Tag: Human Rights

  • What is Happening in Ah Nyar? August, 2026 [Issue 8/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? August, 2026 [Issue 8/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? August, 2026 [Issue 8/2026]

    ICRC visited State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Photo: internet)

    This Month in Ah Nyar: A Quick Overview

    • Sagaing and Mandalay formally joined SCEF, while coordination among the three federal units and with national-level institutions continued.
    • ICRC Representative of Burma visited State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
    • Resistance forces expanded military coordination, while junta forces continued offensives, reinforcements and airstrikes to regain strategic positions.
    • Airstrikes, village raids, arbitrary arrests, looting and arson continued across Ah Nyar, with civilians bearing the main burden of the conflict. The airstrike on a meditation centre in Myaung killed at least 16 people and injured more than 30, highlighting the continuing vulnerability of civilian spaces
    • Sagaing flood directly affected at least 177,700 people in at least 10 Sagaing townships, while restrictions on relief efforts compounded the crisis.

    Politics

    With the rise of discussions around the Steering Council for the Establishment of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), political debate appears to have become more prominent than institutional building, in contrast to the institution-building processes observed last month across the three units of central Burma. These political developments also coincided with the recent visit by the ICRC Burma representative to State Counsellor and NLD Chair Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, during which the ICRC stated that the visit “included the opportunity to speak with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in private.”

    Following these discussions, Sagaing and Mandalay officially joined SCEF, a political and military alliance involving the NUG, KIO, KNU and their partners. Discussions with Magway remain ongoing.

    This month also saw increased horizontal coordination among the three federal units, alongside greater engagement with the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). This can be understood as complementary to the ongoing discussions on the Division of Competencies (DoC) with the NUG, particularly regarding future administrative transitions. At the same time, the continued negotiations point to unresolved questions over representation, authority, and the relationship between federal-unit institutions and national-level actors.

    More consequential developments, however, may be emerging at the administrative level. In Magway and Sagaing, federal-unit governments continued coordinating with NUG structures and township administrations, while Mandalay openly discussed the division of competencies between the NUG and the region in higher education. These developments suggest that federalism is increasingly being negotiated through everyday governance and the exercise of administrative authority, rather than through constitutional and political declarations alone.

    Magway’s federal-unit government also announced the establishment of a public complaints mechanism and the creation of a human rights department under the Deputy Chief Minister’s Office.

    The central political question emerging from August is therefore not simply whether Ah Nyar is developing alternative institutions, but whether these increasingly numerous institutions can establish a coherent division of authority and a shared federal political framework without reproducing political and institutional fragmentation.

    Security

    The security landscape was characterised by persistent territorial contestation, increasing coordination among resistance forces, and continued military efforts to regain strategically important positions. The coordinated military column operating in Myaing and Pauk townships, led by LID 101 and LID 99, was reportedly reinforced by infantry troops from the 14th Military Operations Command based in Mong Hsat, eastern Shan State. The operation has been heavily supported by airpower, including aerial bombardment and fighter-jet strikes, as explored in our recent analysis of the situation. By 8 August 2026, the military column had reportedly raided at least 31 villages across Myaing and Pauk townships. More recently, reports indicated that a Tatmadaw column was approaching the Well No. 2 Oil Field near Kyauk Khwet village in Myaing Township, suggesting an ongoing effort to regain strategically important economic and territorial positions.

    In response, the resistance alliance’s “Ah Nyar Tamar Operation” has continued to confront military forces in areas under the command of the Magway Federal Unit’s Ministry of Defence. Fighting also continued in Minhla and Mindon townships, where reported military reinforcements point to the strategic importance of the routes connecting Magway and Rakhine. The United States of Burma Army, which is active in the area, also reported armed clashes beginning around 20 August. Beyond these frontline clashes, August also saw targeted killings of resistance-linked actors. A central committee member of the Chinland Defence Force (Kalay, Kabaw and Gangaw), along with two other individuals, was reportedly assassinated by gunmen who subsequently joined a Tatmadaw military base in Gangaw Township. Separately, the commander of the Chin Defence Force–Asho was reportedly killed in an ambush by junta forces in western Magway.

    Sagaing similarly experienced a mixture of resistance advances and increased military pressure. Resistance forces reportedly captured a strategically important military position between Indaw and Katha, while fighting and military restrictions continued in areas including Mingin, Yinmabin and Sagaing. The reported use of airstrikes during flooding, alongside arrests, forced recruitment and movement restrictions, further demonstrates how military pressure continues to extend beyond conventional frontline engagements. In Myaung Township, Sagaing Region, a junta field commander was reportedly assassinated inside the town, and resistance forces subsequently seized his mobile phone, potentially providing intelligence on the junta’s local operations and networks.

    In Mandalay, resistance forces continued to target military positions around Myittha, Meiktila, Myingyan and Kyaukpadaung, including the reported capture of a military outpost in Myingyan. At the same time, military and allied forces continued operations against civilian communities and resistance-held areas.

    On resistance coordination, four resistance groups, including the Rocket Fighter Column of the Magway Regional People’s Security Team under the NUG, formally announced the formation of a military alliance. At the local level, there were also signs of growing operational coordination, including joint operations among resistance groups in Mandalay and increased cooperation between different forces in Magway.

    The overall pattern suggests a protracted contest rather than a clear military turning point. Resistance forces appear increasingly capable of coordinating operations and contesting military positions, but the military continues to compensate for territorial vulnerabilities through reinforcement, airpower and coercive control of civilian movement.

    Human Rights

    The humanitarian situation in Central Burma has further deteriorated as flooding and ongoing military operations place a double burden on conflict-affected and displaced communities. According to our monitoring data regarding floods in Central Burma, over 177,700 people have been directly affected in at least ten townships of Sagaing, including Ye-U, Khin U, Taze, Myaung, and Wetlet townships. However, Tatmadaw authorities have also restricted emergency relief and rescue efforts in flood-affected areas. In Sagaing, for instance, local sources reported that people has been stopped and checked from carrying relief supplies at the Sagaing Bridge (Yadanarpon Bridge), locally known as Hna Pauk. 

    Amid such natural disasters, multiple aerial attacks of Tatmadaw continue against civilians. NUG has stated that, from 8 August to 23 August, over 240 airstrikes occurred nationwide, in which Magway and Sagaing were mostly targeted. In Sagaing, during August, attacks on civilians were recorded in Chaung U, Kani, Khin U and Myaung townships, among others. Among deadly aerial attacks, the massacre case was recorded in Myaung township. Tatmadaw conducted airstrikes twice around 9:00 am on 21 August, targeted at Buddhist meditation centre located in Hswe Lae O village, Myaung township.  Our investigation has recorded that the attack resulted in the deaths of 14 people at the scene, and over 30 were injured. Most are male elderly meditators, according to locals. Two people, including a 16-year-old boy, were dead with heavy injuries after the attacks. The attack may have been retaliatory following the killing of a Tatmadaw officer in Myaung on 17 August, although this connection requires further verification.

    In addition, since early August, Tatmadaw’s on-ground operations have continued to expand in Magway, Sagaing and Mandalay. Common patterns of arrests, torture to death, hostages, looting civilian properties, and burnings are widely seen as junta strategy in frontline battles. Such forms of violations were recorded in villages of Seikphyu,  Chauk and Myaing townships in Magway, the villages of Kani and Yinmarbin townships in Sagaing, as well as the villages of  Nyaung U and Taung Thar townships in Mandalay. 

    In urban areas controlled by the Tatmadaw, local sources reported arbitrary arrests under the pretext of conscription in Kalay, Monywa and Salin. These arrests were followed by extortion, with families asked to pay money for the release of those detained, according to local sources. In Salin township, for example, 16 young men aged 25–35 were arrested on August 16 by Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 253, stationed in Salin. Local sources reported that the junta intensified conscription recruitment for batch 28 that will begin in September.  

