တဂ်: အုပ်ချုပ်မှု

  • Petro-Contestation and Emerging Governance Orders in Magway

    Petro-Contestation and Emerging Governance Orders in Magway

    Petro-Contestation and Emerging Governance Orders in Magway

    Bo Let Yar and Ye Htun Zaw attend the closing ceremony of the first cohort training of the Magway Federal Unit Guard Force. (Photo: Mandalay Free Press)

    This situational analysis is produced under အညာလေ့လာရေး as part of our broader effort to inform developments in central Burma and advance contextual understanding of the region. The analysis examines post-coup dynamics of natural resource control in Magway, with particular attention to the oil industry’s strategic importance to armed actors. It explores how oil fields have become embedded within evolving conflict structures and shaped authority, revenue generation and local governance.

    In addition to an extensive review of secondary sources, the analysis draws on nine key informant interviews with individuals possessing expert knowledge of the subject matter, including senior CDM staff formerly employed in oil fields in central Burma.

    Introduction

     After the 2021 coup, oil fields (locally known as Yae Nan Hmaw or Yae Nan Myay) have become contested strategic assets, where control over production and revenue is increasingly fragmented among the military regime, the NUG and local resistance groups, with significant implications for governance, security and energy access for people. These groups have been heavily contested across Magway, particularly in resource-rich townships.

    As of 2026, local resistance forces in Magway controlled two of the seven oil fields under the union government’s authority. The two major oil fields located in Pakokku, Myaing, and Pauk townships are currently under the management of the resistance administration. Oil and gas from these fields provided supplies for the Refinery Industry in Chauk township through Kamma and Pakokku.

    What do these oil fields and routes mean to resistance groups in Magway? How do these resources define the fate of the resistance movement and governance?

    Active Oil Fields in Magway

     Myanmar’s crude oil production is sourced from both onshore oil fields and offshore oil and natural gas blocks. There are at least ten onshore oil fields across the country, of which seven are in Magway. Major production comes from Yenangyaung, Chauk, Mann Yae Nan Myay, Pyay Yae Nan Myay, Shwepyitha (Myan-aung), and the Myaing–Pauk areas, according to senior officials who worked in the industry and now joined CDM. Among these, the Yenangyaung, Chauk, and Mann Yae Nan Myay in Magway Region are among the oldest in the country and have historically been among the most productive.

    The Htauk Shar Pin Oil field historically referred to the oil-producing area south of Minbu, beginning from Ta Pin village and extending through the areas around Htauk Shar Pin, Kywe Tho Myaung, Shwe Yaung Taung, and Hpa Lan Yone villages. The Kanni Oil field refers to the oil-producing area around Kanni village at the southern edge of Minbu township, including the surrounding areas of Htein Taw and Pike Pin villages. At present, the Htauk Shar Pin and Kanni oil fields in Minbu township, together with the Htan Kaing and Yae Nan Ma oil fields in Minhla township, are collectively referred to as the Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni Oil fields.

    The Sabe–Thagyitaung oil fields are located along the route from Pakokku through Kyun Chaung toward Seikphyu township, forming part of a broader oil belt that stretches across the country’s centre. According to a local source from Myaing township, this petroleum belt extends from Padauk Kone village in Pale Township, Sagaing Region, southward through areas such as Nyaung Ma, Sin Swei, Wei Taung, and Su Win, before continuing toward Thagyitaung and the Si Kaung area near the Bagan River port (of Irrawaddy River).

    Other major oil fields in Magway include Kyauk Khwet and Hpa Lan Kaine in Myaing and Pauk townships, as well as Wei Taung, Suwin, Nyaung-ma, Htan Kaing, Sabe–Thagyitaung, and parts of the broader Pakokku–Myaing–Pauk oil belt. Local sources describe the area stretching along the ASEAN Road between Myaing and Pauk as one of the main concentrations of hand-dug oil wells and small-scale extraction sites. Some areas, particularly Kyauk Khwet from Myaing township and Hpa Lan Kaine from Pauk township, are also known for their relatively high oil output, with local sources describing some wells as producing large volumes of crude oil.

    Seven Oil Fields in Magway. Two in the yellow zones are under the control of resistance groups.

    Unlike smaller hand-dug wells common in other parts of the central dry zone, some deposits in these mountainous areas reportedly require deeper and more mechanised extraction methods. In recent years, however, extraction methods have gradually become more mechanised with the increased use of machinery and technical equipment.

