensions between the NSCN-K (AM) and the KIO/KIA over political autonomy, ethnic identity and the future of Naga–Kachin relations.
Naga SAZ and Sagaing Federal Unit
Under the 2025 Constitution, the Sagaing Federal Unit Government was formed in late 2025, with legislative, executive and judicial powers established as separate branches of government (Section 6). Section 7 further provides for the sharing of powers among the Federal Unit Government, the Naga SAZ Government and local governments. However, the territorial boundaries of Sagaing remain unchanged from those in place at the time of the 2020 General Election, as defined under the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar (Section 44). Accordingly, the three townships comprising the Naga SAZ – Leshi, Lahe and Nanyun – retain their existing territorial boundaries (Section 46). In addition, Section 47 constitutionalises the right of indigenous peoples in Sagaing to self-determination, including through self-administered zones, subject to two conditions: territorial contiguity and conformity with future political agreements on state-building.
The extent of the Naga SAZ’s autonomy is further defined by its relationship with the legislative institutions of Sagaing. Under Section 59(b), the SAZ may draft bills, but these must be submitted to the Sagaing Federal Unit Parliament for consideration and passage in accordance with the Parliament’s rules and procedures. This arrangement allows the Naga SAZ to initiate legislation while retaining the Federal Unit Parliament’s authority over its formal enactment. Legislative autonomy is therefore exercised within a broader institutional framework in which powers are shared between the SAZ and the Federal Unit.
The Constitution also establishes a framework for forming the Naga SAZ’s Interim Government, linking its composition to both political representation and the 2020 electoral mandate. The government is to comprise seven members, including a Chief Administrator and a Deputy Chief Administrator (Section 86). Section 87 identifies six categories of eligible participants in its formation:
Sagaing Federal Unit Hluttaw representatives elected in the 2020 multi-party general election who do not cooperate with the terrorist coup regime.
Representatives of political parties.
Representatives of ethnic groups.
Civil servants participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).
Members of the Strike Forces.
Other relevant individuals.
Although this framework provides for participation by a range of political and social actors, Section 88 assigns a decisive role in selecting the seven-member government to eligible Hluttaw representatives elected in 2020 from the Naga SAZ who do not cooperate with the military junta. The arrangement thus combines broader participation in government formation with an electoral basis for executive selection. Regarding the judiciary, the Sagaing Federal Unit Constitution recognises the Naga SAZ’s authority to establish its own courts (Section 123(b)). It also permits the application of customary legal practices, provided that they do not contradict international human rights standards (Section 135).
To our observation, the Sagaing Federal Unit has not established administrative or judicial authorities for the Naga SAZ since its formation in late 2025. One possible explanation is that Sagaing’s political leadership is adopting a cautious and conflict-sensitive approach to the Naga SAZ, particularly in light of the KIO’s position on the proposed Naga Federal Unit and the 3K area (Kantbalu, Kathar and Kawlin). The political position of the KIO-trained ENDA is another factor that may shape this relationship. ENDA has stated that it has established its own interim political arrangement (Eastern Naga Defence Army, 2025), alongside the interim constitutional framework of Sagaing Federal Unit. This raises questions about whether ENDA intends to operate within Sagaing’s emerging political structure or pursue a separate interim arrangement.
The role of Naga elected Members of Parliament in shaping this relationship also remains unclear. Eight representatives from the NLD were elected in the Naga SAZ in the 2020 general election and secured seats in the Union and regional parliaments. Their engagement with the emerging institutions of Sagaing Federal Unit, however, has yet to be clarified. This is politically significant because, under the interim constitutional framework, they may hold substantial influence over decisions concerning the Naga SAZ’s institutional status and the exercise of its autonomy. Their participation, or lack thereof, could therefore affect the formation of the SAZ’s administrative and judicial authorities, as well as the broader relationship between Naga SAZ and Sagaing Federal Unit.
Political Authority, Representation and the Future
Competing sources of authority, political representation and different ambitions for self-determination shape the Naga SAZ’s political landscape today. Currently, elected representatives, established armed and political organisations, and emerging groups derive their political mandates through different pathways. However, they do not necessarily share a common vision of governance. The Naga SAZ, also commonly referred to as the eastern flank in Naga political discourse, represents only a small part of the broader Naga vision held by many armed and political groups. India, or New Delhi, remains a critical factor in understanding the Naga issue as a whole. In that sense, the Naga SAZ is a geopolitical nexus between the two countries – India and Burma (Myanmar). There is, however, no clearly established mechanism through which these actors can reconcile their political objectives and determine the future of the Naga people or the Naga SAZ.
With the emergence of federal units, particularly Sagaing, new questions arise. Would the Sagaing Federal Unit offer a solution, or a political pathway towards a solution, to the existing complexities within the Naga SAZ? With this in mind, it is vitally important to understand that the current arrangements within the federal units in central Burma (better known locally as Ah Nyar) are temporary; they are not yet transitional. Although the interim constitutional (or political) arrangements may be complex in their language and interpretation, the immediate objective of these emerging federal units, including Sagaing, can generally be summarised as consolidating sub-national governance and political groupings. Constitutionally, the Sagaing Federal Unit is notably cautious in its approach to ethnic minority issues, including those concerning the Naga people or the Naga SAZ. It retains the existing territorial boundaries (as of 2020, before the military coup). At the same time, Sagaing is constitutionally committed to the right to self-determination, particularly for ethnic minorities. It is important to note here that successive governments of Burma (Myanmar) have been relatively cautious and silent on this particular right within the international legal framework, given the decades-long ethnic liberation movement. When the NLD administration ratified the United Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it reserved its position on Article (1) of the Covenant concerning the right to self-determination. This, however, was not unique to the NLD administration. This constitutional commitment marks a politically significant departure from the historical caution of successive governments towards the right to self-determination. However, this alone is not a remedy for the protracted identity conflicts and liberation struggles within the Naga community or the Naga SAZ. Therefore, how the Sagaing Federal Unit brings actors on the ground into its political process becomes important.
The eight NLD representatives elected from Naga SAZ constituencies in the 2020 general election retain a potentially significant electoral mandate, although their current engagement in the evolving political landscape remains unclear. The Naga PDF and township-based PaKaPha (People’s Defence Teams) operate under the authority of the NUG Ministry of Defence through Regional Command 1. Their role in supporting the five representative blocs of the Sagaing Federal Unit to establish sub-national governance in the Naga SAZ remains an open question. This process is further complicated by the ongoing transition of NUG mechanisms, including healthcare, education and administration, to the emerging federal units in Sagaing and Magway. Moreover, Regional Command 1, led by a KIA-appointed regional commander, may have limited incentives to facilitate this process, particularly if it conflicts with the KIO/KIA’s political interests in the Naga region.
Meanwhile, ENNO/ENDA’s interim political arrangement and the distinct political objectives of Naga armed organisations indicate that political institution-building is proceeding through multiple channels. This creates a potential divergence between electoral representation, armed influence and emerging institutional authority. Without mechanisms to connect these sources of legitimacy, competing political arrangements may reinforce fragmentation rather than produce a broadly accepted framework for self-governance.
Regional relationships further complicate this process. The KIO/KIA’s proposed “Naga Unit” has exposed disagreements over territorial authority and the political future of Naga-inhabited areas. The NNP’s move towards participation in the junta-orchestrated 2025 elections adds another dimension to the existing complexities within the Naga SAZ. The NNP did not secure any seats in the Naga SAZ constituencies in the 2020 general election. Among the four parties in the Naga SAZ, the NLD and UBP abandoned their previous political pathways by moving away from the military junta, while the NNP chose a different course by participating in the junta-orchestrated elections.
The future political trajectory of the Naga SAZ will therefore depend on whether its diverse actors can translate their respective sources of influence into an agreed framework for representation and governance. Without such an agreement, parallel institutional initiatives and competing claims to authority may persist, limiting political coordination and weakening the legitimacy of emerging governance structures.
Conclusion
The Naga political landscape constitutes a complex intersection of armed competition, political fragmentation and competing approaches to self-determination. Although six Naga armed organisations are identified in this analysis, their strategic alignments and relationships with the Myanmar military, resistance forces and the KIO/KIA differ significantly. Cooperation on the battlefield does not necessarily translate into political unity, as these organisations maintain distinct interests and positions regarding territorial authority and the future political status of the Naga region or the Naga SAZ. Similar divisions characterise Naga political parties and organisations. The NNP participation in the junta-orchestrated elections in 2025, alongside ENNO/ENDA’s pursuit of an interim political arrangement, illustrates divergent approaches to political engagement, representation and institution-building.
These intra-Naga dynamics are further complicated by regional political differences, particularly over the relationship between the Naga SAZ, Sagaing Federal Unit and the KIO/KIA. Disagreements over territorial jurisdiction, political representation and the proposed Naga Unit introduce another dimension to an already fragmented political landscape.
Geopolitically, the Naga SAZ occupies a distinctive position between India and Myanmar. Although it remains a peripheral territory that successive governments in Myanmar have historically given limited attention, it carries broader security and political significance for New Delhi and India’s northeastern states. Despite their differences, Naga armed and political actors share a recurring aspiration for a distinct political status, sometimes expressed through the vision of a Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim, extending Naga-inhabited areas across northeastern India and Myanmar. The central question is whether this shared aspiration can bridge organisational divisions and competing regional or international interests to produce a coherent political project.
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17 October 2026

The Price of Passage: Checkpoints Taxation and Everyday Survival in Sagaing

Across conflict-affected Sagaing, the cost of movement is shaped not only by distance and fuel, but by checkpoints, competing authorities and emerging systems of taxation. The central question is not simply who controls the road, but whether the power exercised there is predictable, respectful and publicly accountable.