  • At Least 38 Civilians Killed, 15 Injured and 370 Homes Burned: Evidence of Ground and Aerial Attacks by LIDs 101 and 99 in Myaing and Pauk

    At Least 38 Civilians Killed, 15 Injured and 370 Homes Burned: Evidence of Ground and Aerial Attacks by LIDs 101 and 99 in Myaing and Pauk

    At Least 38 Civilians Killed, 15 Injured and 370 Homes Burned: Evidence of Ground and Aerial Attacks by LIDs 101 and 99 in Myaing and Pauk

    Weapon remnants found in different locations in Myaing (Source: CAS)

    Highlight

    • At least 38 civilians were killed, including victims in two massacres documented in Htauk Shar Pin village (Pauk Township) and Baw Ton village (Myaing Township).
    • At least 15 civilians were injured in heavy artillery and aerial attacks.
    • At least 370 civilian homes were verified as burned across Myaing Township and neighbouring Htauk Shar Pin village in Pauk Township.
    • Infantry units raided at least 31 villages across Pauk and Myaing Townships, while aerial and heavy artillery attacks affected at least seven additional villages in Myaing Township.
    • LIDs 101 and 99 conducted repeated aerial attacks and heavy artillery shelling against civilian-populated areas, including villages, displacement sites and a monastery.
    • Photographs of military shirts bearing the insignia of both LID 101 and LID 99 corroborated local accounts concerning the units involved in the operation.
    • Evidence from victims’ families, eyewitnesses, aid workers, photographs and weapon remnants indicates patterns of extrajudicial killings, severe ill-treatment, destruction of civilian property and attacks affecting civilian areas.

    Methodology and Evidence Assessment

    This investigation was conducted through a combination of field-based interviews, incident documentation, on-site observations, photographic evidence and cross-checking with local early-warning and flight-spotter information. Our researchers interviewed 11 individuals, including victims’ family members, eyewitnesses, residents, humanitarian and civil society actors and local sources familiar with the movement and activities of the military column. Information collected through interviews was assessed against incident records, photographs, videos, casualty information, property-destruction records and, where available, physical evidence such as remnants of mortar rounds. Our researchers reviewed 117 photos and 11 videos obtained from several sources. The investigation focused on incidents occurring between 23 June and 8 August 2026 in Myaing Township and neighbouring areas of Pauk Township. 

    Timeline of the Incident [23 June – 8 August 2026]

    Date

    Key Events

    23 June 2026

    Magway resistance forces reported engaging and destroying a Myanmar military helicopter near Twin Ma village.

    24 June 2026

    LID 101 and 99 units advanced nearby villages from Twin Ma village. Raided Thar Si and Hnan Si Kan, before reaching Kaing Taw Ma.

    Late June–early July

    Infantry units advanced towards Thin Ma and Gyoke Kone villages.

    13–14 July 2026

    28 civilian homes were burned in Let Khoke Pin village as the military column moved through the area.

    20 July 2026

    Heavy artillery attacks from military positions in Thin Ma affected surrounding villages. Multiple civilian killings were also documented during the military operation, including six victims in Baw Ton.

    21 July–1 August 2026

    65 civilian homes burned in Thin Ma village.

    22 July 2026

    Artillery fire from Thin Ma struck Wet Hpoe, killing civilians and injuring others.

    24 July 2026

    Multiple aerial attacks struck civilian and displacement sites, including Hnan Si Kyin, Gyote Kone and Hnan Sar Kyin.

    24–29 July 2026

    More than 140 aerial attacks were reported over six days, involving fighter aircraft and gyrocopters.

    26 July 2026

    A fighter aircraft attacked So Taw village, Bone Gyi Kan village tract, damaging a monastery and injuring one Buddhist monk and two civilians.

    27 July 2026

    A fighter aircraft attacked Kyet Mauk village. The incident damaged a power line but no civilian casualties were reported.

    31 July 2026

    A fighter aircraft dropped a bomb near Thaphan Kan (Hpan Kan) village. Two gyrocopters subsequently attacked Ma Gyi Kan, damaging civilian homes and injuring cattle. Later that afternoon, another fighter aircraft attacked Ywar Thit Gyi, damaging at least seven houses.

    1 August 2026

    Military forces moving from Thin Ma arrived in Baunt Bin and remained there until the evening.

    2 August 2026

    Military forces reportedly burned civilian homes in Baunt Bin at around 10:00 a.m.

    2 August 2026

    Military forces moved into Yar Gyi Pyin village and remained in the area.

    3 August 2026

    31 civilian homes burned in Kan Net village, Kaing Taw Ma village tract.

    5 August 2026

    Local sources reported that military forces burned homes in Yar Gyi Pyin for the first time during the later phase of their movement through the area.

    6 August 2026

    Local sources reported a second round of house burnings in Yar Gyi Pyin in the morning.

    7–8 August 2026

    Gyrocopters attacks in Su Win killed two civilians and resulted three injuries.

     Background of Myaing Township

    Myaing Township, in northern Magway Region, lies along a strategic security corridor linking central Burma with Chin State, Rakhine State and India. It is also the origin of the Myaing–Pauk–Kamma–Pakokku–Chauk oil belt, which contains several traditional hand-dug oil fields and a major modernised oil and natural gas field.

    Following the 2021 military coup, Myaing became one of the principal contested townships between the junta forces (locally known as Tatmadaw) and pro-democracy resistance forces. Earlier in 2026, resistance forces captured the Pyu-Saw-Htee positions in Wet Poke, Tha Yet Kwa and Tha Yet Kan villages. Currently, resistance groups of the Magway Federal Unit Government controlled most of the township, while Tatmadaw maintained a limited presence through two Pyu-Saw-Htee strongholds and two frontline bases. As the territorial control contracted, Tatmadaw increasingly relied on air power to project military force across Myaing Township, including against oil fields under the control of resistance groups. These operations involved a range of aerial platforms, including fighter aircraft, helicopters, gyrocopters, military-grade paramotors, drones and loitering munitions (kamikaze drones).

    On 23 June 2026, Magway People’s Defence Force released video footage showing its fighters engaging a Tatmadaw helicopter during a military operation, which the group announced resulted in the aircraft being shot down. The incident illustrates the increasingly contested operating environment in Myaing Township.

    Large-Scale Infantry Offensive by LIDs 101 and 99

    On 24 June 2026, a military column comprising troops from Light Infantry Divisions 101 and 99 launched an operation in villages surrounding Twin Ma, where the military-backed Pyu-Saw-Htee militia had maintained a presence since the 2021 coup. Over the following days, the column advanced through a number of villages before reaching Gyoke Kone and Thin Ma, both located near resistance-controlled oil fields in Ba Hin, Wei Taung and Su Win villages along the Myaing–Pauk township boundary.

    Our researchers attributed the military operation to forces from LIDs 101 and 99 based on multiple accounts from local sources familiar with the column’s movements and composition. These accounts were corroborated by photographic evidence obtained from the field, including photographs of military shirts bearing the insignia of both LID 101 and LID 99.

    Operation Area Map of Infantry Raids in Myaing Township (source: CAS)

    Interviews with local resistance sources indicate that the military operation was launched from two staging points – Twin Ma village and the No. 2 Factory in Myaing Township. The sources estimated that the operation involved approximately 1,000 soldiers. Our researchers independently verified that the military column subsequently raided at least 27 villages between 23 June and 2 August 2026. During the period, armed clashes were also reported in several villages, specifically in Hnan Si Kan and Kaing Taw Ma villages. Between 20 and 25 July 2026, junta forces stationed in Thin Ma village repeatedly shelled surrounding villages using 60 mm, 80 mm and 120 mm mortars. The mortar attacks were reported and verified in Baunt Bin, Wet Hpoe, Nyaung Kone (from Ma Gyi Kan village tract), and Kyet Mauk villages. The attacks killed three civilians, injured at least seven others, damaged civilian properties and left unexploded ordnance.

    Mortar rounds documented in Thin Ma village (Photo: private)

    In addition to ground operations, LIDs 101 and 99 extensively employed aerial attacks during the operation, many of which struck civilian-populated areas. Our researchers verified that at least nine villages were subjected to airstrikes involving fighter aircraft and gyrocopters, particularly in areas north of Ba Hin village. The affected villages were Thin Ma, Gyoke Kone, Hnan Sar Kyin, So Taw, Kyet Mauk, Thaphan Kan (Hpan Kan), Ma Gyi Kan and Ywar Thit Gyi. The military column used at least 200 aerial attacks in the last ten days of July, as reported by the Democratic Voice of Burma. Aerial attacks injured at least five civilians, including a Buddhist monk and an elderly woman and caused damage to civilian homes, religious property and other civilian infrastructure across several villages.

    “Which village to burn, which village to burn…”

    Our incident-tracking data documents extensive destruction of civilian homes across several villages during the operation. We verified that LIDs 101 and 99 burned down at least 370 houses across ten villages in Myaing Township and neighbouring Htauk Shar Pin village from Pauk Township. A village-by-village breakdown of the documented destruction is provided below.

