By; Banyar Toee

17 December 2024

When the military seized power in 2021, not only did the people of central Burma, locally known as Ah Nyar, rise in defiance with pots and pans, but few could have imagined they would take up arms to fight the Naypyitaw military back. The most surprising party, undoubtedly, was the military regime itself. Three months after the coup that overthrew the elected National League for Democracy government, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing admitted in a rare and awkward confession during an exclusive interview with China’s Phoenix TV, “To be honest… if I may say so, I didn’t expect it to go this far.” His body language and expressions betrayed his discomfort as he leaned forward, fidgeting, with a flushed face revealing his embarrassment.

For decades, the military had firmly controlled Ah Nyar area which the military itself and security scholars labelled the heartland. Yet, in the early days of the Spring Revolution in 2021, the Ah Nyar Community which I here refer to as the collectiveness of the people from central Burma, not only resisted but also fuelled a growing resistance movement that the military could no longer suppress.

The Ah Nyar Community is courageous and decisive in fighting the very established Nyipyitaw military back. From the onset of the Spring Revolution in early 2021, Ah Nyar revolutionaries rose up across the region, sending a clear message to the military junta: not only would they reject dictatorship, but they were also determined to eradicate it at its roots. It should not be a surprise when a villager from central Burma raises a three-fingers sign and says, ‘End military dictatorship’. It is what the vast majority of locals do in the region. The choice to take the revolutionary path was not one made lightly. The Ah Nyar people were well aware that it would not be a walk in the park, but rather a thorny and arduous road. Yet, having tasted freedom, justice, and dignity, they were not willing to accept an unjust coup. Are these not the very essence of the Spring Revolution’s ideals?

As we approach 2025, the journey of the Spring Revolution will mark its fourth year. Early in the revolution, Kachin leader Lieutenant General Gun Maw commented that “a revolution should not last beyond five years.” His statement was made with measured contemplation, and we now see its relevance in Ah Nyar especially in linking with Kachin Independence Army’s policy position regarding Ah Nyar. The Kachin Independence Organisation’s (KIO) military and political manoeuvres across the region are closely tied to this perspective. KIO/KIA has been, since the onset of 2021 military coup a dedicated supporters in Ah Nyar as a well-established and experienced ethnic armed revolutionary organisation in Burma.

This article will not analyse the whole picture of the Spring Revolution, instead; I will take a focus on Ah Nyar. I must clarify beforehand that I am a native from Ah Nyar, with a deep tie to the community and a firm belief in the values of freedom, justice, and dignity. This perspective informs my writing, and there may be a degree of bias in my arguments.

2025 Watchlist

The wartime situation in Burma is highly fragile and complex. The power dynamics of political and military actors shift rapidly, as do the socio-political landscapes surrounding them. With this in mind, this article will highlight pivotal military and political developments to note in 2025.

Arakan

For Ah Nyar, Chin state, and Rakhine state, the intertwined nature of their geography, economy, security, and social relations necessitates a shared focus. Beyond their proximity, these regions are deeply interconnected through economic and security ties. The Arakan Army’s (AA) military operations in Rakhine state, along with movements near the western edge of Magway Region and southern Chin State, bear strategic implications for Ah Nyar.

As of 16 December 2024, AA reports indicate that it has either gained control or conducted extensive troop deployments in nearly all towns sharing the land border with mainland (central Burma) and Chin State. AA has controlled all areas sharing the border with its immediate neighbour Bangladesh. Out of the 17 towns in Rakhine State, only three towns, including the capital city Sittwe and China’s economic hub Kyauk Phyu, might be controlled by the AA without intense clashes, with attacks by the AA yet to be launched. Therefore, technically, Man Aung is the only town where the AA would need to launch an intense attack against the Naypyidaw military.

The AA’s next critical steps will involve securing assurances of security, especially from the most likely heavy aerial and navy attacks from the Naypyitaw military, and political recognition for the territories it has acquired. For this reason, Magway’s strategic significance to the AA’s broader objectives cannot be overlooked.

NUG and International Relations

Ah Nyar is not only the central stronghold of NUG but also NUG remains a critical political actor for Ah Nyar’s security and political future. This situation clearly indicates the need for the NUG and Ah Nyar to build a mutually beneficial relationship grounded in political accommodation.

It should be noted that the legitimacy boundary has already reached for elected representatives from 2020 General Election. Given the timeframe boundary of legitimacy from 2020 general election, the year 2025 will serve as a critical turning point for elected officials and administrative bodies formed under the NUG, Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and National Unity Consultative Council and National Unity Government (NUCC). Assumably, the NUG head, Acting President Duwa Lashi La has been working on this, and he recently called his squad in exile to come back to Burma, following the public criticism of the fact NUG, NUCC and CRPH members are in exile. In this political climate, it is a question for NUG to do something different from the past, unlike the failed government in exile in the past – National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma. There is still one more strike for NUG. The junta boss, Min Aung Hlaing, and his squad are stepping up clearly on their plan for a sham election in 2025.

The fall of the Northeastern Regional Command (Ya Ma Kha) on 25 July 2024 marks one of the most humiliating military defeats for the Naypyidaw junta. The Ya Ma Kha is a major military base near the Chinese border. This loss has resonated domestically and internationally, drawing criticism of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership even among his supporters. Adding more to this backlash, the junta boss has just recently lost the Western Regional Command, along with major losses in the entire western border of Burma. This raises a signal for Min Aung Hlaing to tighten his grip and legitimacy of his rule.