The road as an institution

In wartime Sagaing, governance is often encountered on the road before it is encountered in an office or policy document. It appears through vehicle inspections, questions about destinations, demands for payment, municipal levies and the different treatment of private cars, passenger vehicles and commercial trucks. Some payments follow recognisable rates. Others depend on the person standing at the gate and the balance of power between checkpoint personnel and travellers.

Checkpoints are therefore more than security installations. They are places where territorial authority, public revenue, informal extraction and everyday negotiation meet. Their costs also travel beyond the gate. A payment initially made by a driver or trader may later reappear in passenger fares, transport charges and the prices of rice, medicine, fuel and agricultural inputs.

Local accounts indicate that private vehicles travelling between rural townships and Monywa may encounter several SAC [military junta] checkpoints in a single journey. A commonly reported charge is 2,000 MMK [ approximately 0.5 USD] per checkpoint for an ordinary private vehicle, with an additional municipal wheel tax when entering Monywa. On a route with four checkpoints, the direct cost can reach 9,000 MMK [approximately 2 USD] one way and 18,000 MMK [approximately 4.5 USD] for a return journey. Passenger express vehicles and commercial trucks may face different charges according to their use and the goods carried.

Drivers describe the 2,000 MMK payment at SAC checkpoints as a routine understood by both sides. What is not predictable is the treatment that accompanies it. Local accounts suggest that encounters can depend on the mood and behaviour of individual soldiers, including whether they have been drinking. The amount may therefore be standardised through repetition while the exercise of authority remains personalised and potentially coercive.

Written policy and uneven practice

Collections by pro-democracy authorities require a different but equally careful analysis. The National Unity Government has established revenue and taxation arrangements for areas under its administration, including township-level collection through People’s Administration Teams, commonly known as Pa Ah Pha. In Sagaing, an announced schedule identifies ten commodity categories and applies rates according to the type, quantity or stated value of goods transported.

Rural road connecting villages in Wetlet township, Sagaing [Photo: Let Pan Ni]

This commodity schedule is directed mainly at vehicles transporting goods for commercial purposes. It is separate from the 2,000 MMK checkpoint payment reported for an ordinary private vehicle. Receipts are mandatory under the announced arrangement. No general exemption has been identified, although formal authorization from the relevant authorities may exempt a particular consignment.

Commodity	Taxable unit or basis	Rate
Fuel	Per gallon	100 MMK
Cow or buffalo	Per animal	5,000 MMK
Goat or sheep	Per animal	1,000 MMK
CP chicken	Per bird	300 MMK
Cement	Per bag	500 MMK
Rebar	Per ton	30,000 MMK
Alcohol or beer	Total value	3 percent
Motorcycle	Per motorcycle	30,000 MMK
Mineral	Load carried	20 per cent
Furniture	Load carried	20 per cent

The schedule provides an institutional basis for collection, but a written policy does not guarantee consistent practice. For mineral and furniture loads, for example, the stated 20 per cent rate requires a clear and publicly understood method for determining taxable value. Consistency also depends on whether rates are displayed, receipts are issued, collectors can be identify,ed and the same goods are protected from repeated assessment across administrative areas.

Local residents often distinguish between the legitimacy of contributing and the conduct of the person collecting. Many people on the ground express support for NUG and Pa Ah Pha taxation because they believe their payments help sustain the revolution. At the same time, that support is weakened when toll-gate personnel communicate poorly or address travellers in an unnecessarily authoritative manner. Public willingness to contribute is not unconditional acceptance of how authority is exercised.

This is why respectful explanation, visible rates and mandatory receipts are not minor administrative details. They influence whether taxation is experienced as participation in a shared political project or simply as another roadside order. Pro-democracy institutions should not be judged only against the arbitrary conduct of SAC checkpoints. They should be judged against the democratic and accountable governance they seek to establish.

Fuel prices are set along the road

The checkpoint economy cannot be separated from fuel. Motorcycles, small vehicles and trucks are essential to everyday life across Ah Nyar. They connect farmers to fields, patients to treatment, traders to markets and volunteers to emergency response. During fighting, they also enable evacuation, movement along safer routes and the delivery of food and medicine.

Local market reports from late August and early September 2026 placed fuel at approximately 8,000 MMK per litre in Kantbalu and 7,000 MMK in Depayin. Informal prices in Monywa and Mandalay ranged from 6,000 to 7,000 MMK, compared with an official dealer price of about 4,300 MMK per litre. At the highest reported price, consumers were paying almost 86 per cent more than the official rate.

The difference in cost/price cannot be attributed to checkpoint payments alone. It reflects restricted official distribution, transport risk, road conditions, scarcity, storage costs, conflict disruption and trader margins. Yet these factors share one feature: they accumulate through movement. Fuel must be purchased, loaded, transported, inspected and moved through areas where authority and security conditions change. Its price is therefore produced along the road, not only at the point of sale.

Scarcity also redistributes economic power. Traders with capital, storage and transport connections can purchase fuel while routes remain open and sell when supplies become scarce. This may create profitable activity without producing broad-based prosperity. An active fuel market can reconcile with declining household welfare, especially when ordinary families and small farmers must pay higher prices without similar opportunities to profit.

Paddy machinery and the wider conflict economy

If fuel is a strategic commodity in northern Sagaing, paddy and rice are central to the political economy of Shwebo District. Paddy must move between fields, villages, mills, storage sites, towns and markets. Checkpoint charges, commodity taxes, fuel prices and route closures influence the farm-gate price received by producers, the operating costs of millers and transporters, and the final price paid by consumers.

Agricultural machinery and energy services remain essential even during war. Farmers need harvesters, tractors, pumps, engines, spare parts and repair services. Communities without reliable electricity increasingly rely on solar systems for homes, water pumping, tube wells, rice mills and small businesses. Transport and risk costs can make these productive assets unaffordable even when they are available elsewhere in the country.

Conflict also expands markets for goods that are not equally beneficial to community welfare. Local accounts and secondary reporting describe increased trade in weapons, ammunition, drugs and other conflict-related materials. Markets for four-wheel-drive and heavy-engine vehicles have grown partly because armed actors need mobility on damaged roads and difficult terrain. The same vehicles and engines may also support farming, emergency response and civilian transport, making the civilian and conflict economies increasingly difficult to separate.

Taxation must carry public responsibility

The need for revenue in resistance-controlled areas is real. Township administrations require resources to provide services, respond to emergencies and maintain institutions under extreme pressure. The question is not whether local authorities may collect revenue, but how collection can become legitimate, coordinated and publicly accountable.

A credible system should identify the collecting authority, display the applicable rates, issue standard receipts and record how revenue is used. Coordination is necessary so that the same consignment is not repeatedly taxed during one journey. Special attention is also required for food, medicine, agricultural inputs and emergency supplies. If costs rise at every territorial boundary, revenue collection may unintentionally weaken food security, health access and local businesses.

The SAC and the pro-democracy movement do not occupy identical political or moral positions. SAC checkpoints are part of a coercive military system that seized state power, while pro-democracy institutions claim authority through resistance and democratic aspiration. That difference makes accountability more important, not less. A movement seeking to construct a different state must demonstrate that public authority can be exercised differently.

For most people in Sagaing, governance is not first experienced through national announcements. It is experienced when they move a sick relative, carry paddy to a mill, bring fuel into a village or travel to market. The conduct of checkpoint personnel, the predictability of a charge and the availability of a receipt may shape public trust more directly than a policy document.

A more accountable revenue system would not remove the costs of war. It could, however, prevent public taxation from becoming another unpredictable burden within it. The road is already helping to finance emerging authorities. The challenge is to ensure that this authority becomes transparent, coordinated and answerable to the communities whose movement and survival sustain it.

Sources and evidence

This commentary draws on anonymised local accounts and market observations from central Sagaing during late August to early September 2026, together with official NUG policy documents. Prices and checkpoint charges are time-specific and may vary with security, availability and local practice.

National Unity Government Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment. Announcement 4/2022 on tax voucher forms. Official announcement
National Unity Government Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment. Enacted laws, including the Union Taxation Law 2021. Official enacted laws page

Let Pan Ni is an independent researcher specialising in the social dynamics of Myanmar’s central dry zone (Ah Nyar). Her research focuses on bridging the gap between realities on the ground and international policy frameworks. The views and analyses presented in this commentary are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Centre for Ah Nyar Studies.

19 September 2026

Living Alongside War: When Conflict Becomes Everyday Life for Ah Nyar Women – A case study from THE VILLAGE in Sagaing Region

Living Alongside War: When Conflict Becomes Everyday Life for Ah Nyar Women – A case study from THE VILLAGE in Sagaing Region

Rural Women of THE VILLAGE in Sagaing Region (Photo: Let Pan Ni)