    Traditional Hand-Dug Well or Let Yet Twin

    Apart from the said major onshore oil fields, there are several tiny oil fields spreading across Magway. These are better known as Let Yet Twin, as locals call them. Traditional hand-dug wells in the region can reach depths of thousands of feet, with workers manually drilling, lowering equipment, and extracting crude oil under difficult conditions. According to Magway government records , there were 45 existing shallow hand-dug oil blocks and 11 newly approved blocks operating in Magway Region in the 2016–2017 fiscal year. This expansion continued into the 2017–2018 cycle as authorities approved 20 license extensions and 12 new permits, generating over 1.5 billion kyats for the regional fund in a single year. These figures represent the last phase of formal stability before the sector became contested; by the 2018–2019 fiscal year, the region’s output from seven major oil fields reached over 2.1 million barrels of crude oil, followed by nearly 3.5 billion cubic feet of natural gas in the 2019–2020 period.

    Resistance Control over Oil and Natural Gas Fields in Magway

    Resistance groups have gained control over oil fields and surrounding communities across Myaing, Pauk and Kamma townships, including two major oil fields previously under the authority of the union government. These are Kyauk Khwet–Let Pan To and Hpa Lan Kaing oil fields in Myaing and Pauk townships and Sabe-Thargyitaung oil field in Pakokku township.

    Earthquake People’s Defence Force fighters in front of a security station of Kyauk-Khwet Oil Field (Photo: Earthquake People’s Defence Force)

    According to U Zaw Min, Minister of Planning and Finance in 2020, these oil fields produced not only crude oil but also natural gas prior to the expansion of resistance control. Official data indicates that the annual natural gas production capacity in FY 2019–2020 reached 3,480 million cubic feet across five major oil fields, including the two now under resistance control.

    Local sources connected to resistance administrations in Myaing and Pauk confirmed the continued extraction of crude oil, but noted technical limitations regarding natural gas production, stating that:

    “We are only capable of producing crude oil from these two fields, but not natural gas due to technical requirements.”

    Magway regional government data further reported that total regional natural gas production capacity reached 4,554 million cubic feet in FY 2017–2018 and 3,739 million cubic feet in 2018–2019. The gas was distributed across Magway and Mandalay Regions to supply state-owned industrial facilities, including cement and cotton factories. Apart from these two major oil fields, resistance forces also control numerous traditional hand-dug oil wells across Magway, particularly in the areas of Myaing, Pauk, Kamma and Pakokku.

    Refinery Industries

    Magway is a major refinery spot for Myanmar’s petroleum sector. Two of the three major refineries are located in the region. They are;

    • The Petrochemical Complex, locally known as Man Thanbayakan, is located near Minhla Township in Magway Region. The facility was constructed in 1982 by Mitsubishi Heavy Industry with a design refining capacity of 25,000 barrels per stream day (BPSD), and production commenced in 1986. Historically, the complex processed crude oil primarily sourced from the Mann Yae Nan Myay and Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni oil fields. Its products include gasoline, diesel, ATF (aviation turbine fuel), LPG, kerosene, fuel oil (FO) and petroleum coke (pet coke). According to official information, the current operational capacity is approximately 8,500 BPSD (around 300,000 gallons per day), depending on the availability of locally produced crude oil. The facility is also reportedly undergoing upgrading and modernisation works.
    • The (2) Refinery in Chauk Township is one of the oldest refineries in Myanmar. Built in 1954 by the Foster Wheeler Company of England, the refinery consists of an atmospheric distillation tower, a vacuum tower and wax extraction plants, with a design processing capacity of 6,000 barrels per stream day (BPSD). The facility historically processed only locally produced crude oil, primarily sourced from the Chauk and Yenangyaung oil fields, as well as crude oil extracted from the Kyaut Khwet and Lat-pan-to oil fields in Pauk and Myaing townships. Crude oil from the upper part of Magway was transported via pipeline to the Ayadaw Oil field near Tant-Kyi-Taung in Pakokku Township before being sent onward to the refineries in Chauk. In addition to crude oil transportation, natural gas extracted from the Kyaut Khwet field was previously transported by pipeline to Aya-daw and industrial facilities in Wazi to support factory operations. The refinery historically produced gasoline, kerosene, diesel, wax, fuel oil (FO) and blue oil. However, according to official information, the plant was shut down on 5 March 2019 due to the declining availability of local crude oil and natural gas.

    Their combined output accounted for only around 3 per cent of domestic fuel consumption.

    Map Showing Refinery Industries in Magway

    The Recent Deal with the Chinese Corporation for Htauk Shar Pin-Kanni Oil Field

    According to state media reports published on 12 April 2026, the Ministry of Electricity and Energy of the Naypyitaw regime signed an agreement with China-based North Petro-Chem Corporation (Myanmar) to increase crude oil production at the Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni oil field in Minhla township. The company, with its mother corporation in Xi’an, northern China, is closely associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. The company started Myanmar operations in 2011 with its principal activity for the extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, as stated in Myanmar’s official source. It has been involved in Myanmar’s petroleum sector for more than a decade through exploration and production projects.

    On 10 April 2026, the agreement was reportedly concluded shortly after the formation of the newly formed Naypyitaw regime led by ex-general Min Aung Hlaing. Myanmar state media reported that the initiative aims to boost domestic crude oil production in response to Myanmar’s heavy reliance on imported fuel, which accounts for approximately 97% of national consumption, and to help alleviate ongoing fuel shortages. The details of the agreement remain unknown.