    Sr

    Village

    Township

    Number of Houses burnt down

    1

    Htauk Shar Pin

    Pauk

    104

    2

    Thin Ma

    Myaing

    65

    3

    Baunt Bin

    Myaing

    90

    4

    Kan Net

    Myaing

    31

    5

    Let Khoke Pin

    Myaing

    28

    6

    Kaing Taw Ma

    Myaing

    2

    7

    Htan Nge Taw

    Myaing

    4

    8

    Nyaung Kone

    Myaing

    5

    9

    Than Chaung

    Myaing

    5

    10

    Gyoke Kone

    Myaing

    16

    11

    Mya Zee Taw (Zee Taw)

    Myaing

    20

    The destruction occurred repeatedly as the military divisions moved through villages. In Let Khoke Pin, our researchers documented 28 houses burnt between 13 and 14 July. In Thin Ma, 65 houses were recorded as burnt between 21 July and 1 August, while 31 houses were documented in Kan Net on 3 August. The geographical spread and timing of these incidents indicate that the burning of civilian homes accompanied the military divisions’ advance through several villages, as illustrated above. One interviewee described the burning of homes in Let Khoke Pin, Kan Net, Myin Koe Thit and Nyaung Kone,

    “It was not that they only burned particular houses. As the military column moved through the villages, they burned the houses they encountered.”

    The arson attacks also affected places where displaced civilians took shelter. At Mya Zee Taw (Zee Taw) monastery, displaced civilians and monks had taken shelter, while villagers had moved food, seeds and other belongings there because they considered it safer than their homes. The same interviewee said,

    “When the column suddenly arrived, the monks and the displaced people in the monastery had to flee. They ran away with only the clothes they were wearing. The motorbikes, clothes and food supplies that the displaced people had stored at the monastery because they thought it would be safe – all of them were caught up in the burning.”

    The interviewee further stated that food and rice were taken by the soldiers and that two religious buildings and motorbikes were burned. According to a villager who survived the military arrest, the field commander of the military column issued direct instructions to his soldiers about which villages to burn. The source said that the man subsequently escaped from the bunker while the commander was issuing these instructions.

    Despite the escalation of conflict and repeated military raids, villagers in the area had limited access to timely information that could enable them to prepare for or safely evacuate ahead of military advances. The operation also took place amid severe restrictions on civilian communications. In addition to the area-wide internet shutdown, telephone communications were reportedly disrupted as LIDs 101 and 99 entered the area. The disruption of communications severely constrained the ability of local authorities and communities to share early warnings and coordinate civilian evacuations. This largely increased the risk that civilians would encounter the advancing military column. A local resistance source explained,

    “The internet lines on our side were completely cut off, and the telephone lines were also completely cut off. Because of this, the resistance administration could only communicate among themselves as they tried to move civilians away from the military column. Sometimes civilians and resistance forces could no longer make contact and people ended up in different places. They then encountered the military column, and these kinds of things happened.”

    As our researchers observed during the on-site investigation, displaced villagers remain scattered across neighbouring communities and farmland, with extremely limited access to food, shelter and other essential supplies. Among the thousands of people displaced and hundreds of families whose homes have been destroyed, many face a heightened risk of prolonged displacement, having fled with little or no belongings beyond the clothes they were wearing. The displacement has also taken a severe psychological toll on affected communities. One interviewee described the distress experienced by her mother-in-law:

    “My mother-in-law is still very sad. She cannot even speak well over the phone. The more she saw the thick smoke, the more she cried.”

    Houses being burnt down in Thin Ma village, Myaing township on 1 August 2026 (source: CAS)

    Extrajudicial killings: Massacre in Htauk Shar Pin and Baw Ton villages

    Our researchers confirmed that at least 33 civilians were killed during infantry raids by LIDs 101 and 99 between late June and 8 August 2026. Of these, we were able to verify the names, ages, genders, villages of residence and townships of 24 victims, while the remaining victims have not yet been identified. The documented cases include civilians who were reportedly arrested and subsequently killed, subjected to torture and other ill-treatment, shot, or apparently burned alive. 

    The circumstances surrounding several of the killings demonstrate a pattern of capture, detention, severe ill-treatment and subsequent killing, rather than deaths occurring solely as a result of armed clashes. In one case in Htauk Shar Pin village, the victim was captured by soldiers while returning from visiting his sisters. According to his wife, who subsequently received the call to identify his body, he was found the following day with his hands bound behind his back and severe injuries to his genital area. His anus had been cut and mutilated with a knife, and his penis had also been cut. The physical condition of the body, together with the fact that his hands had been bound, provides strong evidence that he was subjected to severe physical abuse before his death.

    The victim’s wife provides a direct explanation of the sequence of events leading to his death. She stated that he was captured by soldiers while returning from visiting his sisters and that the family was subsequently contacted by the village rescue team to identify his body. Through our local sources, we have confirmed that he was taken alive and subsequently found dead in military custody, rather than killed during an armed engagement. The restraints and extensive mutilation documented on his body further demonstrate the severe ill-treatment inflicted upon him before or in connection with his killing.

    The account is further corroborated by a local aid worker whom we interviewed and who participated in recovering the bodies of other victims in the area. The aid worker described two additional victims, both men aged 50 and 63, whose bodies were found naked, with their elbow tendons cut. The worker also reported finding a military knife inserted into the anus of one of the victims. Our researchers reviewed photographs taken at the scene and verified that the bodies were naked and displayed visible signs of severe physical ill-treatment. These accounts reiterated our finding of a recurring pattern of ill-treatment of civilians by the junta forces across central Burma.

    Another massacre was also verified in Baw Ton village of Myaing, where our researcher confirmed six civilian deaths on 20 July 2026. Five victims were identified as men, aged between 23 and 59 while one female victim remained unidentified. A local civil society group we interviewed reported that these villagers were burnt alive, but we couldn’t independently verify it.

    The victims were civilians from the same village, and our evidence does not indicate that their deaths resulted from an armed clash. The Baw Ton incident therefore constitutes a significant case for further investigation into the military column’s treatment of civilians and the broader pattern of extrajudicial killings documented across Myaing Township.

    Table 1: List of the victims who were killed by the military column of LIDs 101 and 99

    Sr

    Name

    Age

    Gender

    Village

    1

    Internal Record

    Unknown

    Male

    Thar Si

    2

    Internal Record

    Unknown

    Male

    Hnan Si Kan

    3

    Internal Record

    Unknown

    Male

    Hnan Si Kan

    4

    Internal Record

    Unknown

    Male

    Meik Hti Lar

    5

    Internal Record

    Unknown

    Male

    Meik Hti Lar

    6

    Internal Record

    Unknown

    Male

    Wet Poke

    7

    Internal Record

    30

    Female

    Htauk Shar Pin

    8

    Internal Record

    48

    Male

    Htauk Shar Pin

    9

    Internal Record

    58

    Male

    Htauk Shar Pin

    10

    Internal Record

    35

    Male

    Htauk Shar Pin

    11

    Internal Record

     75

    Male

    Htauk Shar Pin

    12

    Internal Record

    Unknown

    Unknown

    Htauk Shar Pin

    13

    Internal Record

    50

    Male

    Kan Net

    14

    Internal Record

    63

    Male

    Kan Net

    15

    Internal Record

    70

    Male

    Myin Koe Thit

    16

    Internal Record

    67

    Male

    Kaing Taw Ma

    17

    Internal Record

    31

    Male

    War Yin Chaing

    18

    Internal Record

    45

    Male

    Baunt Bin

    19

    Internal Record

    40

    Male

    Baunt Bin

    20

    Internal Record

    45

    Male

    Baunt Bin

    21

    Internal Record

    Unknown

    Male

    Myin Koe Thit

    22

    Internal Record

    60

    Male

    Kaing Yoe

    23

    Internal Record

    35

    Male

    Kun Lat

    24

    Internal Record

    35

    Male

    Kun Lat

    25

    Internal Record

    68

    Male

    Kun Lat

    26

    Internal Record

    23

    Male

    Kun Lat

    27

    Internal Record

    Unknown

    Female

    Baw Ton

    28

    Internal Record

    40

    Male

    Baw Ton

    29

    Internal Record

    35

    Male

    Baw Ton

    30

    Internal Record

    35

    Male

    Baw Ton

    31

    Internal Record

    59

    Male

    Baw Ton

    32

    Internal Record

    40

    Male

    Baw Ton

    33

    Internal Record

    56

    Male

    Than Chaung

     Aerial Attacks and Heavy Artillery

    The ground offensive by LIDs 101 and 99 was accompanied by repeated aerial attacks and heavy artillery fire. Our evidence indicates that these attacks were not isolated incidents; instead, they are critical elements of a coordinated military operation, during which civilian homes, monasteries, displacement sites and other civilian-populated areas were repeatedly targeted.

