တဂ်: အညာလေ့လာရေး

  • What is Happening in Ah Nyar? September, 2026 [Issue 9/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? September, 2026 [Issue 9/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? September, 2026 [Issue 9/2026]

    NUG Minister Dr. Zaw Wai Soe meets resistance fighters on the frontline. (Photo: Zaw Wai Soe/Facebook)

    This Month in Ah Nyar: A Quick Overview

    • Political developments featured parallel processes, including NSPNC–MNDAA talks on political participation, internal changes within the USDP and continued efforts by federal and opposition actors to strengthen alternative political arrangements. Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway were formally confirmed as members of SCEF.
    • Military activity remained concentrated around strategic road and river corridors in Sagaing. The military reportedly expanded positions along the Monywa–Ya Gyi–Kalewa and Kalay–Tamu roads, while fighting continued along the Irrawaddy River.
    • Major military operations continued around Pakokku and Gangaw, alongside intermittent guerrilla attacks elsewhere in Magway. Fighting intensified around the Myaing oil fields, while military columns also advanced from Laungshwe toward Kanpetlet of Yaw.
    • Drone attacks targeted Tada-U Air Base, with the NUG reporting damage to two YAK-130 aircraft in Mandalay. Military forces also reportedly redeployed troops around Madaya, while guerrilla attacks and resistance training continued in southern Mandalay.
    • Aerial attacks remained a major concern across Ah Nyar, with Magway and Sagaing recording high numbers of reported airstrikes. September also saw reported killings in several townships, including attacks affecting civilians, religious figures and local communities.

    နိုင်ငံရေးကဏ္ဍ

    Political developments during the month reflected several parallel processes, including engagement around the military-led political process, internal developments within established political parties, and continued efforts by opposition and federal actors to develop alternative political arrangements.

    The NSPNC of the military junta held talks with the MNDAA in Naypyidaw, reportedly including discussions on the MNDAA forming a political party and participating in the election. The Central Working Committee of the NLD also called for meaningful political dialogue involving political and ethnic forces and other stakeholders, alongside reducing violence and releasing political prisoners including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

    On the USDP, the military-backed political party temporarily suspended its party conference amid reported internal disputes over the election of its executive leadership. The conference subsequently concluded with Khin Yi being re-elected as party chairman, while Min Aung Hlaing’s preferred candidates were reportedly not elected to the party’s top executive positions. The USDP also confirmed that Min Aung Hlaing had become a party member.

    Meanwhile, Sagaing Federal Unit, Mandalay Region and Magway Federal Unit were formally confirmed as members of SCEF under its State/Federal Unit/ERO representation pillar. The NUG also continued efforts to strengthen internal coordination, while the military-led parliament reportedly established the Myanmar Parliamentary Union (MPU).

    Sagaing

    In Sagaing, political and administrative developments focused primarily on strengthening interim governance capacity. The NUG Ministry of Home Affairs, Sagaing Federal Unit Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Mingin Township People’s Administration Team jointly organised a five-day refresher training on interim public administration, attended by more than 100 ward- and village-level administrative officials. The training covered interim administration and capacity building, conflict resolution, emergency security and disaster management, administrative procedures, and rule-of-law-related processes. Sagaing Federal Unit was also confirmed as a new member of the Federal Democratic Union Leading Council (SCEF), together with the Mandalay Region and Magway Federal Unit, under the council’s State/Federal Unit/ERO representation pillar.

    Magway

    In Magway, political developments centred on the institutional consolidation of the Interim Magway Federal Unit Government and its coordination with the NUG. Magway Federal Unit Parliament enacted a Defence and Security Law, which provides a legal basis for the Federal Unit to establish its own parallel security arrangements alongside the NUG. The Parliament also enacted the Magway Federal Unit Attorney General Law during its 12th regular session, further expanding the Federal Unit’s institutional and legal framework. The Interim Magway Federal Unit Government released its six-month activity report. Chief Minister Dr Ye Htun Zaw also reported ongoing coordination with the NUG to bring People’s Defence Forces (PaKaPha) operating within Magway under the command structure of the Federal Unit Government. The Magway Federal Unit was also confirmed as a new member of SCEF.

    Mandalay

    In Mandalay, the main political development was the formal inclusion of the Mandalay Region in SCEF. No further developments concerning the division of competencies between the NUG and the MIGC were reported this month, although human rights focal persons from Mandalay, formerly under the NUG Ministry of Human Rights, met with the MIGC. Separately, the Mandalay Regional Hluttaw met with the Mandalay Civil Disobedience Movement Organisation (MCDMO) to exchange updates on legislative work, CDM support, political prisoners, and assistance provided during the Sagaing floods.

    Security

    Sagaing

    Military activity in Sagaing remained concentrated around strategic transport routes and river corridors. Along the Monywa–Ya Gyi–Kalewa road, an important route connecting to India–Burma border trade, the military reportedly expanded checkpoints, with new checkpoints being established at intervals of approximately three miles (Mandalay Free Press). The road had reportedly remained under resistance control since late 2022, before the military began renewed operations to regain access following the Thingyan period and reportedly reached sections of the route in June. Military positions were also reportedly expanded along the Kalay–Tamu Road, another important India–Burma trade route.