    Signing Ceremony for Hautkshabin-Kanni oil field between the Chinese Company and MOGE (Photo: Global New Lights of Myanmar)

    Under the evolving landscape of natural resources politics in Central Burma, four key issues emerge that shape how oil fields are contested, governed, and integrated into the broader conflict economy.

    1) How is the conflict economy structured around oil fields?

    The conflict is increasingly shaped by a fragmented and adaptive political economy rather than fixed territorial control. Since the 2021 coup, oil-producing areas such as Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni and the Myaing–Pauk fields have become contested economic nodes where authority over extraction, transport, and taxation is dispersed among the military, resistance structures, and local actors. While formal ownership often remains with state-linked institutions, actual control on the ground is fluid and continuously negotiated.

    In particular, mature fields like Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni, where most reserves have already been exploited and production is technologically constrained, retain strategic value not because of untapped resources, but because of their integration into wider supply chains and refining systems, including the Mann Thanbayarkan refinery. Within this system, brokers and traders play a critical but less visible role by facilitating the movement of crude oil, refined fuel, and essential goods across conflict lines. These intermediaries operate through highly flexible arrangements, often engaging with multiple armed actors simultaneously and shifting allegiances based on access, security guarantees, and profit margins. As a result, the conflict economy is sustained not only by armed actors but by a network of commercial agents who mediate flows of fuel, taxation, and information.

    2) How are local armed actors competing over oil fields?

    Myaing and Pauk townships have been resistance stronghold areas since 2021. Several local resistance groups exist alongside the NUG’s 3P-forces and LID 101 of Tatmadaw. Some of them are Ah Nyar Myay Alliance (အညာမြေတပ်ပေါင်းစု), Myaing Villages Revolution Front, Earthquake People’s Defence Force  and Myaing Solidarity Alliance (မြိုင်ညီညွတ်ရေးတပ်ပေါင်းစု), Ghost Of Enemies-GOE Revolution and Southern Yesagyo PDF. The competition among armed actors is structured around control of infrastructure rather than the oil wells themselves. Local resistance forces, including the “3Ps” (people’s defence, administration, and security teams), have consolidated influence by embedding themselves within the oil economy—taxing extraction, regulating access to drilling sites, and controlling key transit routes. For instance, these routes are particularly important, as crude and semi-refined oil must pass through checkpoints linking Pauk–Myaing to Pakokku, Monywa, Mandalay, and beyond. Control over these corridors allows actors to extract revenue at multiple points, creating layered taxation systems that can favour one side or another depending on local arrangements.

    At the same time, Tatmadaw continued to rely on fixed checkpoints and garrison-based control, particularly along major transport axes, requiring goods from certain areas to be channelled through junta-controlled routes. However, the system is not purely adversarial. In practice, there are negotiated flows of commodities—such as rice, fuel, and basic goods—where both sides tolerate or facilitate movement that sustains local economies. This produces a form of transactional coexistence, where economic interdependence tempers military confrontation. Nevertheless, the strategic objective for Tatmadaw remains clear: to regain control over oil-producing zones like Pauk in order to cut resistance revenue streams and re-establish centralized control over fuel distribution, through its continuous raids and aerial attacks.

    3) How do external and allied actors fit into this system?

    China’s involvement is primarily anchored in long-term investments and infrastructure, including pipeline corridors and pre-existing production agreements, some of which date back to before 2015 with contract durations spanning 30–50 years. Recent agreements to increase production at fields such as Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni likely suggest continued interest in maintaining output despite the field’s age and technical limitations. The potential reasons could be seen as to

    First, they may have broader strategic and resource interests in the area beyond oil production, including the potential for coal extraction in central Myanmar. For instance, strategic oil and gas pipeline routes pass through areas such as Ngape, Minbu, and Yenangyaung, while coal-related projects and extraction sites have also been linked to areas around Ngape, Padan, and Minbu. According to local sources, several of these projects are owned, operated, or backed by Chinese-linked companies and investors.

    Second, many Chinese companies had already entered Myanmar’s oil and gas sector long before the 2021 coup through long-term exploration and production agreements. Third, as many Western and foreign companies withdrew from Myanmar after the coup, competition in the sector weakened significantly. This created opportunities for Chinese companies to secure market access, expand their influence, negotiate favorable terms, and establish a stronger foothold in Myanmar’s energy sector with fewer competitors.