    While the infantry raids were concentrated around villages connected to the Tatmadaw’s two frontline positions – Twin Ma Pyu-Saw-Htee post and No. 2 Factory frontline post – the aerial attacks were concentrated in villages farther from the military column’s immediate reach. A closer examination of airstrike incidents in eight villages indicates that LIDs 101 and 99 used aerial attacks to support the advance of their infantry column towards resistance strongholds. As the infantry column advanced from Thin Ma village, aerial attacks were repeatedly reported in neighbouring villages, including Kyet Mauk, Thaphan Kan (Hpan Kan), Ma Gyi Kan and Hnan Sar Kyin. According to our on-site observation, the military column used at least 200 aerial attacks, which caused serious harm to the civilian population in the community. According to local sources we interviewed and early warning information, the attacks involved both gyrocopters and fighter jets operating from different airbases.

    The military column also used 60 mm, 80 mm and 120 mm mortars from positions in Thin Ma village to strike surrounding communities. We reviewed photos of remnants of these weapons, recovered from three locations after the forces left Thin Ma. Some 120 mm mortar remnants bore lot numbers indicating manufacture in 2026 by Myanmar Defence Industries (commonly known as KaPaSa). Unexploded 60 mm mortar rounds were also documented in Ywar Thit Gyi and Baunt Bin on 22 July. 

    Weapon remnants found in different locations in Myaing (Source: CAS)

    The artillery attacks caused both immediate and delayed civilian harm. On 22 July, junta forces stationed in Thin Ma fired heavy mortar rounds at Wet Hpoe village, which killed three civilians and injured at least seven others. Two days later, 120 mm mortar rounds were reportedly fired towards other villages, while additional mortar fire continued as the column moved through the area. The use of heavy mortars allowed the military to strike villages beyond its immediate physical presence; however, civilians remained exposed even when the ground column had not entered their communities.

    In the case of Wet Hpoe, we verified that a husband and wife, both over 50, were killed when artillery struck their home. Their 28-year-old daughter, who was seriously injured in the same attack, subsequently died from her injuries. Other members of the family and nearby civilians sustained serious or minor injuries. A local healthcare worker described the victim’s condition on arrival at the clinic:

    “When she arrived at the clinic at 11:00 am, she was already in a critical condition. We could only provide basic emergency care to stop the bleeding and provide fluids. She had severe injuries, heavy blood loss and her chances of survival were considered unlikely. She was later transferred for further treatment but died from her injuries on the same day.”

    A young, displaced person who witnessed the incident described how the family was attempting to flee when the shell struck.

    “They [affected family] went into their village, Wet Hpoe, to get the medicine. When they [soldiers of Tatmadaw] fired artillery toward Wet Hpoe village, they [the villagers] heard the first shell and shouted, ‘It is dangerous, move, move!’ They rushed to get onto the three-wheeled motorbike. If they did not get on, they might not have been hit. But as they were getting onto the vehicle, the artillery shell struck next to their location. Three of them were injured, and later their daughter died.”

    Our casualty records document 15 people injured and 5 killed by aerial and artillery attacks between 22 and 26 July. Seven of the 15 injured were over the age of 50. The victims included displaced people from Thin Ma, Baunt Bin and Khway Mway, as well as civilians sheltering at a monastery in So Taw.

    Table 2: List of casualties due to aerial attacks in Myaing township

    Sr

    Name

    Age

    Gender

    Village

    Remarks

    1

    Internal Record

    50

    Male

    Wet Hpoe

    Death due to artillery attacks.

    2

    Internal Record

    52

    Female

    Wet Hpoe

    Death due to artillery attacks.

    3

    Internal Record

    28

    Female

    Wet Hpoe

    Death due to artillery attacks.

    4

    Internal Record

    39

    Male

    Su Win

    Death due to gyrocopter attacks.

    5

    Internal Record

    32

    Female

    Su Win

    Death due to gyrocopter attacks.

    6

    Internal Record

    52

    Male

    Wet Hpoe

    Injured due to artillery attacks.

    7

    Internal Record

    54

    Female

    Wet Hpoe

    Injured due to artillery attacks.

    8

    Internal Record

    60

    Male

    Wet Hpoe

    Injured due to artillery attacks

    9

    Internal Record

    40

    Male

    Wet Hpoe

    Injured due to artillery attacks

    10

    Internal Record

    51

    Male

    Wet Hpoe

    Injured due to artillery attacks

    11

    Internal Record

    42

    Female

    Wet Hpoe

    Injured due to artillery attacks

    12

    Internal Record

    53

    Female

    Wet Hpoe

    Injured due to artillery attacks

    13

    Internal Record

    30

    Male

    Khway Mway

    A displaced man from Khway Mway village, got Injuries due to gyrocopter attacks in Hnan Sar Kyin on 24 July 2026.

    14

    Internal Record

    60

    Male

    Baunt Bin

    A displaced man from Baunt Bin village, got injuries due to attacks in Han Sar Kyin on 24 July 2026.

    15

    Internal Record

    34

    Male

    So Taw

    Got injuries due to aerial attack against the monastery of So Taw village, on 26 July 2026 by Y-12 of Tada-U airbase.

    16

    Internal Record

    42

    Male

    So Taw

    Injured due to aerial attack against the monastery of So Taw village, on 26 July 2026 by Y-12 of Tada-U airbase.

    17

    Internal Record

    81

    Female

    So Taw

    Injured due to aerial attack against the monastery of So Taw village, on 26 July 2026 by Y-12 of Tada-U airbase.

    18

    Internal Record

    37

    Male

    Su Win

    Injured due to gyrocopter attack.

    19

    Internal Record

    47

    Male

    Su Win

    Injured due to gyrocopter attack.

    20

    Internal Record

    34

    Male

    Su Win

    Injured due to gyrocopter attack.

    Findings and Assessment

    The operation combined ground raids, village burning, extrajudicial killings, heavy artillery and aerial attacks, extending the military’s reach beyond areas directly engaged by infantry forces. While ground forces advanced through villages, artillery positions in Thin Ma repeatedly shelled surrounding communities, while fighter aircraft and gyrocopters struck villages farther from the column’s immediate position. The timing and geographic overlap indicate that aerial and artillery attacks formed an important component of the wider operation.

    The investigation verified at least 38 civilian deaths, including cases involving arrest followed by killing, shooting, severe ill-treatment and alleged burning alive. In several cases, evidence indicates that civilians were taken alive and subsequently found dead. In Htauk Shar Pin, a victim was reportedly captured and found the following day with his hands bound and severe genital injuries. His wife’s testimony was corroborated by an aid worker and photographs showing visible signs of severe physical ill-treatment. The evidence establishes a pattern of capture, detention, severe ill-treatment and subsequent killing, amounting to extrajudicial executions and torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

    Researchers verified the burning of at least 370 civilian homes across Myaing Township and neighbouring Htauk Shar Pin village in Pauk Township. The timing and geographic spread indicate that the destruction accompanied the military column’s advance rather than resulting solely from armed clashes. Witnesses also described soldiers burning homes along their route and destroying property stored at Mya Zee Taw (Zee Taw) monastery, where displaced civilians had sought shelter.

    Aerial and artillery attacks further extended the operation’s reach into civilian areas. Researchers documented fighter aircraft and gyrocopter attacks, alongside 60 mm, 80 mm and 120 mm mortar fire from Thin Ma, affecting villages, displacement sites and a monastery and causing civilian casualties and property damage. Photographs of weapon remnants and information from early-warning and flight-spotter networks corroborated accounts of these attacks. The pattern raises serious concerns regarding compliance with the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack.

    Accountability and Recommendations

    The evidence warrants further investigation into the responsibility of LIDs 101 and 99 and their commanders for unlawful killings, severe ill-treatment, destruction of civilian property and attacks affecting civilians. Accountability mechanisms should preserve and independently assess available evidence, establish the chain of command and operational responsibility and investigate individual and command responsibility. Domestic and international actors should ensure that survivors and victims’ families have access to truth, justice and effective remedies, including reparations, while protecting witnesses and preserving evidence for future judicial proceedings.

  • What is happening in Ah Nyar? July 2026

    What is happening in Ah Nyar? July 2026

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? July, 2026 [Issue 7/2026]

     

    Politics

    During July 2026, political developments in Central Burma were characterised by continued progress in resistance governance and institution-building, particularly in Sagaing and Magway. The Sagaing Federal Unit Parliament enacted the Interim Defence and Security Council Law, which subsequently drew criticism from the Civil Disobedience Movement Council, a representative bloc within the Sagaing Federal Unit Government. The CDM Council argued that the law was inconsistent with federal democratic principles and the interim constitutional framework. During the same period, the parliament confirmed the appointment of the Chief Justice and judges. This marked a further step in establishing the federal unit’s judicial institutions, while the division of authority between the Ministry of Justice of the NUG and the Sagaing Federal Unit Government is gaining momentum. NUG’s justice minister U Thein Oo held a meeting with key political stakeholders from Sagaing on the transition.