    Military and resistance activity also continued along the Ayeyarwady River corridor. Reports indicated repeated KIA attacks on military vessels transporting supplies and equipment to Bhamaw. Several military and cargo vessels were reportedly damaged or sunk, while only one supply vessel was reported to have reached Bhamaw. As of 9 September, resistance groups destroyed 13 military and cargo vessels, according to a local media report.

    In Wetlet Township, a military column comprising LID 33 forces, Mingun-based Pyu Saw Htee forces, and Infantry Battalion 12 reportedly conducted operations along the eastern bank of the Irrawaddy River. At least 15 clashes were reported over a seven-month period. According to an announcement by Resistance Battalion 2 of Shwebo District, at least 100 military personnel were reportedly killed during the clashes, while resistance forces also claimed to have seized weapons and ammunition. Meanwhile, guerrilla attacks were also reported on the main road connecting Monywa and Sagaing.

    Magway

    Major military operations and resistance activities continued in the two major zones of Pakokku and Gangaw districts, while intermittent guerrilla attacks were widely reported across other districts on the eastern bank of the Irrawaddy River. In Myaing Township, military forces reportedly destroyed oil wells in the Kyauk Khwet oil field, with four wells reportedly burned or destroyed in early September. Local sources also reported further destruction of oil wells and other structures in the area during the month. The Naypyidaw regime claimed that at least 800 oil wells across Myaing and Pauk townships had been destroyed during its operations in the area.

    The Ah Nyar–Tamar resistance coalition is actively confronting Tatmadaw forces from LID 101 and LID 99 in the region, with major clashes reported across several villages surrounding the oil fields.

    In Gangaw district (locally known as Yaw), a combined military column of approximately 300 troops from KaPaSa 25 reportedly entered the area from Laungshwe in September. Six newly conscripted soldiers reportedly fled from the column between Laungshwe and Taungbo Gyi and remained at large.

    Later in the month, a military column of more than 500 troops led by a commander from LID77 reportedly entered Laungshwe on 23 September and began advancing toward Kanpetlet Township in southern Chin State from 26 September, with reported air support. Subsequent reporting indicated that resistance forces had intercepted the column as it advanced toward Kanpetlet.

    Other resistance operations were reported in Natmauk, Minbu, Taungdwingyi, and Sinbaungwe. These included attacks on military columns, security personnel, and military-linked vehicles. On 19 September, a resistance drone unit reportedly attacked a military convoy of 185 vehicles travelling along the Salin–Kanpya road.  

    Mandalay

    The Ministry of Defence of the NUG reported that its drone units carried out targeted attacks on areas where YAK-130 military aircraft were stationed at Tada-U Air Base, reportedly damaging two aircraft. During related ground clashes, the NUG MOD also claimed that five Tatmadaw personnel, including Colonel Myo Hlaing Oo from Air Defence Battalion No. 7, were killed. Three resistance fighters were also reported killed during the operation.

    No military movement was observed in upper Mandalay – areas where Operation 1027 controlled. In central Mandalay, military forces reportedly redeployed part of their troops from positions east of Madaya Township to Madaya town, following the reported reassertion of military control over the eastern part of the township. Local sources said that troops were withdrawn from positions around Satetaw Gyi, Kyauk Seik Lay, Ingyin Myaing, and Kin villages and concentrated in Madaya town, while substantial forces reportedly remained in those areas.

    In southern Mandalay, intermittent guerrilla attacks were reported in Myingyan District, alongside military training organised by the NUG Ministry of Defence for Resistance Battalions 4 and 10.

    Human Rights

    ISP Myanmar reported that, after General Ye Win Oo took charge as commander-in-chief, over 1580 aerial attacks were conducted nationwide. Among them, Magway recorded the highest number of aerial attacks between March and August 2026, with over 320 attacks, while over 240 aerial attacks occurred in Sagaing.

    Amid increasing militarisation and efforts to assert territorial control, Tatmadaw forces used drones not only for reconnaissance but also to carry out attacks targeting people, including through explosive-laden drones, in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay. Our investigation team recorded that one LGBT person, over 60 years old, was killed by Tatmadaw drone attacks against the football playing field in Taung Ywar Ma village, Seikphyu township, Magway. Another woman and three male villagers were injured. Most victims were odd-job and seasonal workers who had gone there to watch the football match.

    In addition, in September, massacre incidents involving the deaths of at least five people occurred in townships such as Mindon, Ye-U, Indaw and Ngazon. Local sources reported that Tatmadaw naval personnel involved in aerial attacks were rewarded for carrying out such deadly operations, which are often seen as an indicator of their ability to accurately hit targets. Monks, lay attendants (locally known as kappiya), and alms-givers have also been among those killed in attacks across Central Burma. One incident, among others, was that on September 6, five people, including a monk, were killed in airstrikes by the Tatmadaw in Min Gyoe village, Ngazon township, Mandalay.