    Meanwhile, the role of the Arakan Army (AA) appears to operate through logistical and commercial linkages. For instance, fuel produced in Myaing–Pauk is reportedly refined into usable forms and transported toward Chin and Rakhine areas, where it supports both civilian and military needs. Within this system, brokers and trading networks potentially serve as intermediaries connecting Central Burma’s oil economy to AA-aligned supply chains, reflecting a pattern of alliance-based resource sharing. At the same time, constraints on arms purchase and financing among resistance groups may increase reliance on such resource-based networks. As a result, Magway’s oil fields are not isolated assets but form part of a wider, interconnected conflict economy that links production zones in Magway to operational theatres in Chin and Rakhine which reinforces the strategic significance of even declining oil fields.

    4) Tensions in Myaing and Pauk Townships

    Magway Federal Unit is a recently emerged political unit within the Spring Revolution, shaped through the interim constitutional arrangement that recognises the National Unity Government of Myanmar as the union/federal government. The arrangement establishes three branches of power: legislative, executive and judicial. NLD lawmaker Ye Htun Zaw, elected from Constituency No. 2 of Min Hla Township, serves as the Chief Minister of the newly formed government, while youth activist Chit Win Maung serves as his deputy, representing the bloc of unions, women’s organisations, youth organisations and people’s strike committees from the Spring Revolution.

    Magway Federal Unit Government (2026)

    Magway has emerged as a unit within the evolving federal model, with the authority to establish armed forces at the level of a state guard. Article 114 of the constitutional arrangement provides that:

    “The Magway Federal Unit Government shall, in consultation with the National Unity Government of Myanmar, establish the following armed forces for defence and security purposes: (a) the Magway Federal Unit Guard Force; and (b) the Magway Federal Unit Security Force / Police Force.”

    In practice, however, the situation is far more complex than it may appear, given the fragmented landscape of armed resistance groups across Magway, despite their shared objective of resisting the military junta. Within Magway’s political geography, numerous small resistance factions, commonly known as Local People’s Defence Forces (LPDFs), operate independently across villages. Alongside them are the National Unity Government’s People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and People’s Security Teams (PSTs), more widely known as Pa Ka Pha, active across several townships in Magway. The region is also home to ethnic minority communities and their respective armed organisations.

    These include the Yaw, Taung Thar and Asho Chin ethnic groups. The Yaw and Taung Thar communities are indigenous populations inhabiting the Pon Taung and Pon Nyar hill tracts in north-western Magway. In these hilly areas, the Yaw Army and the Yaw Defence Force are the predominant local armed groups. Both identify themselves as Ethnic Armed Organisations/Revolutionary Organisations (EAOs/EROs) and advocate for self-determination in the region. At the same time, major battalions and PSTs (Pa Ka Pha) under the Ministry of Defence of the NUG are active across the three townships of Gangaw, Tilin and Saw.

    The Asho Chin (also known as Plains Chin) are a small ethnic subgroup of the broader Chin ethnic population inhabiting lowland areas of Myanmar, particularly in western Magway. Following the military coup, two major armed groups emerged within the community: the Asho Chin Defence Force (ACDF) and the Chin Defence Force–Asho (CDF-Asho). Both maintain connections with resistance forces operating in the hilly areas of Ngape and Sidoktaya townships along the Magway–Rakhine border. Both groups advocate for ethnic liberation and self-determination.

    These local armed groups have been substantially integrated into the political processes of drafting of the Magway interim constitutional arrangement and formation of the Magway Federal Unit Government. They constitute two of the seven representative blocs shaping the political process and institutional development of the Magway Federal Unit.

    Beyond these two ethnic armed branches, several other LPDFs continue to operate alongside the NUG’s PDFs and PSTs. These include groups such as the People’s Revolution Alliance (Magway), the Southern Yesagyo PDF and the United States of Burma Army (USBA). While some maintain affiliations with the NUG, others operate independently outside the formal NUG command structure.

    Within this fragmented security landscape, security governance in Magway remains inherently challenging, beyond the influence of the NUG alone. The petroleum sites in the resistance strongholds of Myaing and Pauk Townships have constituted particularly intense contestation among the various security actors operating in Magway. More recently, following the formation of the Magway Federal Unit Government and its attempt to establish a Unit Guard Force, Chief Minister Ye Htun Zaw and Security Minister Let Yar attended the closing ceremony of the first cohort of Guard Force training. The event subsequently sparked existing complexities and tensions within the regional dynamics between LPDFs, the NUG and the Magway Federal Unit.

    Bo Let Yar and Ye Htun Zaw attend the closing ceremony of the first cohort training of the Magway Federal Unit Guard Force. (Photo: Mandalay Free Press)

    The NUG reportedly mobilised hundreds of PDF personnel to the area amid claims that the operation aimed to capture Bo Let Yar. However, Soe Thura Zaw, a senior official from the Ministry of Defence, denied the accusation, stating that the situation was not a dispute between the Magway Federal Unit and the NUG. He further rejected claims that the operation concerned control over petroleum sites. According to him, the operation had two primary objectives: (1) to undertake corrective and chain of command measures in response to issues relating to the Myaing PST, following unsuccessful attempts to impose administrative action in 2024 and 2025; and (2) to deploy forces for security duties to protect petroleum sites placed under union/federal management. In response to Soe Thura Zaw’s statement, Chief Minister Ye Htun Zaw wrote on his Facebook that the conflict was associated with resource governance. He further stated that senior NUG officials needed to adhere to the decisions jointly agreed upon between the NUG and the Magway Federal Unit on 5 April 2026 regarding the management of petroleum and related products. Coinciding with the timing of the incident, 42 local PDFs operating in the area and across Magway issued a statement on 18 April 2026 declaring that the groups would affiliate with the Magway Federal Unit under its military command structure.