    The Deputy Chief Minister of the Sagaing Federal Unit Interim Government conducted a field visit to Khin-U Township, where he met with the Township People’s Administration Team, Township MP Dr Win Aung and sectoral administrative leaders. Although the government did not disclose details of the discussions, the meeting reflected ongoing coordination between the federal unit government and township-level governance structures. In addition, the National League for Democracy convened a working coordination meeting of executive committee members from its township and regional branches across the Sagaing Federal Unit.

    At the political dialogue level, both the Sagaing and Mandalay Federal Units endorsed the first draft of the Common Political Agreement (CPA) of the National Unity Consultative Council.

    In Magway, the interim government expanded its defence structures by establishing additional temporary military columns in response to intensified military offensives. During July, the Magway Federal Unit Government added five new military columns to its existing four. According to official statements, the sub-national government consolidated local defence forces across Magway into military columns under the leadership of former Pa Ka Pha (locally acronym for People’s Security Team of the NUG) leader Bo Let Yar of Myaing Township.

    Meanwhile, the NLD reiterated that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s participation remains indispensable to any political resolution in Burma. In a separate joint statement marking her 81st birthday, political stakeholders from Central Burma urged ASEAN and the international community not to legitimise or prematurely engage with the military junta, warning that such actions would prolong Myanmar’s political crisis and armed conflict. The statement also called for the unconditional release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners as a prerequisite for an inclusive and peaceful political settlement.

    Security

    This month, major battles were reported across north-western Magway (Myaing, Pauk, Saw and Tilin Townships), the Kalay–Kabaw area of Sagaing (Kalay and Tamu Townships) and upper Sagaing (Mingin, Kantbalu, Kawlin and Katha Townships). Meanwhile, frequent aerial bombardments by the Tatmadaw and guerrilla attacks by resistance forces were reported across southern Mandalay (Natogyi, Myingyan and Taungtha Townships), as well as several townships in Sagaing and Magway.

    In north-western Magway, the Tatmadaw infantry columns comprising LID 101 and LID 99, supported by Pyu-Saw-Htee (locally acronym for the paramilitary wing of the Myanmar military), intensified ground offensives in Myaing and Pauk Townships. Several media reports confirmed that at least 26 villagers were killed by the columns during their raids. At least 25 villages were displaced. Resistance forces claimed that a military column became encircled in western Myaing Township, prompting the Tatmadaw to launch more than 120 airstrikes within four days in an apparent effort to support its ground troops. Fighting also intensified around the Myaing oil fields, where resistance groups warned that the military was attempting to destroy oil infrastructure if it could not regain control of the area.

    The Yaw region (of western Magway) remained another major theatre of conflict. Resistance forces, including the Arakan Army, reportedly coordinated with local resistance groups to repel Tatmadaw offensives in Saw Township. The Magway Regional Military Command of the People’s Defence Force reported capturing nine Tatmadaw soldiers and seizing weapons during the fighting. At the same time, the Tatmadaw relied increasingly on aerial logistics, using transport aircraft to airdrop weapons, ammunition and supplies to forward-deployed troops in Saw and Tilin Townships while conducting aerial reconnaissance over strategic locations.

    In the Kalay–Kabaw corridor, clashes intensified along the Asian Highway linking Kalay and Tamu, prompting resistance authorities to warn civilians to relocate temporarily to safer areas. The Tatmadaw also announced that it had recaptured Kanan Village near Khampat. The contestation continued over strategically important transport routes along the India–Myanmar border.

    Elsewhere, resistance forces continued guerrilla operations targeting military bases, police stations, checkpoints and military convoys across Magway and Mandalay Regions. The attacks were reported in Natmauk township, Chauk township, Min-bu township, Sinbaungwe township, Magway townshipAunglan township of Magway region and Mahlaing township, Madaya township, Nyaung-U township, Natogyi township of Mandalay region. Several attacks reportedly resulted in casualties among Tatmadaw personnel, the seizure of weapons and ammunition, and the temporary capture or destruction of military and police outposts. In southern Mandalay, resistance forces also targeted military facilities supporting air operations, while clashes continued around Madaya and Malaing Townships.

    Across Sagaing, the Tatmadaw maintained extensive aerial operations and artillery attacks against civilian-populated areas while continuing efforts to regain territory in upper Sagaing. Airstrikes in Sagaing Township, Wetlet Township and other areas reportedly killed civilians and damaged homes, schools and other civilian infrastructure. Simultaneously, the military claimed to have re-established control over several villages in Indaw Township, which reflected ongoing efforts to secure key transport corridors linking Sagaing with Kachin State.

    Human Rights

    The human rights situation in Central Burma has deteriorated further, while civilian casualties and displacement figures have increased due to repeated airstrikes by the Tatmadaw against single targets, in Pauk, Myaing townships among others. It was obvious after the political transition to a new military commander, Ye Win Oo, according to the ACELD report, on 27 July 2026. From mid-June to late July, the diversification strategy of Tatmadaw forces involved using multiple airstrikes and continuous raids in north-western villages of Myaing township resulting in massacres of civilians and torture to death, while five bodies were burnt alive in Baw Ton village.

    In addition to physical violence, military operations continued to rely on tactics intended to terrorise civilian populations, including burning homes, looting civilian properties, as well as destruction of historical religious sites. The attack is no longer confined to active frontlines but increasingly affects civilians in their homes, farms, and public spaces. That was reported in the incident where an elderly man was killed while herding cattle after artillery attacks struck Hta Naung Kaing Lay village, Khin U township, Sagaing, on 30 July.

    Alongside such conventional tools, Tatmadaw continued to expand its use of drones during military operations for aerial surveillance and reconnaissance to monitor the movements of resistance forces and support ground offensives before the forces entered villages. In July, military drone activity was reported in Singu, Chauk, and Saw townships, including drone-delivered attacks. The growing use of drones has increased the risk of civilian casualties, including the death of a three-year-old boy.

    Furthermore, in urban areas controlled by Tatmadaw forces, since 21 July, digital surveillance through the Person Scrutinisation and Monitoring System (PSMS) has been used to verify the identities of persons linked to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), political activists, and those eligible for compulsory military service, thereby restricting freedom of movement. In some cases, local authorities under Tatmadaw engaged in extortion by manipulating conscription lists and demanding payments at checkpoints in Magway further increasing the financial burden of civilians.


  • My Father Was Unable to Flee and Was Burned Alive

    My Father Was Unable to Flee and Was Burned Alive

    My Father Was Unable to Flee and Was Burned Alive

    [Junta forces’] soldiers standing in front of the monastery in Sin Myay village (Photo: Myawaddy)

    Highlights

    • We independently verified that three civilians and one resistance fighter were killed during the military operation. An elderly man with a chronic illness was burned alive inside his home after being unable to flee. Three civilians were injured by artillery shelling, landmines and a suicide drone during and after the military operation.
    • Approximately 8,000 civilians from Sin Myay, Hman Cho, Nga Lone Tin, Ywar Taw Lay and surrounding villages were displaced, with many seeking refuges in monasteries, neighbouring villages and farmland without adequate shelter, food or safe drinking water.
    • We independently verified that at least 255 civilian houses in Sin Myay, Hman Cho and Nga Lone Tin villages were destroyed by fire. This left a total of 1,049 people homeless, including 546 women, 12 mothers and 7 persons with disabilities. A historic monastery and a Buddha statue believed by the local community to be at least 200 years old were also burned.
    • Our evidence indicates that the military operation extended beyond engagements with resistance forces and had a serious impact on civilians and civilian properties, including homes, cultural and religious heritage and civilian infrastructure.
    • The findings reiterate continuing concerns regarding compliance with international humanitarian law, particularly the obligations to distinguish between civilians and combatants and to protect civilian objects during military operations.