The crisis did not create women’s agency from nothing. It tested, expanded and made visible the economic judgement, courage and community responsibility that Ah Nyar women already possessed. War entered every part of an ordinary woman’s life, and she quietly developed the knowledge and economic strategies needed to keep her family alive.
In the last week of August 2026, shortly after severe flooding affected large parts of Sagaing Region, I returned to my native village in Sagaing. By then, the village had come under the control of pro-democracy resistance forces associated with the National Unity Government’s Ministry of Defence. What struck me most was not only the visible impact of conflict, but how my aunts, uncles and cousins had learned to continue their everyday lives amid frequent, sometimes daily, airstrikes and the continuing threat of ground raids.
As is customary in Ah Nyar society, we sat together and talked about our families and what had happened during the five years since the attempted military coup. Through these conversations, I began to understand more deeply how my female cousins had confronted dangers and hardships that would previously have been unimaginable to them.
One cousin’s experience stayed particularly strongly with me. She runs a small clothing shop in the village market. She is married to a local man who operates a vehicle-repair workshop, and they have a teenage daughter. Before the conflict, she lived what might be considered an ordinary and relatively comfortable life. The youngest daughter in a family of five children, she graduated from a university in Monywa, married a man from her village and settled into family life. She sold clothes, helped sustain the household and occasionally travelled to Monywa or Mandalay. Her aspirations were modest and grounded in the rhythms of everyday Ah Nyar life.
That life changed profoundly in late 2023.
One afternoon, while her husband was away, SAC [military junta] soldiers entered her compound. My cousin was at home with her 83-year-old father and her 15-year-old daughter. The soldiers suddenly dragged all three outside and ordered them to walk towards the police station. Meanwhile, other soldiers began setting fire to her house.
Inside the house was approximately MMK 34.5 million – 345 lakh – set aside to cover the costs associated with harvesting their paddy fields. It represented the income and productive investment on which the family would depend for the entire year. As the house began to burn, she understood that losing this money could destroy their ability to recover. Survival, for her, did not mean only escaping with her life. It also meant preserving the resources her family would need to continue living afterwards.
Gathering her courage, she told one of the soldiers that she and her daughter had been taken outside without even having time to put on their slippers. She asked for permission to go back inside. When the soldier nodded, she grasped her daughter’s hand and ran into the burning house.
Inside, she broke open a locked wardrobe and retrieved the bag containing the money. She also collected her husband’s driving licence, their vehicle documents, their citizenship cards and other essential papers. These were not merely possessions. The vehicle and its documents were directly connected to the family’s income, while their identity cards would be essential if they were displaced or forced to pass through checkpoints.
A three-storey reinforced-concrete building stood beside their house, separated from it by a narrow space along a brick wall. She hid the money and documents in this small gap, hoping the fire would not reach them.
At that moment, she and her daughter might have attempted to escape. But her elderly father had already been taken towards the police station. She feared that he would not know what had happened to them and would believe they had been injured or killed. Her daughter was crying and pleading not to return to the soldiers, but my cousin insisted that they could not abandon her father. Whatever happened, she said, the family must remain together.
They returned and were held at the police station until midnight. They were released around dawn the following morning. My cousin understood that the presence of her 83-year-old father and 15-year-old daughter had contributed to their release.
While running through the burning house, my cousin had struck her arm against a wall. In the intensity of the moment, she had not even felt the injury. She noticed it only after reaching the police station. When I visited her almost three years later, she showed me the large, uneven scar that remained on her arm.
Since that incident, her family has lived in a state of constant alertness. They built a small bomb shelter behind their house and have become accustomed to moving back and forth between their beds and the shelter, sometimes twice in a single day. Airstrikes, warnings and the possibility of another ground raid have become part of the routine through which they organise everyday life.
Nevertheless, whenever conditions permit, she continues opening her clothing shop. Her reasoning is simple and practical: if the family is forced to flee again, they will need money to survive and establish themselves elsewhere.
When pro-democracy resistance forces prepared to take control of the village, residents reportedly received only three hours’ notice to evacuate. Because her family owned a car, my cousin managed to load some of the clothes from her shop before leaving. They sought safety in a nearby village, where her mother was born. Even while displaced, she remained economically active. She began selling the clothes she had brought to people in the host village. She later told me with pride that she had earned approximately MMK 8.5 million – 85 lakh – during the period of displacement.
After the resistance forces took control of her village, the family returned home and resumed its livelihood. Yet their return did not mean that security had been restored. Airstrikes continued, and the risk of road raids remained. She now understands warnings communicated through walkie-talkies and can interpret the reported direction of approaching aircraft. She explained that if a warning mentions the northeast of Budalin, the aircraft may be heading towards the village. “If you hear that,” she cautioned me, “find somewhere safe immediately.”
She now keeps an emergency bag ready because she does not know when the family may have to run again. She is also conscious that SAC [military junta] forces might attempt to retake the village. Preparedness, mobility and the ability to read rapidly changing risks have become part of her daily knowledge.
As I listened, I found myself looking at my cousin differently. Before the conflict, she was an ordinary Ah Nyar woman leading a relatively secure and unremarkable life. She had not been trained as a humanitarian worker, political activist, security analyst or emergency responder. Yet the conflict compelled her to perform aspects of all these roles within her family and community.
Her experience illustrates why women in Ah Nyar should not be understood only as victims, vulnerable groups or recipients of humanitarian assistance. She protected three generations of her family. She made a rapid decision to preserve the household’s productive resources. She maintained her business during displacement, learned to interpret security warnings, prepared for further emergencies and continued supporting the wider pro-democracy movement with whatever limited resources were available to her.
This does not mean that suffering should be romanticised as resilience. She continues to bear an injury, persistent insecurity, economic uncertainty and the responsibility of protecting both an elderly parent and a teenage daughter. Her expanded agency has emerged at an enormous personal cost.
Nor should her quiet endurance be mistaken for acceptance of war. Like many women across Ah Nyar, she concentrates on what must be done next: keeping the family together, earning an income, preparing to flee, returning when possible and sustaining hope that the pro-democracy movement will make progress.
Her story shows that women’s agency in Ah Nyar is not something newly introduced through external “empowerment” interventions. It grows from women’s established roles in household management, agriculture, local trade, family care and community relationships. The crisis has intensified these responsibilities and made their social, economic and political significance more visible.
Across conflict-affected Sagaing, ordinary women are becoming indispensable actors in household survival, local economies, civilian protection and community resilience. They are not waiting to be empowered. They are already acting.
Let Pan Ni is an independent researcher specialising in the social dynamics of Myanmar’s central dry zone (Ah Nyar). Her research focuses on bridging the gap between realities on the ground and international policy frameworks.
The real name of the village has been anonymised to protect the identity and location of the village, as well as the safety and security of the individuals involved. The views and analyses presented in this commentary are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Centre for Ah Nyar Studies.

16 September 2026

My Father Was Unable to Flee and Was Burned Alive

Highlights

We independently verified that three civilians and one resistance fighter were killed during the military operation. An elderly man with a chronic illness was burned alive inside his home after being unable to flee. Three civilians were injured by artillery shelling, landmines and a suicide drone during and after the military operation.
Approximately 8,000 civilians from Sin Myay, Hman Cho, Nga Lone Tin, Ywar Taw Lay and surrounding villages were displaced, with many seeking refuges in monasteries, neighbouring villages and farmland without adequate shelter, food or safe drinking water.
We independently verified that at least 255 civilian houses in Sin Myay, Hman Cho and Nga Lone Tin villages were destroyed by fire. This left a total of 1,049 people homeless, including 546 women, 12 mothers and 7 persons with disabilities. A historic monastery and a Buddha statue believed by the local community to be at least 200 years old were also burned.
Our evidence indicates that the military operation extended beyond engagements with resistance forces and had a serious impact on civilians and civilian properties, including homes, cultural and religious heritage and civilian infrastructure.
The findings reiterate continuing concerns regarding compliance with international humanitarian law, particularly the obligations to distinguish between civilians and combatants and to protect civilian objects during military operations.

Timeline of the Incident

Date	Description of major events
2 June 2026	Fighting broke out between Sin Myay and Hman Cho villages, forcing local residents, including teachers, to flee. According to resistance sources, approximately 30 junta soldiers were killed and resistance forces reportedly seized firearms. A military column of around 200 junta troops reportedly retreated without advancing further. Resistance authorities temporarily restricted movement in the area for security reasons. As the military withdrew, it reportedly laid landmines, resulting in subsequent explosions and fired more than 20 rounds of artillery. Resistance sources stated that junta forces were unable to advance for three consecutive days, sustained significant casualties and later reinforced their troop strength. A total of four engagements reportedly took place.
3-4 June 2026	More than eight aerial attacks using gyrocopters and paramotors occurred.
7 June 2026	At approximately 4:00 p.m., around 500 junta troops who had been stationed at the General Administration Department compound in Chaung U town reportedly arrived at Hman Cho village. Villagers and resistance fighters reported that Tatmadaw forces used drones reportedly carried substances containing chemical agents. It marked the beginning of a renewed military offensive.
8 June 2026	At approximately 5:40 p.m., junta troops were stationed at Gu Gyi Pagoda, north of Sin Myay village, before entering the village. Resistance sources also reported that suicide drones were launched from the Northwestern Regional Military Command in Monywa during the operation.
9 June 2026	At approximately 4:00 p.m., junta troops temporarily stationed in Nga Lone Tin village.
10 June 2026	Junta forces looted civilians’ properties from Nga Lone Tin and Sin Myay villages.
11 June 2026	Junta forces began setting fire to residential homes in the affected villages. 255 houses were burnt down.

Overview Map of the Incident Area

Civilians at Risk Amid Escalating Military Operations

Chaung U Township of Sagaing is located approximately 12 miles south of Monywa, the headquarters of the Northwestern Regional Military Command. Since the 2021 military coup, Chaung U has been one of the strongholds of the resistance movement in Sagaing. Consequently, the township has long been subjected to military offensives, including aerial bombardments, artillery shelling and ground operations. Previous attacks include the Bon-To massacre on 6 October 2025 in western Chaung U Township. While the Tatmadaw maintains control over the urban wards of Chaung U, areas north of the town, including Khin Mon, the Mya Pa Le fuel station and sections of the Monywa–Mandalay Road, the majority of rural areas remain under the control of locally based resistance forces.

In early June this year, military operations in the area intensified as the Tatmadaw launched renewed offensives across central Burma and strategic transport corridors. According to local sources we interviewed, fighting between Tatmadaw forces and local resistance groups began on 2 June 2026 in the area between Sin Myay and Hman Cho villages. Resistance sources stated that the Tatmadaw initially deployed a military column of approximately 200 troops, resulting in significant casualties during four separate engagements and subsequently reinforced its forces for a renewed offensive.

The military operation had immediate and severe consequences on civilians from five nearby villages. As fighting intensified, residents were forced to flee their homes, while access to the villages and farmland was restricted because of ongoing hostilities. Between 3 and 4 June, local sources reported more than eight aerial attacks involving gyrocopters and motorised paramotors. A local healthcare worker we interviewed told us;

“The gyrocopters and paramotors did not only target resistance positions. They also struck places where displaced families were taking shelter.”