    Adding to this contestation, Tatmadaw’s LID 101, based in Pakokku and backed by Meiktila-based LID 99, launched a large-scale mobilisation of troops along the main roads connecting Pakokku to Pauk, Myaing and Yesagyo. This triggered the most recent escalation of conflict from late April through to the time of writing of this briefing paper. Thousands of villagers from the three townships have reportedly fled to farmlands and neighbouring villages. More recently, junta forces raided and burned houses in several villages in Yesagyo Township.

    The recently adopted constitutional arrangement of the Magway Federal Unit establishes a policy framework for the sharing of revenues and financial interests between the NUG and the Unit (Section 129), while the Unit retains legislative authority over natural resources (Section 169(d)).

    Conclusion

    Three major contested zones can be observed within Magway’s resistance landscape:

    • The eastern bank of the Ayeyarwady River, particularly the Salay-Chauk-Gwaycho plain;
    • The upland areas on the western bank of the Ayeyarwady River, particularly Minhla, Ngape, Sidoktaya, Mindon and Thayet townships;
    • The Bhan-Kywe and Pa-Khan plains (In Burmese: ဗန့်ကျီ-ပခန်းလွင်ပြင်) (Yesagyo, Myaing, Pale and Yinmarbin townships) and the Pon Taung-Pon Nyar Hills.

    Key Takeaways

    • Security and political contestation are likely to intensify further in resource-concentrated zones and key transportation corridors. These dynamics will involve not only confrontation between the Tatmadaw and resistance forces but also growing competition between the Magway Federal Unit and the NUG.
    • The petroleum agreement between the Chinese company and the Naypyitaw regime represents a development that warrants close attention. It may be understood as more than merely technical assistance from China for petroleum production, carrying potentially significant implications for regional security and political dynamics.
    • The ways the NUG and the Magway Federal Unit manage disputes concerning the administration of petroleum fields in the Myaing-Pauk area will test the integrity of the Magway Federal Unit’s political arrangement. At the same time, the case presents an important point of reference for other emerging federal units and states in Burma.
    • The influence exercised by Arakan and Chin revolutionary organisations, operating within broader alliance frameworks, over Magway’s petroleum fields and strategic transportation routes has become a significant factor shaping the region’s security and political developments. In particular, the security and political positioning of revolutionary forces operating in the Pon Taung-Pon Nyar Hills and the Arakan Yoma hill tracts – areas aligned with the Arakan Army – are becoming critical determinants in Magway’s evolving conflict and political landscape.

    Cite this article: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. (2026, May 15). Petro-Contestation and Emerging Governance Orders in Magway [Situational Brief]. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies.


    [cas_related]

  • Analysis of the Evolving Power Structure of Federal Units in Central Burma

    Analysis of the Evolving Power Structure of Federal Units in Central Burma

    Analysis of the Evolving Power Structure of Federal Units in Central Burma

    Photo: People of Sagaing Show Their Support for Operation 1027 and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (Photo: Sagaing Region Strike Forces’ Facebook Page)

    Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma (part 2)

    The emergence of federal units in central Burma marks a major shift in the country’s revolutionary politics, shaped by the political dynamics of the Spring Revolution. Although this development has been influenced to some extent by the federal principles articulated by actors involved in the NCA process before the coup, as well as by the longstanding principles of ethnic revolutionary groups, the formation of federal units has been driven primarily by the latest discussions after the coup. In the meantime, central Burma has become a testing ground for revolutionary governance, shaped by various armed and political actors working towards a common goal.

    While Part (1) of this series traced the origins and formation of these federal units, Part II examines the power structures within the three units. The analysis aims to uncover how central authority is organised, distributed, and contested, and to offer insights into the political struggles at the regional (federal unit) level amid growing calls for NUG reform.

    Constituent Base of Power

    The power structure of the federal units is shaped by three overlapping sources of legitimacy: electoral, revolutionary, and civil. These cores altogether create a hybrid political order that is neither traditionally parliamentary nor purely revolutionary. This hybrid nature is still a new concept in the political history of Burma.