    Timeline of the Incident

    DateDescription of major events
    2 June 2026
    • Fighting broke out between Sin Myay and Hman Cho villages, forcing local residents, including teachers, to flee.
    • According to resistance sources, approximately 30 junta soldiers were killed and resistance forces reportedly seized firearms.
    • A military column of around 200 junta troops reportedly retreated without advancing further.
    • Resistance authorities temporarily restricted movement in the area for security reasons.
    • As the military withdrew, it reportedly laid landmines, resulting in subsequent explosions and fired more than 20 rounds of artillery.
    • Resistance sources stated that junta forces were unable to advance for three consecutive days, sustained significant casualties and later reinforced their troop strength.
    • A total of four engagements reportedly took place.
    3-4 June 2026
    • More than eight aerial attacks using gyrocopters and paramotors occurred.
    7 June 2026
    • At approximately 4:00 p.m., around 500 junta troops who had been stationed at the General Administration Department compound in Chaung U town reportedly arrived at Hman Cho village.
    • Villagers and resistance fighters reported that Tatmadaw forces used drones reportedly carried substances containing chemical agents.
    • It marked the beginning of a renewed military offensive.
    8 June 2026
    • At approximately 5:40 p.m., junta troops were stationed at Gu Gyi Pagoda, north of Sin Myay village, before entering the village.
    • Resistance sources also reported that suicide drones were launched from the Northwestern Regional Military Command in Monywa during the operation.
    9 June 2026
    • At approximately 4:00 p.m., junta troops temporarily stationed in Nga Lone Tin village.
    10 June 2026
    • Junta forces looted civilians’ properties from Nga Lone Tin and Sin Myay villages.
    11 June 2026
    • Junta forces began setting fire to residential homes in the affected villages.
    • 255 houses were burnt down.

    Overview Map of the Incident Area

    Civilians at Risk Amid Escalating Military Operations

    Chaung U Township of Sagaing is located approximately 12 miles south of Monywa, the headquarters of the Northwestern Regional Military Command. Since the 2021 military coup, Chaung U has been one of the strongholds of the resistance movement in Sagaing. Consequently, the township has long been subjected to military offensives, including aerial bombardments, artillery shelling and ground operations. Previous attacks include the Bon-To massacre on 6 October 2025 in western Chaung U Township. While the Tatmadaw maintains control over the urban wards of Chaung U, areas north of the town, including Khin Mon, the Mya Pa Le fuel station and sections of the Monywa–Mandalay Road, the majority of rural areas remain under the control of locally based resistance forces.

    In early June this year, military operations in the area intensified as the Tatmadaw launched renewed offensives across central Burma and strategic transport corridors. According to local sources we interviewed, fighting between Tatmadaw forces and local resistance groups began on 2 June 2026 in the area between Sin Myay and Hman Cho villages. Resistance sources stated that the Tatmadaw initially deployed a military column of approximately 200 troops, resulting in significant casualties during four separate engagements and subsequently reinforced its forces for a renewed offensive.

    The military operation had immediate and severe consequences on civilians from five nearby villages. As fighting intensified, residents were forced to flee their homes, while access to the villages and farmland was restricted because of ongoing hostilities. Between 3 and 4 June, local sources reported more than eight aerial attacks involving gyrocopters and motorised paramotors. A local healthcare worker we interviewed told us;

    “The gyrocopters and paramotors did not only target resistance positions. They also struck places where displaced families were taking shelter.”

    Following the fighting on 2 June 2026, on 7 June, the Tatmadaw forces reportedly reinforced their military column with additional troops from Chaung U Town and launched a renewed offensive supported by drones and aerial assets. According to a report from a local information scout channel, two military trucks departed from the General Administration Department compound in Chaung U Town to reinforce the military column before it re-entered Sin Myay village. Villagers and resistance fighters alleged that drones carrying substances believed to contain chemical agents were used during the operation. Witnesses said that

    “Smoke was everywhere. The whole area was covered in it. The resistance fighters and rescue workers had to wear protective gloves in the field”

    However, we could not independently verify the use of chemical agents. In the following days, Tatmadaw forces reportedly occupied nearby villages, removed civilian properties and began burning residential homes on 11 June. Approximately 8000 villagers were displaced, particularly from Sin Myay, Hman Cho, Nga Lone Tin and Ywar Taw Lay villages. At least 255 civilian houses were independently identified as being burned down by the Tatmadaw military column. This left a total of 1,049 people homeless, including 546 women, 12 mothers and 7 persons with disabilities.

    Residential houses destroyed following an arson attack (Source: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies)

    In addition, the Buddha statue of at least 200 years old and the monastery were also burned down.

    “The pagoda is believed to be sacred and powerful. People say that if you make a wish or a solemn vow there, it will come true. It hurts us so much to see it destroyed. As for those who set it on fire, they will face the consequences one day.”

    Villagers fled their homes to nearby monasteries, neighbouring villages and farmland, where they lacked adequate shelter and access to essential supplies, including food and safe drinking water.

    “I’m not afraid of dying at once. What frightens me more is the thought of surviving with injuries, as disable person. So, I have to flee since I know the fighting is near our villages. Now, I have temporarily stayed at my relative at the border village between Chaung U and Myaung townships”.

    In addition to the destruction of a historic monastery and Buddha statue, which hold significant religious, cultural, and historical value for the local community in Chaung U Township, the Centre for Ah Nyar Studies independently verified that 197 houses in Sin Myay village, 28 houses in Nga Lone Tin village and 30 houses in Hman Cho village were destroyed by fire during the military operation. During the verification process, our researchers examined physical and digital evidence reportedly left behind by Tatmadaw soldiers, including military uniforms and a mobile phone belonging to a local resident. As we observed, a soldier allegedly used the device to post the following message on the resident’s TikTok account,

    “[We] will burn Sin Myay village”

    A Tatmadaw soldier posted on TikTok stating, “We will burn Sin Myay village” (Source: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies)

    Elderly Man Burned Alive After Being Unable to Run

    Three civilians and one resistance fighter died in the incident. Two civilian men were killed by artillery shelling at sites where displaced people were sheltering, while an elderly man with disabilities was burned alive in Sin Myay village during the Tatmadaw raid. We verified the identities of those who died in the incident as follows.

    NameAge (yrs) Gender Village Remark 
    Internal Record58MaleNga Lone TinDied due to artillery attacks. Had a mental disability. His dead body was found on 12 June 2026.
    Internal Record 65MaleSin MyayDied due to artillery attacks. Lost contact with family members since 12 June 2026 and confirmed his death on 17 June 2026.
    Internal Record 70MaleSin MyayBurnt alive on 14 June 2026.
    Internal Record 25Male Sin MyayDeath, Local Resistance Force member. Died on 4 June 2026.

    The victim was a 70-year-old man with a long-term chronic medical condition. He was unable to flee during the military raid because of his illness. His daughter told us,

    “My father was ill and unable to speak. He could only make sounds like ‘Wu, Wu, wahh…’. We were in a different place at that time and I couldn’t take him out of the village. I didn’t know whether he was still alive. Later, I heard from some rescue workers that he had been killed.”

    On 14 June, she received confirmation from rescue workers and local (resistance) administration that her father had been burned alive in his home.

    The burnt remains of a 70-year-old man in Sin Myay village, Chaung U township, Sagaing (source: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies)

    Furthermore, three civilian men were also injured by landmines, artillery attacks and a suicide drone. We verified their identities as follows.

    NameAge (yrs)GenderVillageRemark
    Internal Record29MaleSin MyayInjured in a heavy artillery attack on 13 June 2026.
    Internal Record28MaleMa Hti Thar

    Injured in landmine explosion on 12 June 2026.

    Internal Record56MaleMin Khaung

    Injured in a suicide drone attack on 12 June 2026.

    Airstrike on a Funeral Gathering Resulting in Civilian Casualties

    Tatmadaw also carried out a jet fighter airstrike targeting the funeral of a resistance fighter who had been killed during the fighting in Chaung U Township. The funeral was held in Pauk Taw (West) village, Myaung Township. According to information verified by our researchers, the military aircraft dropped bombs on the funeral site, killing two resistance fighters and injuring 13 civilians. A local resistance administrative official interviewed stated,

    “The attack happened after we had paid tribute to the deceased. Otherwise, the number of casualties would have been unthinkable.”

    According to local witnesses interviewed, the airstrike on the funeral took place at approximately 11:15 a.m. on 10 June 2026. Those injured in the attack included local construction workers and villagers from Pauk Taw (West) village.

    Analysis

    Tatmadaw stated that the operation was a counter-terrorism campaign aimed at regaining control of the main road connecting Chaung U and Yesagyo Townships.

     

    [Junta Forces’] soldiers standing in front of the monastery in Sin Myay village (Photo: Myawaddy)

    The findings from this investigation indicate that the military operation extended beyond armed confrontations with resistance forces and had severe consequences for civilians and civilian properties. The pattern of violations raises concerns regarding the conduct of military operations, particularly the protection of civilians and civilian objects under international humanitarian law.

