Photo: Villagers from Pauk Township, Magway Region, fleeing their homes. (Credit: Khit Thit Media)

Six years into Burma’s Spring Revolution, the political landscape is shifting once again and not always in ways the resistance had imagined. National Unity Government has declared a multi-stage reform process in response to escalating public frustration from its own support base. Questions about effectiveness, coordination, and accountability are no longer whispered concerns; they are openly debated online and across liberated areas. At the same time, Operation 1027 of the three Brotherhood Alliance (MNDAA, AA and TNLA) has effectively stalled. Beijing’s mounting pressure on the alliance has altered battlefield calculations and reminded all actors that geopolitics remains a determining force in Burma’s conflict. Adding to this fragile equation, the junta’s renewed push for general elections has been widely dismissed as a political manoeuvre rather than a genuine democratic transition. Labelled a “sham” by much of the international community, including ASEAN, the elections underscore the regime’s attempt to repackage military rule in civilian clothing. These events emerged as defining features of Burma’s political landscape in late 2025. Amid these developments, central Burma — known locally as Ah Nyar — has quietly become one of the most consequential political arenas of 2026.

Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway have announced the formation of federal unit governments. This signals a significant shift from resistance mobilisation to sub-national political structuring. Since the coup d’état in 2021, the central dry zone has been more than a resistance stronghold; it has served as the backbone of the NUG’s de facto authority. The formation of federal unit governments was welcomed by the NUG, states and regional parliaments, and non-violent movement coalitions such as CDM and People’s Strike Groups. Somewhat unexpectedly, ethnic revolutionary organisations refrained from expressing their positions or formally acknowledging the establishment of the federal unit governments. NUG Acting President stated, “to establish a better system of governance for the Sagaing region” in his speech during the seventh regular meeting of Sagaing Federal Unit Hluttaw, introducing the cabinet.

Federal Foundations or Parallel Power Centres?

The newly emerged federal unit governments in Ah Nyar raise two fundamental questions. Are these sub-national governments creating parallel power centres? Or are they laying the foundations of a future federal union?

The revolution may have achieved its immediate objective of removing the Naypyitaw regime over the past five years if the major groups had reached a consensus and formed a unified military alliance. However, it failed to bring smaller factions together under a coherent strategic direction. This means that the Spring Revolution has developed within a fragmented reality. That said, the reason why the federal units in central Burma emerged can generally be conceptualised in three ways. First, resistance forces in the region spread across villages and townships (around 87 townships), which makes collective actions challenging. Politically, the movement lacked a coherent central nucleus to provide unified strategic direction. In the past five years, the NUG has struggled to bring these dispersed forces under a coherent organisational framework. Second, a political foundation was already in place. The Federal Democracy Charter, NLD’s federal principles (Suu’s six principles) and the continuing legitimacy of 2020 elected MPs provided both normative and institutional grounding. Many of these MPs remained active in Ah Nyar and liberated areas. Taken together, these reinforce the case for formalised federal units. Third, perceived shortcomings of the NUG in Ah Nyar accelerated local initiatives. Weak coordination with emerging grassroots leaders, ineffective rebel governance and concerns over resource distribution contributed to demands for more autonomous regional structures.

The federal units have formally recognised the NUG as the central authority of the revolution and the interim federal government. In military affairs, their mandate is limited to unit-level security forces to effectively function as unit guard forces, while PDFs remain under the existing NUG command. Section 139 of the Sagaing Constitution states, “The following armed forces may be established in consultation with the National Unity Government: (a) the Defence Force of the Unit; and (b) the Security Force/Police Force of the Unit.” Section 114 of the Magway Interim Arrangement reflects a similar provision, while the Mandalay Interim Arrangement does not mention any security arrangements. Foreign affairs are fully vested in the centre and reaffirm the NUG’s exclusive diplomatic role. Provisions in Chapter 17 of the Magway Interim Arrangement, Chapter 18 of the Sagaing Constitution, and Annexe I of the Mandalay Interim Arrangement outline power-sharing between the NUG and the units. However, the division of competency still requires careful negotiation.

These developments could, in principle, reinforce the NUG rather than weaken it. Yet this outcome is not automatic. Critical conditions remain. Clear and durable understandings must be made, particularly on sensitive issues such as military coordination and foreign relations. The division of competencies between the centre and emerging federal units cannot be left ambiguous; it requires deliberate and structured negotiation. Given the political weight of these matters, authority must be exercised with restraint, caution, and strategic foresight.

Governing Priorities?

Sub-national governments are primarily functional in nature, widely described as mechanisms to deliver public services and coordinate with key stakeholders at the regional level. Their formation and structure are not unitary; rather, they are coalition-based. In Sagaing, the unit government comprises five representative blocs, while in both Magway and Mandalay, the respective unit governments are composed of seven representative blocs each. That said, and with the fragmented reality of the revolutionary landscape, the basic question arises. Can they truly make these governments work effectively? They must juggle competing priorities: confronting intensifying military pressure from the junta, navigating complex relationships with neighbouring ethnic organisations (KIO in Sagaing, AA in Magway, and TNLA/MNDAA in Mandalay) and sustaining alignment with the NUG and at the same time, building functioning sub-national governments.

Within this reality, two priorities stand out for 2026.

First, upper-layer political stability must be deliberately constructed. This requires stabilising the internal balance of power within the unit governments, particularly among the representative blocs, while also managing relationships with the NUG and neighbouring ethnic revolutionary organisations. Without cohesion at this level, effective governance on the ground will remain fragile and contested. To sustain this equilibrium, structured communication channels and agreed decision-making procedures must be institutionalised between representative blocs, the NUG, and neighbouring ethnic organisations. Clear mechanisms for dispute resolution should also be established to manage inevitable tensions before they escalate into political rifts. Without such frameworks, internal competition, mistrust, or overlapping claims to legitimacy will erode administrative effectiveness and weaken public confidence.

Second, an administrative framework at the federal unit level must be clearly defined, not in rhetoric, but in practice. The 2020 electoral mandate and revolutionary legitimacy, while powerful, cannot by themselves sustain governance. Authority must be translated into systems. Federal units need functioning structures for administration, budgeting, taxation, public service delivery, dispute resolution, and coordination with security actors. Lines of authority must be codified. The boundaries between civilian leadership and armed forces must be clearly drawn. Without institutional discipline, coalition-based governments risk becoming symbolic rather than functional. Equally important is a smooth and orderly transition from the NUG’s Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration administration to the emerging sub-national governments. This transition is not merely technical; it is political.

The success of Ah Nyar’s sub-national governments will depend less on how broadly they are composed and more on how effectively they are structured and managed.