    Sources of Legitimacy

    Electoral legitimacy derives from the 2020 elected MPs who constitute the unit parliaments. The 2020 General Elections were an electoral process established under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. Under that Constitution, the terms of the parliaments were set at five years (see Sections 119, 151 and 168[1]). However, the Constitution was completely abolished by the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw on 31 March 2021[2]. Since then, the new terms of the unit parliaments have been defined as lasting until the emergence of new parliaments under a permanent constitution developed for each region (see Section 58 of the Magway Interim Arrangements; Section 65 of the Mandalay Interim Arrangements; and Section 51 of the Sagaing Constitution).

    Unit parliaments have very limited capacity to exercise territorial authority due to displacement, weak administrative structures, and the complex dynamics of post-coup actors. Nevertheless, their presence provides continuity with pre-coup democratic mandates and offers both local and international legitimacy. The unit parliaments also confer legality on the interim arrangements and serve as the principal bodies for legislative oversight during wartime.

    Revolutionary legitimacy arises from resistance groups that have gained authority through territorial control or influence within the units. These groups include the “3-Ps” (People’s Defence Team, People’s Administration Team, and People’s Security Team) of NUG and the Local People’s Defence Forces (LPDF). Their legitimacy is grounded in the practical authority they exercise through on-the-ground governance and the provision of security. A closer look at the leadership and the composition of resistance groups, four broad community clusters can be identified: youth groups, political parties (primarily the NLD), students’ unions, and local labour and peasant communities. Youth groups involved in national and regional youth policy processes between 2015 and 2020 now form the core of youth-led resistance groups in the region, while the NLD youth wings in the three regions (now federal units) and other democratic political parties have also joined the armed resistance. In central Burma, the Myay-Latt and upper Burma divisions of the All Burma Federation of Students’ Unions, along with several university students’ unions, joined various armed organisations after the coup. In addition, local labour and peasant communities also stepped forward to take up arms and fight against the military junta following the coup.

    Despite differing levels of participation in the political process surrounding the interim arrangements, no direct involvement of resistance groups was found in Sagaing, whereas such involvement was evident in Magway and Mandalay (as reflected in categories 6 and 4 of their respective drafting bodies). In Magway, 14% of the members of the drafting commission were representatives of armed resistance groups, compared with 9% in Mandalay.

    Civic–stakeholder legitimacy comes from women’s organisations, labour groups, peasants, ethnic/minority groups, students’ unions, strike groups, youth networks, and CDM civil servants. Although this category represents very diverse organs, three major groups significantly influence this layer: ethnic minorities, CDM participants, and strike groups. These three groups have demonstrated a relatively higher level of dominance over the political process, beginning with the drafting phase and continuing to the current stage of executive formation. Local bodies representing each group have emerged alongside the drafting process. These include the Sagaing Region Strike Forces[3], formed by strike groups in the Sagaing Region; the Sagaing Federal Unit CDM Civil Servants Council[4] and the Chin Ethnic Groups[5] of the Magway Federal Unit.

    Yinmarbin-Salingyi Strike of Sagaing Region Strike Forces [6]

    This inclusion reflects the social character of the Spring Revolution and broadens political participation beyond armed actors and elected officials. However, their roles often lack a clear constituency and accountability mechanisms, leading to overlapping mandates and the potential duplication of functions.

    These sources of legitimacy combine and create a power structure characterised by negotiation, decentralisation, and collective decision-making. Clearly, the term “consensus” is frequently described in the interim arrangements (in Sagaing, it is the constitution) of three units.

    Varied Models of Executive Power

    The three units share common goals and similar political origins, but they adopt different models of executive power to adapt to the need to balance local power and drive the resistance movement forward.

    Sagaing adopts a highly collectivised executive structure. The five groups responsible for drafting the Sagaing Constitution have significant influence over executive authority, as Section 67 empowers them to scrutinise and select members of the executive. Their influence is further reinforced by Section 66, which permits only individuals belonging to the representative groups involved in the constitution-drafting commission to serve as cabinet members. The Chief Minister has very limited unilateral power, and the government operates through consensus among representative blocs. The Chief Minister does not have the executive authority to appoint or remove any cabinet members, including the Chief Administrator of the Naga Self-Administered Zone. Nor does the Chief Minister have the power to restructure the executive body under the constitution.

    Process Diagram of Cabinet Formation in Sagaing

    This model strictly prevents the concentration of power in any single actor but risks policy paralysis under collective leadership.

    Magway presents the most codified and legally formalised model of executive formation among the federal units. Law No. 1/2023 of the Federal Unit Parliament institutionalises the drafting commission as a body composed of seven representative blocs, and these blocs subsequently become embedded as core political actors within the executive architecture. Their influence is structurally established through Sections 12(d), 61–63, and 152–154 of the Magway Interim Arrangement.