As the junta attempts to legitimise its rule, it has announced plans for elections, albeit limited to the regions it controls. However, with most of the country’s key borders and rural areas beyond its control, these elections will likely be confined to the Naypyidaw Council area and Yangon, and some cities under his influence. Whatever the situation is, it is unlikely that the junta will care about either international or domestic laws even the 2008 Constitution which they repeatedly framed like a bible.

In the realm of international relations, three significant challenges influence central Burma and NUG. First and foremost is China’s overt support for the Naypyitaw military, particularly in the aftermath of the junta losing control of a major regional military command near the Chinese border. Multiple announcements from ethnic revolutionary groups have confirmed China’s policy of discouraging collaboration between ethnic revolutionary groups from peripheral states and the revolutionary forces in central Burma and the NUG. For Beijing, the prospect of Naypyitaw’s regime collapsing and being replaced by a government dominated by Western democracies – or Burma splintering into smaller, independent states – would be a deeply unsettling scenario. Recent moves made by New Delhi become a second factor – likely to have a more direct influence on central Burma. The Naypyitaw military recently dispatched its political representatives to New Delhi. While no official statements were released, it is evident that the military is determined to pressure New Delhi – at any cost – to assist in suppressing revolutionary groups from central Burma, Arakan, Chin, and Kachin. The Naypyitaw military sees it as essential to contain its enemies within the heartland, preventing them from forming alliances with borderland-based powerful ethnic revolutionary groups or other political factions. Finally, regional stability and security concerns from ASEAN member states represent the third significant factor influencing the movement in central Burma. Despite the major failure of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), ASEAN – particularly Burma’s neighbouring countries – has persistently sought to normalise the 2021 military coup under the pretext of maintaining regional stability and security. The Naypyitaw military has exploited its control over the Presidential House and Parliament in Naypyitaw to push ASEAN into endorsing its agenda since 2021. In 2025, this should also be watched together with China and India’s interactions with Naypyitaw.

The Shan-Man Operation

The Shan-Man Operation began on 25th June 2024 and is a significant military operation aligned with the powerful 1027 operation and wider movement in central Burma. The group in the centre, Mandalay People Defence Force (MDY PDF) confirmed the operation’s significance in 1027 Operation, as Phase 2 after it was paused for a while. Despite the command structure is not clear yet, the Shan-Man Operation is a joint military operation of revolution forces, notably TNLA, MDY PDF, DPLA and several battalions from Ah Nyar, particularly Shwebo District. The operation spread across Thabeikkyin, Singu, Tagaung, and Madaya but also as far as Naungcho and Mogok. It is a strategic operation linked to the movement in Upper Sagaing. Upon its success, the L-shaped supply route connecting Kachin, Sagaing, and Mandalay to northern Shan – where nearly all townships are under the control of ethnic revolutionary forces – is expected to serve as a major catalyst for further military operations across central Burma. Despite continuous pressure from China, the Shan-Man Operation has not entirely halted, although its momentum has slowed, as recently confirmed by MDY PDF’s Soe Thura Zaw. Strategic military operation such as this, which surpass the level of a regional operation, are vital for bolstering the strength and unity of revolutionary forces in the central plains. This makes the operation highly significant for the region’s overall strategy.

The Junta’s Election Plan

The current realities in Naypyitaw have consistently signalled to the dictators in power the need for a big move – one that halts widespread military operations, particularly from powerful EROs, and prompts consideration of the legitimacy of their rule. This comes as they announce plans for elections, albeit limited to the regions under their control.  However, with most of the country’s key borders and rural areas beyond its control, these elections will likely be confined to the Naypyidaw Council and some city areas like Rangoon. Once again, the Naypyitaw military has no option but to resort to its old playbook in an attempt to secure international recognition. It remains reliant on a handful of allies, including Russia, China, India, and certain ASEAN member states. Despite its financial crisis, the Naypyitaw military appears willing to pay any price to secure such support.

On the other hand, we should also look at the limitations of 2020 election results, which will reach its five-year boundary very soon. It necessitates NUG and Spring Revolution Forces to do something different and prove they are smart and different from the previous government in exile, NCGUB. This situation could sway countries, such as ASEAN members and India, into falling into Naypyitaw’s trap with its fraudulent election. This is a likely scenario, given the regional security concerns of ASEAN members and neighbouring states due to the fragile political and security landscape in Burma.

The Kachin Operation

The Kachin Operation is deeply interlinked with the revolutionary movements in Ah Nyar since in the beginning of Spring Revolution 2021. Laiza’s perspective on the Spring Revolution plays a crucial role in shaping the dynamics of the central region. The late KIA Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General R Hkawng Lum, who passed away on 13 May 2024, was reported to have maintained close coordination with leaders from the NUG’s Ministry of Defence, as well as with revolutionary movements in Ah Nyar. NUG Defence Minister Ye Mon disclosed that R Hkawng Lum was a close associate with whom he frequently discussed the revolutionary movement in central Burma. Meanwhile, we have seen the significant role of KIA across central Burma, particularly in Sagaing region. KIA also controlled all of its borders with China following the recent military operations along the border. 

To continue part (2) …

Photo: Internet

About the Author: 

Banyar Toee is a Human Rights Analyst specialising in Transitional Justice in Burma and Southeast Asia. He holds a Master’s degree in Human Rights from the United Kingdom.