    Burning of Civilian Homes

    We independently verified that a total of 255 residential homes in Sin Myay, Hman Cho and Nga Lone Tin villages were deliberately set on fire during the military operation. The destruction occurred after Tatmadaw forces had gained access to the villages and after large numbers of residents had already fled. Witness testimonies, physical evidence and digital evidence examined by our researchers indicate that the burning of civilian homes formed part of the military operation rather than resulting from active fighting. The message allegedly posted by a Tatmadaw soldier through a villager’s mobile phone, stating, “[We] will burn Sin Myay village,” further supports witness accounts that the destruction of civilian property was deliberate. The widespread burning of homes deprived hundreds of families of shelter and livelihoods and contributed to the displacement of approximately 8,000 civilians.

    Destruction of Cultural and Religious Heritage

    The military operation also destroyed a historic monastery and a Buddha statue estimated by the local community to be at least 200 years old. Beyond the physical damage, the destruction represents a significant loss of cultural and religious heritage for affected communities. Monasteries in central Burma serve not only as places of worship but also as centres for education, humanitarian assistance and refuge during armed conflict. During this incident, many displaced villagers had sought safety in monasteries before continuing their displacement. The destruction of these sites therefore had both cultural and humanitarian consequences for the local population.

    Allegations Regarding the Use of Chemical Agents

    We documented consistent allegations from local residents and resistance personnel that Tatmadaw forces deployed drones carrying substances believed to contain chemical agents during the  military operation. Witnesses reported that resistance fighters and rescue workers wore protective gloves. However, we were unable to independently verify the composition of the substances or determine whether prohibited chemical agents had been used.

    Elderly Civilians Unable to Flee

    The death of the 70-year-old man who was reportedly burned alive inside his home illustrates the heightened risks faced by older persons and persons with disabilities during military operations. According to our investigation, the victim suffered from a long-term medical condition that prevented him from fleeing with other villagers. His death demonstrates how rapid military raids and the burning of civilian homes disproportionately affect individuals with limited mobility. This incident is not isolated. We documented a comparable case during military operations in Myay Zun Taw village, Yesagyo township in 2025, where an elderly resident was also burned alive after being unable to escape advancing Tatmadaw forces. These recurring incidents highlight the particular vulnerability of elderly persons and persons with disabilities during military operations involving the burning of civilian settlements. Reflecting on the findings of the investigation, the researcher at the Centre for Ah Nyar Studies commented,

    “The military forces continuously conduct their campaign of terror against civilians not only by burning homes but also by destroying the cherished memories and cultural heritage of communities in central Burma. The use of suicide drones, landmines, and other attacks affecting civilian property poses a serious threat to civilian life, particularly for vulnerable groups such as women, older persons, and persons with disabilities.”


  • An Emerging Bill of Rights? Human Rights in Ah Nyar’s Federal Units

    An Emerging Bill of Rights? Human Rights in Ah Nyar’s Federal Units

    An Emerging Bill of Rights? Human Rights in Ah Nyar’s Federal Units

    Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma (Part 3)

    This analysis is Part (III) of the Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma. While Part I examined the structural formation of federal units and Part II analysed their internal power structures, this section focuses on the human rights frameworks embedded within the interim constitutional arrangements of three federal units in Ah Nyar. In the context of ongoing armed conflict and evolving governance arrangements, these interim constitutional frameworks represent early attempts to articulate commitments to fundamental rights, freedoms, and protections for people from war zones. This section, therefore, examines the scope of rights recognised in these interim constitutions and assesses the institutional mechanisms provided for their protection.

    Before examining the human rights frameworks, it is important to understand the nature of the interim political arrangements adopted by the three federal units in Ah Nyar. These arrangements are neither purely legal nor purely political; rather, they represent a hybrid arrangement that combines legal foundations with the practical necessities of interim governance amid the revolutionary context in central Burma. The terminology used in these documents itself reflects different approaches to the legality and political nature of the arrangements. Sagaing refers to its document as a “constitution”, Magway adopts the term “arrangement law”, while Mandalay uses “interim arrangement.” These distinctions are not merely semantic. They reflect attempts to balance legal legitimacy with the need for flexibility in governance under conditions of conflict and political transition. Moreover, the authority and process through which these documents were adopted have also influenced the terminology used in each case. Nevertheless, these interim political arrangements function as the supreme legal frameworks during the interim period (Art. 18 of the Magway Interim Arrangement Law, Art.11 of the Mandalay Interim Arrangement, and Art. 2 of the Sagaing Interim Constitution).

    Human Rights Responsibilities of the State

    Over decades of civil war, Burma has long experienced different forms of sub-national governance and political arrangements, particularly among ethnic liberation movements such as the Karen, Wa, and Kachin. They are driven by liberation and self-determination. These structures have largely been shaped by wartime necessity. What is different in the emerging federal units in central Burma is the deliberate division of power across the three branches of government – legislative, executive and judicial. The state constitutions set out clear boundaries between these branches (Art. 7 of Mandalay Interim Arrangement, Art. 12 of Magway Interim Arrangement and Arti 6 of Sagaing constitution). These institutions are expected to exercise checks and balances. On human rights, these interim constitutional arrangements provide legal foundations to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.

    International human rights law establishes that the primary responsibility for protecting and promoting human rights lies with the state. The UDHR affirms that individuals are entitled to effective remedies for violations of their rights (Art. 8) and to the realisation of economic, social, and cultural rights necessary for human dignity (Art. 22). These principles are further codified in the two major international covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR). Together, these instruments require states to respect, protect and fulfil human rights by establishing legal frameworks to ensure human rights responsibilities of the state, including taking appropriate measures to realise social, economic and cultural rights progressively.

    Burma is not a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, it is a State Party to several other core international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In the absence of a federal constitutional framework, sub-national constitutions re-affirm commitments to state responsibilities under international law (Art. 177 of the Magway Interim Arrangement Law; Art. 191 of the Sagaing Interim Constitution; with no corresponding provision in the Mandalay Interim Arrangement).

    Fundamental Rights and Freedom

    The three constitutional frameworks demonstrate a clear commitment to the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights. In doing so, they broadly reflect core international human rights standards, particularly in relation to civil and political rights, across all three federal units. While these provisions are articulated within interim constitutional arrangements, they indicate a deliberate effort to align with established human rights norms.

    At the core, a set of fundamental rights and freedoms is consistently recognised across all three frameworks. These include:

    1. Right to Life
    2. Right to legal recognition as a person, and the right to acquire respect and protection for her/his human dignity
    3. Right to equality before the law.
    4. Right to freely express, write, publish, and have access to and disseminate information.
    5. Right to freedom of thought, belief, religion and the freedom to observe and practice customs and traditions.
    6. Right to freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration.
    7. Right to freely form and participate in associations.
    8. Right to trade and work
    9. No one shall be subjected to forced labour, torture, enslavement, sexual abuse, and degrading treatment.

    Civil and Political Rights

    The civil and political rights provisions across the three constitutional frameworks show a partial but meaningful alignment with the standards set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Core protections are broadly recognised across Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay. These include the right to life, protection from torture and forced labour, liberty and security of the person, equality before the law, and fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression, religion and association. Other core civil and political rights are also widely listed in all three constitutional frameworks across Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay. These include

    1. Equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of civil and political rights
    2. Fair trial rights
    3. Right to recognition (as a person) before the law
    4. Right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy, family, home or correspondence, and from unlawful attacks on one’s honour and reputation.
    5. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
    6. Right to hold opinions without interference
    7. Right to marriage
    8. Minority rights (to enjoy their culture, religion, etc.)

    At the same time, the comparison highlights notable gaps and inconsistencies when assessed against international human rights law. Certain foundational rights under the ICCPR, such as the right to an effective remedy and the prohibition of propaganda for war, are absent across all three frameworks. Other core rights, including the right to self-determination, freedom of movement, political participation, and child protection, are unevenly recognised, appearing in some constitutions but not others. In Sagaing, the right to self-determination, particularly for ethnic minorities, is generally recognised under Articles 153 and 47 of the constitution. However, this right is not explicitly provided for in Mandalay and Magway.

    Meanwhile, certain rights are not constitutionally entrenched but are instead left to be addressed through specific legislation to be enacted by the interim parliaments, including the Child Rights Law in the Magway Federal Unit. Rights to participate in public affairs, to vote, and to be elected are not constitutionalised in Sagaing and Mandalay, but are recognised in Magway under Article 25 of the Interim Arrangement Law.

    Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

    The economic, social and cultural rights across the three constitutional frameworks show an uneven and selective level of development when compared to civil and political rights. While all three recognise certain core labour-related rights such as the right to work, just and favourable conditions of work and the right to form trade unions, this reflects only a partial alignment with the standards set out in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The principle of equal rights of men and women in the enjoyment of these rights is also consistently recognised.

    However, other key ESCR protections remain limited. The right to social security is only provided in Sagaing, while absent in both Magway and Mandalay. Similarly, the right to education is fully recognised in Sagaing but only partially addressed in Mandalay and not explicitly provided in Magway. Broader rights, such as the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to mental health, are largely absent across all three frameworks.

    At the same time, each framework goes beyond the ICESCR in its own way. This is not incidental. It reflects the lived realities and priorities of each federal unit in central Burma. In Sagaing, for example, the constitution brings in environmental rights, guarantees healthcare access without discrimination, and recognises protections for youth, women, and persons with disabilities. These are not abstract commitments. They respond directly to conditions on the ground. Taken together, they point to an emerging effort to shape a broader, more responsive social policy framework, even within the limits of interim governance. Mandalay, meanwhile, includes provisions on primary healthcare, targeted healthcare for vulnerable groups, farmers’ rights, and cultural promotion.

    Sub-national protection mechanisms

    The sub-national protection mechanisms for human rights across three federal units remain varied. They are still evolving. A key question is whether protection is institutionalised through an independent mechanism or embedded within existing governance structures. The central issue, however, is whether a coherent human rights protection system is taking shape across Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay under the current constitutional frameworks. That said, what have we seen now?

    All three federal units provide for a “free and fair judiciary system” (Art. 6 in Sagaing, Art. 7 in Mandalay and Art. 12 (a and b) in Magway). This matters. It places the judiciary at the centre of rights protection. At the same time, interim parliaments and governments are mandated to establish independent commissions, including for human rights protection (Art. 61 in Sagaing, Art. 46 in Mandalay, and 72(l) in Magway). These are still openings rather than fully operational institutions. But they point to a direction where more structured protection mechanisms could emerge as they create space.

    Sagaing goes further in setting out constitutional protection. Article 42 (a) provides

    “The right to apply to the Office of the Supreme Court of Sagaing Federal Unit when seeking constitutional protection”.

    This right is non-derogable (Art. 42 (b)). In addition, Article 41 (a) states “The right to receive legal protection by filing a complaint to the Unit’s Human Rights Commission in cases of human rights violations.”

    More broadly, there is also a baseline expectation that the state provides protection. Article 24 of the Sagaing Constitution states that “Every citizen residing in Sagaing Federal Unit has a right to receive protection from the Sagaing Federal Unit Government in accordance with the law.” A similar provision appears in Article 51 of the Magway Constitution. Taken together, these provisions indicate that responsibility for protection is recognised. But how this responsibility is exercised and coordinated across institutions remains an open question.

    At the same time, it should be noted that discussions on the Division of Competencies (DoC) are still ongoing. It is not yet clear how these federal units will cooperate with the Human Rights Commission or the Ministry of Human Rights of the National Unity Government. As these arrangements continue to take shape, a key question remains: will these emerging mechanisms evolve into a coherent system of protection, or remain fragmented across different levels of governance?

    Conclusion

    These constitutions are not only framed as rights-based documents; they also reflect this in their structure and emphasis. A significant portion of their content is dedicated to human rights and protection—23 per cent in Sagaing, 22 per cent in Magway, and 18 per cent in Mandalay. While the differences are not substantial, they suggest a relatively consistent prioritisation of rights across the three frameworks, with Sagaing showing a slightly stronger emphasis. They set out a foundation of fundamental rights and freedoms that, in many ways, function as an emerging Bill of Rights across the federal units. Some specific rights are also set to be defined through separate legislation, such as the Farmers’ Rights Law in Sagaing and the Minority and Child Rights Laws in Magway. There is also a clear effort to draw from and respect international human rights law. This matters. It shows that these frameworks are not being built in isolation. That said, this is a meaningful starting point. The foundations are there.

    Cite this article: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. (2026, April 11). An Emerging Bill of Rights? Human Rights in Ah Nyar’s Federal Units [Briefing paper]. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. https://ah-nyarstudies.org/an-emerging-bill-of-rights-human-rights-in-ah-nyars-federal-units/

  • Rethinking Transitional Justice for Burma: No Way Out?

    Rethinking Transitional Justice for Burma: No Way Out?

    Rethinking Transitional Justice for Burma: No Way Out?

    Photo: Internet 

    Burma has been embroiled in civil war and trapped in a recurring cycle of coups and regime changes. After independence in 1948, Burma experienced a decade of parliamentary democracy until 1958, which later ended in the first military coup in 1962. This announced military rule, later rebranded as the “Burmese Way to Socialism”. This failed experiment ended with another coup in 1988. The then junta promised a transition to multi-party democracy leading to another experiment of the so-called “disciplined democracy”. It lasted from 2010 to 2020. That system, too, collapsed with the recent military coup in 2021. I referred that situation to an endless loop of coups and political reconfigurations. Amid this endless loop, opposition groups have fought for a transition to democracy and federalism. However, the 2010 transition, widely seen as nominal, lacked justice and ignored long-standing calls for transitional justice. Even looking solely at the post-2021 period, the extent of crimes and atrocities against civilians is nothing short of an unimaginable tragedy. Now again, the new junta announced general elections, perhaps to rebrand itself. Questions arise.

    Is it practical to think about TJ without considering the geopolitical grounds of the SEA region? Can Burma be transitioned to democracy and federalism without TJ? Can the orthodox thinking of TJ be realistic in Burma?

    SEA Illusion for Human Rights

    In Asia, the treaty-based international human rights protection mechanism seems ineffective. Cambodia ranks second after the Philippines in ratifying international human rights treaties. It has even ratified the covenant on civil and political rights, which several countries relatively hesitated to endorse. Today, Cambodia’s civil and political rights landscape remains eerily quiet. I recently spoke with Cambodian journalists and activists who cautiously described their struggles. One whispered that “an opposition figure was assassinated in Bangkok earlier this year”.

    ASEAN is often seen as an emerging regional bloc. Its human rights mechanism includes an intergovernmental commission and several thematic bodies. In Burma’s case, however, a clear crack exists between member states which directly challenges ASEAN centrality. Nevertheless, the failed 5-PC underscores ASEAN’s rights diplomacy as a toothless tiger. Like it or not, such SEA realities pose significant pressure for TJ advocates in Burma. Meanwhile, Burma needs democracy and federalism. Can both be without TJ? I doubt it.

    Beyond Orthodox Theory

    Countless victims and survivors in Burma, including those who suffered from gang-rapes in Ah Nyar (central Burma), are still helpless without even protection for their right to life. Meanwhile, Myanmar military continues its lawless aerial attacks. Synchronously, it has begun trumpeting political transition alongside its planned elections, especially to the countries it believes will support it. Of course, ASEAN or some of its member states cannot be excluded. Once again, it is the said political transition without accountability. Meanwhile, resistance groups remain in control of large territories and have deployed troops across central Burma. They continue seeking common ground between groups of Ah Nyar and periphery ethnic states on political transition. They speak about TJ.

    TJ means how we respond to the legacies of gross violations of human rights. The orthodox TJ theory remains largely focused on the four-pillar approach: truth, justice, reparation and guarantee of non-recurrence. However, this approach has three significant weaknesses: overdependence on typical political transitions, over-reliance on international law, and failure to incorporate modern digital realities. TJ is not only about securing accountability during political transitions; it is also about how traumatised societies heal and rebuild their social fabric after conflict. Major political actors and civil society continue to place excessive reliance on orthodox theory, while overlooking their weaknesses and possible alternatives.

    Justice Outside the Courtrooms

    Are there any alternatives? Indeed, there are. I often explain Myanmar’s revolution using the “Elasticity Theory” from physics: even the most flexible reed breaks when pushed beyond its limit. Likewise, when oppression exceeds tolerance, revolution becomes inevitable. Revolution itself is a pathway to justice, especially in Burmese context, when all options are exhausted. Additionally, a community-based TJ model also exists. It shifts focus from state-led efforts to community-driven processes. Grassroots initiatives document experiences, share stories, and foster healing through local practices. This grassroots model empowers survivors and families to hold perpetrators accountable, decide forgiveness, and shape local justice processes. It can also be crafted to complement formal justice mechanisms.

    Conclusion

    It is time to question whether our work remains confined to the orthodox model. Geopolitics, digital realities, and the rapid rise of AI are reshaping TJ. Authoritarian regimes may become more powerful than pro-democracy actors in shaping narratives and manipulating the truth. We should never underestimate this risk.


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