    Process Diagram of Cabinet Formation in Magway

    Section 12(d) predetermines the composition of the cabinet by limiting eligibility to members of these seven blocs, effectively transforming the drafting commission into a gatekeeping mechanism for executive authority. Sections 61–63 further empower the blocs to constitute the Selection Commission responsible for appointing cabinet members, including the Chief Minister. Each bloc nominates one candidate for Chief Minister, and the Selection Commission—comprised of representatives from these same blocs under Sections 153 and 154 determines the executive leadership. Although the Chief Minister is nominally authorised to nominate ministers, cabinet formation remains contingent on the collective consent of the seven blocs and subsequent parliamentary approval. In effect, the Magway model reflects the Sagaing protocol: the Chief Minister lacks unilateral authority to appoint, dismiss, or restructure the cabinet. Executive authority is instead dispersed across the seven blocs and the parliament. Consequently, Magway’s executive structure operates as a hybrid parliamentary model in which executive leadership is balanced, and at times constrained, by institutionalised checks from both parliamentary institutions and civil–political groups.

    Mandalay adopts the least formalised and most centralised model, built around the Coordination Platform of revolutionary forces (the Mandalay Platform). Its Interim Governing Council is selected by the 11–15 representative blocs from the Mandalay Platform, followed by parliamentary approval. Unlike Sagaing and Magway, the Mandalay Executive Head is authorised to appoint, dismiss, or restructure the cabinet.

    Process Diagram of Council Formation in Mandalay

    However, there are no provisions in the arrangement guiding the accountability mechanisms of executive members. It remains unclear whether executive members will be held accountable to the parliament or to the Mandalay Platform. Mandalay has not yet published the members of the Mandalay Platform. The absence of detailed legal provisions on accountability reflects the politically sensitive security environment, where coordination takes precedence over legal precision.

    Reference

    [1] Section 119. The term of the Pyithu Hluttaw is five years from the day of its first session. Section 151. The term of the Amyotha Hluttaw is the same as the term of the Pyithu Hluttaw. The term of the Amyotha Hluttaw expires on the day of the expiry of the Pyithu Hluttaw. Section 168. The term of the Region or State Hluttaw is the same as the term of the Pyithu Hluttaw. The term of the Region or State Hluttaw expires on the day of the expiry of the Pyithu Hluttaw.

    [2] CRPH, “Declaration on the Complete Abolition of the 2008 Constitution” [31 March 2021]. Available here: https://crphmyanmar.org/publications/statements/crph3103212/

    [3] https://www.facebook.com/Sggstrike

    [4] https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091451325717

    [5] https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580838481806

    [6] https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=122196780116063633&set=pb.61551909016018.-2207520000&type=3

    Read part (1) of the briefing paper here.


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  • Understanding Federal Units in Central Burma (part 1)

    Understanding Federal Units in Central Burma (part 1)

    Understanding Federal Units in Central Burma

    Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma (part 1)

    Introduction

    The dry zone or Central Burma is locally known as Ah Nyar (or Anyar). The central plain where Burmese majority lives was once politically referred to as the heartland of the Myanmar military (or Tatmadaw). It could be due to some demographic and geographic strategy of the Tatmadaw. Firstly, Tatmadaw is the state military, and it is formed by the Burmese majority, and the founding father General Aung San is from Natmauk of Ah Nyar. On the second, and more importantly, the tactical formation of Tatmadaw was strategically built on fighting against its domestic enemies in the periphery states. Tatmadaw has been a central figure of the decade-long civil war with ethnic liberation movement, particularly Karen, Mon of southern Burma, Kachin of northern Burma, Shan of Eastern Burma and Rakhine and Chin of western Burma. In light of this peripheral warfare in the mountainous regions, its major supply bases were heavily located in the central plain areas of Ah Nyar, mostly in Magway region. Out of 25 Weapon Manufacturing Industries of Directorate of Defence Industries of Tatmadaw, 68% of industries manufacturing major weapon supplies are situated in Ah Nyar alone, while the remaining 32% are in Bago and Yangon. Additionally, its human resource pool has long been filled by unemployed young men from central Burma. It was not an unfounded hypothesis for the Tatmadaw’s military strategists to view Ah Nyar as a strategic and secure position from which to counter and contain its enemies in the peripheral states. Who would have imagined the rise of a revolutionary movement in Ah Nyar? Neither the Tatmadaw nor its opposition groups, including Burma’s ethnic revolutionary organisations, could have foreseen it. The 2021 military coup d’état became a miracle in the history of revolution in Burma. The people of Ah Nyar became a central figure of the prominent Spring Revolution in Burma since the early days of 2021. Despite the tragedies on the frontlines and the fragmented structure of the resistance groups, their guerrilla campaigns have, at times, demonstrated efforts to evolve into conventional warfare, most notably marked by the launch of Operation 1027. This has also led to re-framing revolutionary strategies in Ah Nyar. Nearly five years into the Spring Revolution, with Ah Nyar at its heart, the movement now confronts escalating threats from the Tatmadaw. This raises a critical question: what direction is the revolution in Ah Nyar now taking?