Following the fighting on 2 June 2026, on 7 June, the Tatmadaw forces reportedly reinforced their military column with additional troops from Chaung U Town and launched a renewed offensive supported by drones and aerial assets. According to a report from a local information scout channel, two military trucks departed from the General Administration Department compound in Chaung U Town to reinforce the military column before it re-entered Sin Myay village. Villagers and resistance fighters alleged that drones carrying substances believed to contain chemical agents were used during the operation. Witnesses said that

“Smoke was everywhere. The whole area was covered in it. The resistance fighters and rescue workers had to wear protective gloves in the field”

However, we could not independently verify the use of chemical agents. In the following days, Tatmadaw forces reportedly occupied nearby villages, removed civilian properties and began burning residential homes on 11 June. Approximately 8000 villagers were displaced, particularly from Sin Myay, Hman Cho, Nga Lone Tin and Ywar Taw Lay villages. At least 255 civilian houses were independently identified as being burned down by the Tatmadaw military column. This left a total of 1,049 people homeless, including 546 women, 12 mothers and 7 persons with disabilities.

Residential houses destroyed following an arson attack (Source: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies)

In addition, the Buddha statue of at least 200 years old and the monastery were also burned down.

“The pagoda is believed to be sacred and powerful. People say that if you make a wish or a solemn vow there, it will come true. It hurts us so much to see it destroyed. As for those who set it on fire, they will face the consequences one day.”

Villagers fled their homes to nearby monasteries, neighbouring villages and farmland, where they lacked adequate shelter and access to essential supplies, including food and safe drinking water.

“I’m not afraid of dying at once. What frightens me more is the thought of surviving with injuries, as disable person. So, I have to flee since I know the fighting is near our villages. Now, I have temporarily stayed at my relative at the border village between Chaung U and Myaung townships”.

In addition to the destruction of a historic monastery and Buddha statue, which hold significant religious, cultural, and historical value for the local community in Chaung U Township, the Centre for Ah Nyar Studies independently verified that 197 houses in Sin Myay village, 28 houses in Nga Lone Tin village and 30 houses in Hman Cho village were destroyed by fire during the military operation. During the verification process, our researchers examined physical and digital evidence reportedly left behind by Tatmadaw soldiers, including military uniforms and a mobile phone belonging to a local resident. As we observed, a soldier allegedly used the device to post the following message on the resident’s TikTok account,

“[We] will burn Sin Myay village”

A Tatmadaw soldier posted on TikTok stating, “We will burn Sin Myay village” (Source: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies)

Elderly Man Burned Alive After Being Unable to Run

Three civilians and one resistance fighter died in the incident. Two civilian men were killed by artillery shelling at sites where displaced people were sheltering, while an elderly man with disabilities was burned alive in Sin Myay village during the Tatmadaw raid. We verified the identities of those who died in the incident as follows.

Name	Age (yrs)	Gender	Village	Remark
Internal Record	58	Male	Nga Lone Tin	Died due to artillery attacks. Had a mental disability. His dead body was found on 12 June 2026.
Internal Record	65	Male	Sin Myay	Died due to artillery attacks. Lost contact with family members since 12 June 2026 and confirmed his death on 17 June 2026.
Internal Record	70	Male	Sin Myay	Burnt alive on 14 June 2026.
Internal Record	25	Male	Sin Myay	Death, Local Resistance Force member. Died on 4 June 2026.

The victim was a 70-year-old man with a long-term chronic medical condition. He was unable to flee during the military raid because of his illness. His daughter told us,

“My father was ill and unable to speak. He could only make sounds like ‘Wu, Wu, wahh…’. We were in a different place at that time and I couldn’t take him out of the village. I didn’t know whether he was still alive. Later, I heard from some rescue workers that he had been killed.”

On 14 June, she received confirmation from rescue workers and local (resistance) administration that her father had been burned alive in his home.

The burnt remains of a 70-year-old man in Sin Myay village, Chaung U township, Sagaing (source: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies)

Furthermore, three civilian men were also injured by landmines, artillery attacks and a suicide drone. We verified their identities as follows.

Name	Age (yrs)	Gender	Village	Remark
Internal Record	29	Male	Sin Myay	Injured in a heavy artillery attack on 13 June 2026.
Internal Record	28	Male	Ma Hti Thar	Injured in landmine explosion on 12 June 2026.
Internal Record	56	Male	Min Khaung	Injured in a suicide drone attack on 12 June 2026.

Airstrike on a Funeral Gathering Resulting in Civilian Casualties

Tatmadaw also carried out a jet fighter airstrike targeting the funeral of a resistance fighter who had been killed during the fighting in Chaung U Township. The funeral was held in Pauk Taw (West) village, Myaung Township. According to information verified by our researchers, the military aircraft dropped bombs on the funeral site, killing two resistance fighters and injuring 13 civilians. A local resistance administrative official interviewed stated,

“The attack happened after we had paid tribute to the deceased. Otherwise, the number of casualties would have been unthinkable.”

According to local witnesses interviewed, the airstrike on the funeral took place at approximately 11:15 a.m. on 10 June 2026. Those injured in the attack included local construction workers and villagers from Pauk Taw (West) village.

Analysis

Tatmadaw stated that the operation was a counter-terrorism campaign aimed at regaining control of the main road connecting Chaung U and Yesagyo Townships.

[Junta Forces’] soldiers standing in front of the monastery in Sin Myay village (Photo: Myawaddy)

The findings from this investigation indicate that the military operation extended beyond armed confrontations with resistance forces and had severe consequences for civilians and civilian properties. The pattern of violations raises concerns regarding the conduct of military operations, particularly the protection of civilians and civilian objects under international humanitarian law.

Burning of Civilian Homes

We independently verified that a total of 255 residential homes in Sin Myay, Hman Cho and Nga Lone Tin villages were deliberately set on fire during the military operation. The destruction occurred after Tatmadaw forces had gained access to the villages and after large numbers of residents had already fled. Witness testimonies, physical evidence and digital evidence examined by our researchers indicate that the burning of civilian homes formed part of the military operation rather than resulting from active fighting. The message allegedly posted by a Tatmadaw soldier through a villager’s mobile phone, stating, “[We] will burn Sin Myay village,” further supports witness accounts that the destruction of civilian property was deliberate. The widespread burning of homes deprived hundreds of families of shelter and livelihoods and contributed to the displacement of approximately 8,000 civilians.

Destruction of Cultural and Religious Heritage

The military operation also destroyed a historic monastery and a Buddha statue estimated by the local community to be at least 200 years old. Beyond the physical damage, the destruction represents a significant loss of cultural and religious heritage for affected communities. Monasteries in central Burma serve not only as places of worship but also as centres for education, humanitarian assistance and refuge during armed conflict. During this incident, many displaced villagers had sought safety in monasteries before continuing their displacement. The destruction of these sites therefore had both cultural and humanitarian consequences for the local population.

Allegations Regarding the Use of Chemical Agents

We documented consistent allegations from local residents and resistance personnel that Tatmadaw forces deployed drones carrying substances believed to contain chemical agents during the military operation. Witnesses reported that resistance fighters and rescue workers wore protective gloves. However, we were unable to independently verify the composition of the substances or determine whether prohibited chemical agents had been used.

Elderly Civilians Unable to Flee

The death of the 70-year-old man who was reportedly burned alive inside his home illustrates the heightened risks faced by older persons and persons with disabilities during military operations. According to our investigation, the victim suffered from a long-term medical condition that prevented him from fleeing with other villagers. His death demonstrates how rapid military raids and the burning of civilian homes disproportionately affect individuals with limited mobility. This incident is not isolated. We documented a comparable case during military operations in Myay Zun Taw village, Yesagyo township in 2025, where an elderly resident was also burned alive after being unable to escape advancing Tatmadaw forces. These recurring incidents highlight the particular vulnerability of elderly persons and persons with disabilities during military operations involving the burning of civilian settlements. Reflecting on the findings of the investigation, the researcher at the Centre for Ah Nyar Studies commented,

“The military forces continuously conduct their campaign of terror against civilians not only by burning homes but also by destroying the cherished memories and cultural heritage of communities in central Burma. The use of suicide drones, landmines, and other attacks affecting civilian property poses a serious threat to civilian life, particularly for vulnerable groups such as women, older persons, and persons with disabilities.”