    Contextual origins

    Across central Burma, the emergence of federal units was not from the prior constitutional design but a response to the evolving dynamics of the Spring Revolution. As resistance forces gained territorial control across Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay alongside advances in northern Shan, Chin, Kachin and Rakhine, the need for structured governance became increasingly urgent. Beginning in early 2023, consultations among local revolutionary actors, 2020 elected representatives and community networks led to the creation of drafting bodies for interim arrangements. These interim frameworks opened political space for decentralised regional federal governments that complement, coordinate with and strengthen the broader federal-democratic movement led by the National Unity Government. The three regions of central Burma are currently in the process of establishing federal units; most notably Sagaing, which many diplomats and scholars see pioneer of federal units. All three regions of central Burma have now enacted legal arrangements for forming federal unit governments. These interim arrangements form the core of the regional political framework and are key to understanding the direction in which the revolution in Ah Nyar is heading, despite the presence of several tiny factions of resistance groups in each region.

    Drafting and Approval Framework

    The drafting processes were led by the drafting bodies established by the respective regional parliaments. In Magway and Sagaing, the interim arrangements drafting processes began following the enactment of Laws No. 1/2023 in both regions, dated 17 November 2023. In contrast to these two regions, the Mandalay interim arrangements drafting process commenced through an agreement between the Mandalay parliament (Committee Representing Mandalay Hluttaw) and revolutionary groups in Mandalay. Unlike Sagaing and Magway, Mandalay deliberately avoided using the term “law”; instead, it adopted the “Plan for Coordination and Drafting of Interim Political Arrangements in Mandalay”. The plan was officially approved on 12 July 2024. Nevertheless, the principles and drafting processes across all three regions are largely similar.

    Drafting Bodies

    Approval Process

    Unit parliaments hold the sole authority to approve the interim arrangements in Sagaing and Magway. Mandalay follows a two-step approval process: first, the interim arrangements must be approved by the Mandalay Region People’s Revolutionary Forces Coordination Platform, which comprises seven groups representing revolutionary forces; and second, the Mandalay Parliament (in Burmese, မန္တလေးဒေသလွှတ်တော်) approves and announces the arrangements to the public.

    Executive

    Despite differences in terminology, the structure and functions of unit governments in central Burma are largely similar.

    Structure

    Who Forms the Cabinet?

    Sagaing

    Constituting the Sagaing Cabinet is based on selection, as defined in Chapter 5 of the constitution, rather than appointment. Section 67 requires the parliament (Sagaing Federal Unit Hluttaw) to form a Scrutiny and Selection Commission (SSC) for the Interim Sagaing Federal Unit Government. By structure, the SSC comprises representatives similar to those in the drafting commission (for the interim arrangement), together with representatives from the People’s Administration Team in Sagaing. The SSC plays a crucial role in selecting candidates for the position of Chief Minister, and the parliament elects the Chief Minister through a secret ballot system. Once the Chief Minister is confirmed and formally appointed by the parliament, the Chief Minister joins the SSC to select and nominate the remaining members of the cabinet for parliamentary approval.

    Magway

    The Magway Interim Cabinet is constituted through a selection-based system, rather than an appointment system. Under Section 61 of the interim arrangement, the Selection Commission is required to nominate candidates for the position of Chief Minister for approval by the parliament. Once the parliament confirms the Chief Minister, the CM, upon the agreement of the seven parties represented in the Interim Drafting Commission, may nominate the remaining members of the cabinet. These nominations must then be submitted to the parliament for final approval.

    Mandalay

    The Mandalay Region People’s Revolutionary Forces Coordination Platform serves as the key body responsible for forming the Selection Commission for members of the Mandalay Interim Governing Council (MIGC), in accordance with Section 67 of the interim arrangement. The Mandalay parliament is then required to approve the Commission’s selections and formally announce the formation of the MIGC.

    Political Leadership

    Defence and Security

    Sagaing

    Sagaing Federal Unit establishes a federalised, civilian-led, and NUG-coordinated security architecture. The constitution allows Sagaing to form two types of armed forces — the People’s Security Team and the People’s Defence Team (the “2-Ps”), excluding the People’s Defence Force. Although NUG may deploy the 2-Ps with the agreement of the Unit Government, these forces remain under the authority and control of the Unit Government. In accordance with Section 142, the Unit Government is required to establish a Defence and Security Council to oversee the security governance of the Unit.

    Magway

    Magway interim arrangement sets out a civilian-led, locally grounded, and revolutionary-aligned security architecture. Section 114 establishes that security and defence functions fall under the authority of the Magway Interim Government. To support this, the Magway Federal Unit Parliament is mandated to enact laws governing the Unit’s security and defence forces (Section 123). An additional provision is also included that the Unit’s Ministry of Defence must form a preparatory committee to organise the Unit’s security and defence force in coordination with the armed revolutionary actors operating within the region.

    Mandalay

    The interim arrangement does not contain any provisions on this matter.

    Terms of Government

    Photos: Internet


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