17 July 2026

အညာ၏ စားနပ်ရိက္ခာ အကျပ်အတည်း – ပဋိပက္ခနှင့် ရာသီဥတုဒဏ်ကြားမှ ပြိုလဲပျက်စီးနေသော ရှင်သန်ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းများ
အညာ၏ စားနပ်ရိက္ခာ အကျပ်အတည်း – ပဋိပက္ခနှင့် ရာသီဥတုဒဏ်ကြားမှ ပြိုလဲပျက်စီးနေသော ရှင်သန်ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းများ

အညာဒေသသည် ယခင်က မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အဓိက စားနပ်ရိက္ခာထုတ်လုပ်ရေးဒေသ တစ်ခုဖြစ်ခဲ့ သော်လည်း ယနေ့အချိန်တွင် စားနပ်ရိက္ခာစနစ်များ၏ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံဆိုင်ရာ ပျက်ယွင်းမှုကို ကြုံတွေ့နေ ရသည်။ ဤအကျပ်အတည်းသည် ယာယီဖြစ်ပေါ်သော ထုတ်လုပ်မှုလျော့ကျခြင်းမျိုးမဟုတ်ဘဲ ပဋိပက္ခ၊ ရာသီဥတုဖောက်ပြန်မှုနှင့် အရင်းအမြစ်များကို လက်နက်သဖွယ် အသုံးချခံရမှု (Weaponization of Resources) တို့ကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာသော ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံဆိုင်ရာပြိုလဲမှု (Structural Breakdown) ဖြစ်သည်။ တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် အာဏာသိမ်းချိန်မှစ၍ ဆက်တိုက်ဖြစ်နေသော ပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများနှင့်အတူ ဒေသတွင်းနေရပ်စွန့်ခွာရသည့်လူဦးရေ (IDP) မှာလည်း တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး အတိုင်းအတာဖြင့် အများဆုံးဖြစ်နေသည်။ ယခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလအထိ စာရင်းများအရ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း တစ်ခုတည်းမှာပင် IDP ဦးရေ (၁.၃) သန်းကျော်ရှိနေသည်။ မကွေးတွင် (၃) သိန်းနီးပါး နှင့် မန္တလေးတွင် (၁) သိန်းနီးပါး ရှိကြောင်း ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၏ စာရင်းများအရ သိရသည်။ အညာဒေသ စစ်ရှောင်များ၏ ယာယီတိမ်းရှောင်လိုက်၊ နေရပ်ပြန်လိုက်ဖြစ်နေသည့် သဘောသဘာဝကို ထည့်တွက်ပါက လက်တွေ့ တွင်မူ အဆိုပါကိန်းဂဏန်းများထက် အလွန်ပိုများမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုအခြေအနေတွင် စစ်ပွဲဒေသရှိ လူထု၏ ရှင်သန်ရေးအတွက် လူသားချင်စာနာမှု အကူအညီများ၏ အခန်းကဏ္ဍသည် လွန်စွာအရေးပါ နေသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာ ရံပုံငွေလျော့ချလာမှုများရှိနေသော်လည်း စစ်ကိုင်း၊ မကွေး နှင့် မန္တလေး ဒေသများသို့ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုအကူအညီများသည် အထိုက်အလျောက် စီးဆင်းနေသည် ကိုလည်း တွေ့ရသည်။
လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာ အရေးပေါ် အကူအညီများမှာ အမှန်တကယ်ထိခိုက်ခံစားနေရသူများထံသို့ လုံလောက်စွာ မရောက်ရှိနိုင်သည့် အနေအထားတွင် ရှိသည့်အရင်းအမြစ်များကို အလိုအပ်ဆုံး နေရာများသို့ ထိထိမိမိရောက်ရှိသွားနိုင်မှုမှာလည်း မေးခွန်းထုတ်စရာပင်။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ ဆက်သွယ်ရေး ဖြတ်တောက်ထားမှု၊ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီစီးဆင်းမှုကို တင်းကျပ်စွာ ပိတ်ဆို့ထားမှုအပြင် အကူအညီပေးရေးရပ်ဝန်းအပေါ် ဥပဒေစည်းမျဉ်းများဖြင့် ဘောင်ခတ်တင်းကြပ် ထားမှု စသည်တို့ဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်ထားသည့်အခြေအနေတွင် သမားရိုးကျ အကူအညီပေးရေး ဇာတ်ကောင်များမှာ ချောင်ပိတ်မိနေတော့သည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ အဖက်ဖက်မှ ပိတ်ဆို့၊ တင်းကြပ်မှုများကြားတွင် ၎င်းတို့မှာ ဒုက္ခရောက်နေသောလူထုထံ အကူအညီများ ထိထိမိမိ ရောက်ရှိနိုင်ရန် ကြံစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းထက် ၎င်းတို့၏ ရပ်တည်ရှင်သန်ရေး ပထမစဉ်းစား၍ blanket approach များကို အသုံးပြုလာသည်။ အကူအညီလိုအပ်နေသူများ၊ အကူအညီ အမျိုးအစား တို့အပြင် အရေးကြီးသည့် ဒေသိယကွဲပြားမှုမျိုးစသည့် အခြေအနေ အသေးစိတ်များကို ရှည်ရှည် ဝေးဝေး စဉ်းစား မနေဘဲ အလုံးစုံခြုံငုံချည်းကပ် လိုက်ခြင်းမျိုးဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုသို့ အကူအညီပေးရေး မဟာဗျူဟာများသည် humanitarian efficiency အတွက် မေးခွန်းထုတ်စရာပင်။
ဒေသိယပြုခြင်းမဟာဗျူဟာ (localisation) ကို အကူအညီပေးရေးရပ်ဝန်းမှ အသံကျယ်ကျယ်ဟစ်၍ လုပ်ဆောင်သော်လည်း အဆိုပါ လုပ်ဆောင်မှုများကိုယ်တိုင်က ဒုက္ခရောက်နေသောလူထုနှင့် ဝေးကွာနေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူများ (တနည်းအားဖြင့် အကူအညီပေးရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ၏ အကျိုးခံစားခွင့်ရှိသူများ)မှာ ဒေသိယပြုခြင်းလှိုင်းတွင် ပါဝင်ခွင့်၊ အသံပြုခွင့် ရ၏၊ မရ၏ ဆိုသည်မှာ မေးခွန်းထုတ်စရာပင်။ စစ်မက်ပဋိပက္ခ ဖြစ်ပွားနေသော အခြေအနေတွင် အကူအညီပေးရေး ပိုက်လိုင်း၏ အပေါ်ပိုင်းဇာတ်ကောင်များရှိရာ အလယ်ဗဟိုချက်မသည် စစ်ပွဲအတွင်းမှ အနိဌာရုံများ၊ ရေခံမြေခံပြောင်းလဲနေမှုများ၊ စစ်ပွဲဒေသရှိ လူထု၏ ရုန်းကန်ရှင်သန်နေရမှုများအပါအဝင် ၎င်းတို့မည်သို့ တွေးခေါ်ကြသနည်းဆိုသည့် အခြေအနေအရပ်ရပ်များနှင့် ဝေးကွာနေတတ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အကူအညီပေးရေးရပ်ဝန်း၏ ဗဟိုချက်မဖြစ်သည် ရန်ကုန်သည် စစ်ကိုင်းစစ်မြေပြင်တွင် စဉ်းစား လုပ်ဆောင်ကြသည်များနှင့် အတွေးကွာလွန်းမည်မှာ အံ့ဩစရာမဟုတ်ပါပေ။ ဤအခြေအနေတွင် ဒုက္ခရောက်နေသော လူထုအတွင်းရှိ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ ဦးဆောင်သည့် အကူအညီပေးသည့်ပုံစံ ဖြစ်လာရန် မဟာဗျူဟာဆိုင်ရာ အပြောင်းအလဲများပြုလုပ်ရန် လိုအပ်နေ ပါသည်။
စစ်ကိုင်းဒေသတွင် စားနပ်ရိက္ခာမလုံလောက်မှုကို တွန်းအားပေးနေသည့် အကြောင်းရင်းများ
သမားရိုးကျ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီများထက် မြေပြင်အခြေအနေနှင့် ကိုက်ညီသော၊ ဒေသခံများ ကိုယ်တိုင်ဦးဆောင်သော (Locally-led) ခံနိုင်ရည်ရှိသည့် စိုက်ပျိုးရေးပုံစံများသို့ အရေးပေါ် ကူးပြောင်းရန် လိုအပ်နေပါသည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် အညာဒေသ၏ လက်ရှိစားနပ်ရိက္ခာလိုအပ်ချက် အကျပ်အတည်း၏ အဓိကတွန်းအားများ (Drivers of Insecurity)မှာ
Weaponization of Water: ဆည်ရေပေးဝေမှုကို ထိန်းချုပ်၊ ပိတ်ပင်ထားခြင်းသည် နွေစပါးနှင့် ဆီထွက်သီးနှံ ထုတ်လုပ်မှုကို တိုက်ရိုက်ထိခိုက်စေပြီး တောင်သူများကို စားနပ်ရိက္ခာ လုံခြုံမှုမရှိတော့သည့် အခြေအနေသို့ တွန်းပို့နေသည်။
Climate & Geological Shocks: ပြင်းထန်သော အပူချိန်နှင့် မကြာသေးမီက လှုပ်ခတ်ခဲ့သော ငလျင်ဒဏ်ကြောင့် မြေသားများအက်ကွဲကာ စိုက်ပျိုးမြေနှင့် ရေအရင်းအမြစ်များ ပျက်စီးခဲ့ရသည်။
Contested Governance: အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ အားပြိုင်မှုများကြောင့် စိုက်ပျိုးရေး သွင်းအားစုနှင့် ဈေးကွက်ချိတ်ဆက်မှုများ ပြတ်တောက်နေသည်။
လက်ရှိအခြေအနေအား ပို၍အသေးစိတ်ကြည့်သော်
(က) တွက်ချက်ခန့်မှန်းရန် ခက်လာသော လယ်ယာစိုက်ပျိုးရေးလုပ်ငန်း
ရွှေဘိုခရိုင်ကဲ့သို့ ဆည်မြောင်းများမှ ရေပေးဝေရေးစနစ်ရှိသည့် ဒေသများတွင်ပင် စပါးစိုက် တောင်သူများသည် ခါတိုင်းကဲ့သို့ တွက်ချက်၊ ခန့်မှန်း၍ ရင်းနှီးစိုက်ပျိုးရန် ခက်ခဲလာနေသည်။ ဒေသတွင်း မလုံခြုံမှုမှာ အဓိကအကြောင်းရင်းဖြစ်သော်လည်း သူ့ချည်းသက်သက်မဟုတ်ပေ။ ရေရရှိနိုင်မှု မသေချာခြင်း၊ ဓါတ်မြေဩဇာအပါအဝင် စိုက်ပျိုးရေး သွင်းအားစုဈေးနှုန်းများ မိုးပျံတက်သွားခြင်း နှင့်အတူ ထုတ်လုပ်မှုကုန်ကျစာရိတ် မြင့်တက်ခြင်းတို့မှာ ကြီးမားသော အကြောင်းတရားများဖြစ်သည်။ သွင်းအားစုဈေးနှုန်းများမှာ အလွန်မတည်မငြိမ်ဖြစ်နေပြီး မြို့နယ်၊ ကျေးရွာများ၏ လမ်းပန်းဆက်သွယ်ရေး အနေအထားပေါ်မူတည်၍ ဓါတ်မြေဩဇာဈေးနှုန်းမှာ အလွန်အမင်း ကွာခြားနေလေ့ရှိသည်။ ဥပမာ နယ်မြေချင်း သိပ်မဝေးလှသည့် ဒီပဲယင်းမြို့နယ် နှင့် ကန့်ဘလူမြို့နယ် တို့တွင် ဓါတ်မြေဩဇာ တစ်အိတ်ဈေးနှုန်းမှာ အနည်းဆုံး(၁၀၀၀၀) ကျပ် ကွာဟသည်။
ထိုဝန်ထုပ်ဝန်ပိုးများနှင့် ဆုံးရှုံးနိုင်ချေများလွန်းသည့် အန္တရာယ်တို့ကို စပါးစိုက်တောင်သူများက ခါးစည်းခံရုံသာ။ သူတို့ကို ပခုံးကူထမ်းပေးမည့်သူ မရှိ။ အစိုးရ၏ အကူအညီ၊ အစိုးရမဟုတ်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ အကူအညီကို တောင်သူများ လက်လှမ်းမမှီ။ ထိုအခြေအနေမှာ လေထီးမပါဘဲ sky-diving လုပ်ရသည့် အခြေအနေနှင့် တူသည်။ မသေလျှင်တောင် ရမည့်ဒဏ်ရာမှာ ခြေကျိုး၊ လက်ပွန်းအဆင့်တော့ မဟုတ်ပါပေ။
လယ်ကွင်းထဲက ထွက်သည့်နောက် ဈေးကွက်ကို မျှော်ပြန်သော်လည်း ရင်မောစရာ။ မုံရွာကဲ့သို့ ပဲမျိုးစုံနှင့် နှမ်းစသည့် ဆီထွက်သီးနှံများ အဓိက ထုတ်လုပ်ရေးဒေသများတွင်လည်း ကုန်သွယ်ရေး နှောင့်နှေးမှု၊ ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုနှင့် ဈေးကွက်မတည်ငြိမ်မှု တို့ကြောင့် တောင်သူများမှာ စိုက်ပျိုးရေး လုပ်ငန်းဝင်ငွေများ အကြီးအကျယ်လျော့နည်းလာနေသည်။ ထို့ပြင် အညာတစ်ခွင်တွင် လှည့်လည် မွှေနှောက် ဖျက်ဆီးနေသော အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ စစ်ကြောင်းများကလည်း ကြုံလျှင်ကြုံသလို ရိပ်သိမ်းခါနီး သီးနှံများ သို့မဟုတ် ရိပ်သိမ်းပြီးသီးနှံများကို ဖျက်ဆီးသွားတတ်သေးသည်။ တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင် ဒေသတွင်း နယ်မြေအားပြိုင်မှုနှင့်အတူ ကုန်သွယ်ရေးလမ်းမကြီးများ နှင့် ရွာချင်းဆက်လမ်းများတွင် ခရီးလမ်းသွားလာမှု လွယ်ကူမနေခြင်းတို့ကြောင့် လယ်ယာထွက်ကုန်များ အချိန်မှီတင်ပို့ရောင်းချနိုင်ရန် အခက်အခဲရှိနေသေးသည်။ နောက်ဆုံးတွင် ယင်းမာပင်ခရိုင် အပါအဝင် အညာခြောက်သွေ့ဒေသများတွင် လယ်သမားများသည် စိုက်ပျိုးဧက လျှော့ချခြင်း၊ ရာသီအလိုက် သီးနှံ စိုက်ပျိုးချိန်ရွှေ့ခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် မြေကိုအလွတ်ထားခြင်းစသည့် အန္တရာယ် ရှောင်ကြဉ်သည့် နည်းလမ်းများကို ကျင့်သုံးလာကြရရာ ဒေသတွင်း စားနပ်ရိက္ခာ ထုတ်လုပ်မှုပမာဏမှာ တဖြည်းဖြည်း နည်း၍ နည်း၍ လာနေသည်။
(ခ) ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုများ အလွန်အကျွံဖြစ်ပေါ်လာခြင်းကြောင့် နောက်ဆက်တွဲအန္တရာယ် နှင့် ဆိုးကျိုးများ
စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီးသည် ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲခြင်း၏‌ နောက်ဆက်တွဲပြဿနာကြောင့် မိုးခေါင်ခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် အချိန်အခါမဟုတ် မိုးရွာခြင်း၊ မိုးကြီးခြင်းများမှာ တနှစ်ထက်တနှစ် ပိုမိုပြင်းထန်လာနေသည်။ မထင်မှတ်သော ရေလွှမ်းမိုးမှုများကို တပြိုင်နက်ကြုံတွေ့နေရသည်။ ၂၀၂၃–၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်အတွင်း ယခင်က ရေလွှမ်းမိုးမှု မကြုံဖူးသောဒေသများဖြစ်သည့် ဒီပဲယင်း၊ ခင်ဦး၊၀က်လက်နှင့် အရာတော် မြို့နယ်များ အပါအဝင် လယ်ယာမြေများ ရေလွှမ်းမိုးခံရခြင်းသည် ရာသီအလိုက် (နွေ၊မိုး၊ဆောင်း) စပါးနှင့်သီးနှံများ အလှည့်ကျ စိုက်ပျိုးခြင်းအလေ့အထအပေါ် တောင်သူများ၏ ယုံကြည်မှုကို ပိုမိုလျော့နည်း လာစေသည်။ တောင်သူများမှာ ကံကိုယုံ၍ ဆူးပုံမနင်းရဲ။ ထို့ပြင် ပဋိပက္ခဖြစ်စဥ်များ အထူးသဖြင့် စစ်ပွဲများ၊ စစ်ကောင်စီမှ စစ်ထိုးလာခြင်းများ၊ မြေပြင်တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်များမှ တိုက်ပွဲဖော်ခြင်းများနှင့် ဆက်စပ်သော ကန့်သတ်ချက်များနှင့် ပေါင်းစပ်လိုက်သောအခါ ရာသီဥတုမတည်ငြိမ်မှုသည် စိုက်ပျိုးရေးကို အားပြုရသည့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းလို ဒေသအတွင်း ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို ပိုမိုပြင်းထန်စေသည်။
(ဂ) မြေ၊ ရေနှင့် လှုပ်ရှားသွားလာခွင့်အပေါ် အာဏာပြိုင်ဆိုင်မှု
ဆည်ရေပေး‌ဝေသည့် ရေလမ်းကြောင်း၊ ရေတံခါးများဖွင့်၊ ပိတ်ခြင်းစသည်တို့အား စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ၄င်းတို့၏ ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ်အစီအစဥ် တစိတ်တပိုင်းအနေဖြင့် အကြီးအကျယ်လုပ်သည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် နွေစပါးစိုက်သည့် အချိန်များတွင် ပစ်မှတ်ထား၍ လုပ်သည်။ ထိုအချက်က နွေစပါးစိုက်သည့် တောင်သူများအား စပါးစိုက်ရန် ရေသွင်းရမှု၊ ရေရရှိမှုတို့ကို အခက်အခဲဖြစ်စေသည်။
ထို့ပြင် သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေး လမ်းကြောင်းများအား ပိတ်ဆို့ခြင်း၊ အထူးသဖြင့် တနေရာမှ အခြား တနေရာသို့ သွားရောက်ရာ လမ်းတွင် မြို့/ရွာ အ၀င်အထွက်ဂိတ်များတွင် ဝင်ရောက်ခွင့်သည် ဒေသဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ (ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့များ)နှင့် အခြားသောအာဏာ/လက်နက်များ လက်၀ယ်ရှိသည့် အဖွဲ့များအကြား ပြိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများပိုပြင်းထန်လာပြီး၊ ဂိတ်ကြေးကောက်ယူမှု များမှာလည်း ပိုမိုများပြားလာသည်။ ဤအခြေအနေသည် နေရာဒေသအလိုက် မတူညီပဲ တကျောင်းတဂါထာ၊ တရွာတပုဒ်ဆန်းဖြစ်နေကြခြင်းကလည်း လယ်သမားများအတွက် အရာရာကို ခန့်မှန်းရ ပိုခက်စေသည်။ စပါးနှင့် အခြားသီးနှံစျေးကွက်အတွက် အနှောင့်အယှက်ဖြစ်စေပါသည်။ ဥပမာ ကန့်ဘလူမြို့နယ်၏ အခြေအနေသည် အညာဒေသ၏ ပျက်စီးနေသော ဈေးကွက် ကို အထင်ရှားဆုံး သက်သေပြနေသည်။ နယ်မြေကပ်နေသည့် ခင်ဦးမြို့နယ်တွင် စပါးတင်း (၁၀၀) လျှင် (၅၇) သိန်းကျပ် ဈေးပေါက်နေချိန်၌ ကန့်ဘလူတွင် (၁၈) သိန်းခန့်သာ ရရှိခြင်းမှာ ပိုလျှံသော ထွက်ကုန်များကို အပြင်သို့ တင်ပို့နိုင်သည့် လမ်းကြောင်းများ ပိတ်ဆို့ခံထားရခြင်းကြောင့် ဖြစ်သည်။ တစ်ဖက်တွင် ရေနံတွင်းများ ပေါများသည့်နေရာခြင်းအတူတူ စက်သုံးဆီဈေးနှုန်းမှာ မုံရွာ(ဓာတ်ဆီတဂါလံ ၁၄၀၀၀ နှင့် ဒီဇယ်တဂါလံ ၁၃၀၀၀ကျပ်)ထက် ကန့်ဘလူ (ဒီဇယ်/ဓာတ်ဆီတဂါလံ ၂၀၀၀၀ကျပ်) တွင် ပိုပြီး မြင့်တက်နေခြင်း များကြောင့် တောင်သူများသည် အရှုံးနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရပြီး၊ ဤသည်မှာ စားနပ်ရိက္ခာ ထုတ်လုပ်သူများကိုယ်တိုင် ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးမှု ဘေးအန္တရာယ်ဆီသို့ တွန်းပို့ခြင်းခံနေရသည့် အခြေအနေပင် ဖြစ်သည်။
ထို့ကြောင့် လယ်သမားများ၏ စိုက်ပျိုးရေးဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များသည် စိုက်ပျိုးရေးနည်းပညာအလား အလာထက် လုံခြုံရေးအခြေအနေသုံးသပ်ချက်အပေါ် ပိုမိုအခြေပြုလာကြရပါသည်။
ထို့ကြောင့် လက်ရှိစစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းသည် ပုံမှန်အရေးပေါ် စားနပ်ရိက္ခာအကူအညီ တစ်ခုတည်း ပံ့ပိုး ပေးရုံ၊ အရေးပေါ်ငွေသားပေး‌‌ဝေသည့်အစီအစဥ်များ ကူညီရုံနှင့်မလုံလောက်သည့် အနေအထား ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အရေးပေါ် စားနပ်ရိက္ခာအကူအညီသည် အထူးသဖြင့် နေရာပြောင်းရွှေ့ရသူ စစ်ရှောင်များနှင့် အလွန်အမင်း ထိခိုက်လွယ်သူအုပ်စုများ/အရေးပေါ်အကူအညီလိုအပ်နေသည့် အုပ်စုများအတွက် အရေးကြီးနေဆဲဖြစ်သော်လည်း၊ အဆက်မပြတ်ဖြစ်ပွားနေသော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများနှင့် ထပ်တလဲလဲ ဖြစ်ပွားနေသော စစ်ပွဲအန္တရာယ်များကြောင့် တောင်သူအိမ်ထောင်စုများသည် အကျပ်အတည်းတစ်ခုမှ နောက်တစ်ခုသို့ ကူးပြောင်းချိန်တွင် ထုတ်လုပ်မှုစွမ်းအားစတင်ရန် ငွေကြေးအားဖြင့် ပြန်လည် နာလန်ထူနိုင်ခြင်း မရှိနိုင်တော့သည်ကလည်း အကြောင်းရင်းတရပ်ဖြစ်လာပါသည်။
ထုတ်လုပ်မှုနှင့် ဝင်ငွေတည်ငြိမ်မှုကိုပံ့ပိုးပေးနိုင်ရန်နှင့်ဒေသအလိုက်စိန်ခေါ်မှုများအား ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရန် အမှန်တကယ်အကူအညီဖြစ်စေသည့် လိုက်လျောညီထွေသော ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှု ပုံသဏ္ဍန်များမဟုတ်လျှင် စားနပ်ရိက္ခာအကူအညီသည် ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရေးအတွက် တံတားမဟုတ်ဘဲ အကြိမ်ကြိမ် အခါခါပေး‌ဝေနေရခြင်းဖြင့် အကူအညီရယူသူ လူထုအတွက်လည်း အမှီခိုခံ အခြေအနေ ဆီသို့ လုံးလုံးလျားလျား ကျရောက်သွားစေသည့် ဖြေရှင်းနည်းတစ်ရပ်အနေဖြင့်သာ ရှိနေပါသည်။
ထို့ပြင် လက်ရှိ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းတွင်၊ ၂၀၂၅ မတ်လအတွင်း လှုပ်ခတ်ခဲ့သော ငလျင်ဒဏ်ကြောင့် မြေသား များ အက်ကွဲကာ စိုက်ပျိုးမြေများ ပျက်စီးခဲ့ရုံသာမက၊ ဆည်ရေပေးဝေမှုမှာလည်း စစ်ကောင်စီမှ လုံးဝ ရပ်ဆိုင်းခံထားရခြင်း (Weaponization of water) ကြောင့် အညာဒေသ၏ အဓိက အသက်မွေးဝမ်း ကျောင်းဖြစ်သော နွေစပါးနှင့် ဆီထွက်သီးနှံစိုက်ခင်းများမှာ ဆက်လက်စိုက်ပျိုးရန်၊ ရှင်သန်ရန်လည်း လမ်းစပျောက်နေပါသည်။
ဥပမာအားဖြင့်၊ ဆားလင်းကြီးမြို့နယ်၊ xxx ကျေးရွာတွင် ငလျင်ဒဏ်ကြောင့် မြေပဲခင်းများ တွင် မြေများအက်ကွဲပျက်စီးခဲ့ပြီး ကိုယ်ပိုင်ရေတွင်းမရှိသော တောင်သူများမှာ နွေသီးနှံစိုက်ပျိုးရန်ရေ အရင်းအမြစ် လုံးဝမရှိတော့ပါ။ အစဉ်အလာအရ အားကိုးခဲ့ရသော ဆည်ရေမှာလည်း ပိတ်ပင် ခံထားရသဖြင့် လယ်ယာစိုက်ပျိုးရေးအပြင်၊ ကျေးရွာနေလူထုများ သောက်ရေ၊ သုံးရေအတွက်ပင်လျှင် ရေတွင်းအသစ်များ တူးဖော်ရန်အတွက် ရေစုတ်စက်၊ ရေသွင်းပိုက်များ အရေးပေါ် လိုအပ်နေပါသည်။
အလားတူ ချောင်းဦးမြို့နယ်၊ xxx ကျေးရွာအုပ်စု၊ xxx ကျေးရွာသည် ကုန်စည်စီးဆင်းသည့် အဓိကဆက်သွယ်ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းဖြစ်သည့် မုံရွာ-မန္တလေးလမ်းမကြီးနားတွင် တည်ရှိပြီး၊ လက်ရှိ လက်ပံတောင်းတောင်မှ ထွက်ရှိသည့် ကြေးနီသတ္တုရိုင်းများအား ၀မ်ပေါင်ကုမ္ပဏီမှ သယ်ယူရာတွင် စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များမှ ၄င်းတို့လုံခြုံရေးယာဥ်တန်းများနှင့် အလှည့်ကျပုံမှန် သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင် ပေးနေသည်ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များမှာ ၂၀၂၆ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်န၀ါရီ လဆန်းပိုင်းမှ စတင်၍ xxx ကျေးရွာတွင် အထိုင်ချတပ်စွဲလာပါသည်။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ xxx ကျေးရွာရှိ လူဦးရေ ၁၃၈၀၊ အိမ်ထောင်စု (၇၀၀)ကျော်မှာ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ် လက်လှမ်းမမှီသည့် နေရာသို့ ရွေ့ပြောင်းရပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ ရွေ့ပြောင်းသည့် နေရာသစ်တွင် သောက်သုံးရေ ရရှိရန် အနည်းဆုံး (၃) မိုင်ခန့်‌ဝေးသော နေရာမှ ရေတွင်းသို့ သွားရောက်ခပ်ယူရပါသည်။ အကယ်၍ မသွားရောက်နိုင်သော သက်ကြီးရွယ်အိုနှင့် မသန်စွမ်း၊ က‌လေးသူငယ်များပြားသော အိမ်ထောင်စုများမှာ စားသုံးဆီ ငါးပိဿာ၀င် ပုံးနှင့် တပုံးလျှင် (၈၀၀) ကျပ် နှင့် သောက်သုံးရေအား ၀ယ်ယူသုံးစွဲနေရပါသည်။ ငလျင်ဒဏ်ကြောင့် ရေတွင်းများ ပျက်စီးခဲ့ရုံသာမက၊ ဝမ်ပေါင်ကြေးနီစီမံကိန်းနှင့် ကျေးရွာတွင်းရှိ “ကုမာရမျိုးဆက်” လူငယ်အဖွဲ့ကဲ့သို့သော ကိုယ်ထူကိုယ်ထ ရပ်ရွာကူညီရေးအဖွဲ့များမှ ပညာရေးနှင့် လူမှုရေးလုပ်ငန်းများ လုပ်ဆောင်နေရင်း အရေးပေါ်ကူညီရေး လုပ်ငန်းများကိုပါ ကူညီပေးနေသော်လည်း နည်းပညာနှင့် ငွေကြေးလက်လှမ်းမှီမှုမှာ အကန့်အသတ်ရှိနေဆဲဖြစ်ပါသည်။ လက်ရှိ အခြေအနေတွင် အညာလူထု အနေနှင့်အသက်ရှင်သန်ရေးအတွက် အခြေခံအကျဆုံးဖြစ်သော “ရေ”ကို အရေး ပေါ် ဦးစားပေး ဖြေရှင်းရန် လိုအပ်နေပြီး၊ ရေရရှိရေးသည် စားနပ်ရိကွာဖူလုံမှု တစိတ်တပိုင်းအတွက် အဓိကကျသည့်အခြေအနေဖြစ်ပါသည်။
စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းအတွင်း၊ ယခုလက်ရှိအခြေအနေသည် အထက်ဖော်ပြပါအခြေအနေများကြောင့် စားနပ် ရိက္ခာဖူလုံရေးဆိုင်ရာ အခြေအနေအတွက် အထောက်အကူပြုစေသော ဒေသအခြေပြု၊ ပံ့ပိုးငွေ ပမာဏမများပြားသည့်၊ ရေတိုလတ်တလောလိုအပ်ချက်ကို ဖူလုံစေပြီး၊ ရေလတ်အစီအစဥ်များအား ချမှတ်နိုင်ရန် အခွင့်အလမ်းရှိသည့် လိုက်လျောညီထွေ၊ မြေပြင်အခြေအနေအရ ပြုပြင် ပြောင်းလဲလွယ်သည့် အရေးပေါ်စီမံချက်များအား ပံ့ပိုးအကူအညီပေးခြင်းသည်သာလျှင် အသင့် တော်ဆုံးနှင့် ထိရောက်မှုအရှိဆုံး၊ လိုအပ်နေသည့် လူထုထံသို့ တိုက်ရိုက်အကူအညီ ရောက်ရှိစေနိုင် သည့် အစီအမံများဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ထိုကဲ့သို့သော အကူအညီအသွင်သဏ္ဍန်များမှာ အရေးပေါ် အခြေအနေအား တုံ့ပြန်ဆောင်ရွက်နေရင်း၊ အချိန်မရွေး ကျရောက်နိုင်သည့် စစ်ကြောင်းထိုးမှုနှင့်
စစ်ပွဲဖော်ဆောင်မှုအစရှိသည့်အန္တရာယ်များမှ ရှောင်လွှဲနိုင်စေမှုကိုပါ အထောက်အကူပြုစေပြီး၊ လူထု၏စားနပ်ရိက္ခာရရှိနိုင်မှုကို/လက်လှမ်းမှီစေနိုင်မှုကိုပါ ‌ရေရှည်တည်ငြိမ်/အကျိုးပြုစေနိုင်သည်။
ဥပမာ ရွှေဘို သို့မဟုတ် ယင်းမာပင်ခရိုင်ရှိ ကျေးရွာများတွင်
စားနပ်ရိက္ခာမလုံလောက်မှုအား လူထုမှ အလုံးစုံ၊ တသက်တာ ခံစားစေရနိုင်သည့် အခြေအနေသို့ မရောက်မီ ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများပေးနိုင်ခြင်း/ထောက်ပံ့နိုင်ခြင်း။
ပဋိပက္ခနှင့် ရာသီဥတုဖိအားအောက်တွင် လက်တွေ့အသုံးဝင်နေသည့် ယခင်ပုံမှန်ရိုးရာ လယ်ယာပုံစံများမှ ခွဲထွက်ထားသည့် မတူညီသည့် အခြားပုံစံအသစ်၊ ပဋိပက္ခကာလအတွင်း စားနပ်ရိကွာဖူလုံမှုအတွက် ချဥ်းကပ်မှု အသွင်သဏ္ဍန်အသစ်များကို လေ့လာနိုင်ခြင်း။
ယခင်ပုံမှန် လယ်ယာမြေစိုက်ပျိုးခြင်းအလေ့အထတို့နှင့် မတူကွဲပြားသော ပဋိပက္ခကာလ အတွင်း တိုးချဲ့အသုံးချနိုင်မည့် အထောက်အထားများကို ထုတ်လုပ်နိုင်ခြင်း စသည့် အကျိုးကျေးဇူးများ ကို ရရှိလာစေနိုင်ပါသည်။
ထိုသို့ ‌ဒေသအခြေပြုစီမံချက်ဒီဇိုင်းများ ရေးဆွဲရာတွင်လည်း ပဋိပက္ခကာလအတွင်း ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် သိရှိလိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးရမည့် အခြေအနေများအားသတိပြုမှုရှိခြင်း၊ ပြောင်းလဲ နေသောရာသီဥတုနှင့် လိုက်လျောညီထွေဖြစ်ခြင်း၊ အလုပ်ပြီးမြောက်မှုထက်စာလျှင် အန္တရာယ် လျှော့ချရေးကို ဦးစားပေး ခြင်းနှင့် ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့်လုပ်ငန်းစဥ်များအား ဒေသခံများမှသာ ဦးဆောင်မှုရှိစေခြင်းစသည့် အချက် အလက်များကိုသာ အခြေခံပြီးကျင့်သုံးပါမှသာ အဆင်ပြေနိုင်ပါမည်။
ထိုသို့သော စီမံချက်အစီအစဥ်များအား ဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင်လည်း စားနပ်ရိက္ခာထုတ်လုပ်မှု အမြင့်ဆုံး ရရှိရေး ထက်စာလျှင် မသေချာမှုနှင့် အချိန်မရွေးအန္တရာယ်ရှိစေသည့် အခြေအနေအောက်တွင် စားနပ် ရိက္ခာရရှိနိုင်မှု သို့မဟုတ် လက်လှမ်းမှီစေနိုင်မှု နှင့် တည်ငြိမ်မှုကိုသာ ဦးစားပေးသင့်ပါသည်။
ရေရှည်တည်တံ့သောရလဒ်များ ရရှိရန်နှင့် အမှန်တကယ်အကျိုးဖြစ်ထွန်းစေရန် ဒေသခံများမှ သာဦးဆောင်သော၊ ၄င်းတို့ကိုယ်တိုင်သိရှိနားလည်ရေးဆွဲထားပြီး၊ဒေသခံအချင်းချင်းအကြား ချိတ် ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်ကြသည့် အလေ့အထများရှိသည့် မြေပြင်ကွန်ယက်များကိုသာ ပိုမိုအားကောင်း လာစေရန် ပံ့ပိုးပေးစေရန်သာ လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ပြင်ပပညာရှင်များ မရနိုင်သော လက်တွေ့အခြေအနေ သိမြင်မှုကို ဒေသခံအဖွဲ့များကသာ သိရှိနားလည် ကျွမ်းကျင်ထားကြပါသည်။
သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ အညာဒေသရှိ စားနပ်ရိက္ခာမလုံလောက်မှုသည် ယာယီပြဿနာမဟုတ်တော့ဘဲ လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်း၏ စနစ်တည်ဆောက်ရေး၊ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံဆိုင်ရာ အကျပ်အတည်းဖြစ်လာနေပါသည်။ မတူညီသော ဒေသအခြေအနနှင့် လူမှုစံနှုန်းများနှင့် ကိုက်ညီစွာ၊ ပဋိပက္ခကာလအတွင်း အချိန်မရွေး အန္တရာယ် ကျရောက်နိုင်သည့် လုံခြုံးရေးအခြေအနေနှင့် လျော်ညီစွာ ပြုလွယ်၊ ပြင်လွယ်ဖြစ်အောင် စနစ်တကျ ဒီဇိုင်းရေးဆွဲထားသော စီမံချက်များသည်သာ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းအတွင်းရှိ လူထု၏ ပဋိပက္ခ ကာလအတွင်း အရေးပေါ်စားနပ်ရိကွာလိုအပ်ချက်ကို ဖြေရှင်းပေးနိုင်မည့်အပြင် ရေရှည်အတွက် လူထု၏စားနပ်ရိက္ခာလက်လှမ်း‌မှီနိုင်မှုကိုပါ တည်ငြိမ်စေသည့် အစီအမံဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် လူထု၏ ဆက်လက်အသက်ရှင်သန်နိုင်ရေး၊ ပဋိပက္ခကာလအတွင်း ဆက်လက် ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံနိုင်ရေး အတွက် အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်းဆိုင်ရာအခွင့်အလမ်းများကိုပါ လက်လှမ်းမှီစေခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် စားနပ်ရိကွာ ဖူလုံနိုင်စေရန်အကာအကွယ်ပေးခြင်းနှင့် ရေရှည်တုံ့ပြန်ရေးအတွက် အစီအမံများ ချမှတ်နိုင်သည့် အခြေခံအချက်အလက်များအားလည်း ပံ့ပိုးပေးနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
အညာဒေသ၏ စားနပ်ရိက္ခာ အကျပ်အတည်းသည် ယာယီစိုးရိမ်မှု မဟုတ်တော့ဘဲ ဒေသတစ်ခုလုံး၏ ရှင်သန်ရေးနှင့်ဆိုင်သော ကိစ္စဖြစ်သည်။ မြေပြင်ရှိ အမှန်တကယ် လုပ်ဆောင်နေသော အဖွဲ့အစည်း များကို ယုံကြည်စွာဖြင့် တိုက်ရိုက်ပံ့ပိုးခြင်းကသာလျှင် အညာမြေ၏ စားနပ်ရိက္ခာစနစ် ပြိုလဲသွားခြင်း မှ ကာကွယ်နိုင်မည့် တစ်ခုတည်းသော နည်းလမ်းဖြစ်သည်။
လက်ပံနီသည် အညာဒေသ၏ လူမှုပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ အခြေအနေများကို အထူးပြုလေ့လာသည့် လွတ်လပ်သည့် သုတေသီတစ်ဦးဖြစ်သည်။ သူမ၏ သုတေသနများမှာ မြေပြင်၏ ပကတိ အခြေအနေများနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာမူဝါဒရေးရာ မူဘောင်များအကြား ကွာဟမှုကို ချိတ်ဆက်ဖြည့်ဆည်း ပေးရန် အဓိထားသည်။
xxx ကျေးရွာအမည်များကို လုံခြုံရေးကြောင့် မဖော်ပြခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယခုသုံးသပ်ချက်ဆောင်းပါးတွင် ဖော်ပြထားသော အကြောင်းအရာများသည် စာရေးသူ၏ လွတ်လပ်သော အမြင်နှင့် သုံးသပ်ချက်များဖြစ်သည်။
27 February 2026

Main Township	Sub-Township
Lahe Township	Htanparkway
Leshi Township	Mobaingluk
Leshi Township	Sonemara
Nanyun Township	Donhee
Nanyun Township	Pansaung

Tag: Sagaing

Naga Analysis

Naga Analysis

The Price of Passage: Checkpoints Taxation and Everyday Survival in Sagaing

The Price of Passage: Checkpoints Taxation and Everyday Survival in Sagaing

Living Alongside War: When Conflict Becomes Everyday Life for Ah Nyar Women – A case study from THE VILLAGE in Sagaing Region

Living Alongside War: When Conflict Becomes Everyday Life for Ah Nyar Women – A case study from THE VILLAGE in Sagaing Region

My Father Was Unable to Flee and Was Burned Alive

My Father Was Unable to Flee and Was Burned Alive