    On-the-ground operations through raids were recorded in the villages located between Chaung U and Monywa townships in Sagaing, as well as the villages along the Seikphyu-Saw road from Magway. Patterns of human shields, shooting, extrajudicial killings and burning homes were committed by the column of the Tatmadaw raids, according to local sources.

  • What is Happening in Ah Nyar? August, 2026 [Issue 8/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? August, 2026 [Issue 8/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? August, 2026 [Issue 8/2026]

    ICRC visited State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Photo: internet)

    This Month in Ah Nyar: A Quick Overview

    • Sagaing and Mandalay formally joined SCEF, while coordination among the three federal units and with national-level institutions continued.
    • ICRC Representative of Burma visited State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
    • Resistance forces expanded military coordination, while junta forces continued offensives, reinforcements and airstrikes to regain strategic positions.
    • Airstrikes, village raids, arbitrary arrests, looting and arson continued across Ah Nyar, with civilians bearing the main burden of the conflict. The airstrike on a meditation centre in Myaung killed at least 16 people and injured more than 30, highlighting the continuing vulnerability of civilian spaces
    • Sagaing flood directly affected at least 177,700 people in at least 10 Sagaing townships, while restrictions on relief efforts compounded the crisis.

    နိုင်ငံရေးကဏ္ဍ

    With the rise of discussions around the Steering Council for the Establishment of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), political debate appears to have become more prominent than institutional building, in contrast to the institution-building processes observed last month across the three units of central Burma. These political developments also coincided with the recent visit by the ICRC Burma representative to State Counsellor and NLD Chair Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, during which the ICRC stated that the visit “included the opportunity to speak with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in private.”

    Following these discussions, Sagaing and Mandalay officially joined SCEF, a political and military alliance involving the NUG, KIO, KNU and their partners. Discussions with Magway remain ongoing.

    This month also saw increased horizontal coordination among the three federal units, alongside greater engagement with the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). This can be understood as complementary to the ongoing discussions on the Division of Competencies (DoC) with the NUG, particularly regarding future administrative transitions. At the same time, the continued negotiations point to unresolved questions over representation, authority, and the relationship between federal-unit institutions and national-level actors.

    More consequential developments, however, may be emerging at the administrative level. In Magway and Sagaing, federal-unit governments continued coordinating with NUG structures and township administrations, while Mandalay openly discussed the division of competencies between the NUG and the region in higher education. These developments suggest that federalism is increasingly being negotiated through everyday governance and the exercise of administrative authority, rather than through constitutional and political declarations alone.

    Magway’s federal-unit government also announced the establishment of a public complaints mechanism and the creation of a human rights department under the Deputy Chief Minister’s Office.

    The central political question emerging from August is therefore not simply whether Ah Nyar is developing alternative institutions, but whether these increasingly numerous institutions can establish a coherent division of authority and a shared federal political framework without reproducing political and institutional fragmentation.

    Security

    The security landscape was characterised by persistent territorial contestation, increasing coordination among resistance forces, and continued military efforts to regain strategically important positions. The coordinated military column operating in Myaing and Pauk townships, led by LID 101 and LID 99, was reportedly reinforced by infantry troops from the 14th Military Operations Command based in Mong Hsat, eastern Shan State. The operation has been heavily supported by airpower, including aerial bombardment and fighter-jet strikes, as explored in our recent analysis of the situation. By 8 August 2026, the military column had reportedly raided at least 31 villages across Myaing and Pauk townships. More recently, reports indicated that a Tatmadaw column was approaching the Well No. 2 Oil Field near Kyauk Khwet village in Myaing Township, suggesting an ongoing effort to regain strategically important economic and territorial positions.

    In response, the resistance alliance’s “Ah Nyar Tamar Operation” has continued to confront military forces in areas under the command of the Magway Federal Unit’s Ministry of Defence. Fighting also continued in Minhla and Mindon townships, where reported military reinforcements point to the strategic importance of the routes connecting Magway and Rakhine. The United States of Burma Army, which is active in the area, also reported armed clashes beginning around 20 August. Beyond these frontline clashes, August also saw targeted killings of resistance-linked actors. A central committee member of the Chinland Defence Force (Kalay, Kabaw and Gangaw), along with two other individuals, was reportedly assassinated by gunmen who subsequently joined a Tatmadaw military base in Gangaw Township. Separately, the commander of the Chin Defence Force–Asho was reportedly killed in an ambush by junta forces in western Magway.

    Sagaing similarly experienced a mixture of resistance advances and increased military pressure. Resistance forces reportedly captured a strategically important military position between Indaw and Katha, while fighting and military restrictions continued in areas including Mingin, Yinmabin and Sagaing. The reported use of airstrikes during flooding, alongside arrests, forced recruitment and movement restrictions, further demonstrates how military pressure continues to extend beyond conventional frontline engagements. In Myaung Township, Sagaing Region, a junta field commander was reportedly assassinated inside the town, and resistance forces subsequently seized his mobile phone, potentially providing intelligence on the junta’s local operations and networks.

    In Mandalay, resistance forces continued to target military positions around Myittha, Meiktila, Myingyan and Kyaukpadaung, including the reported capture of a military outpost in Myingyan. At the same time, military and allied forces continued operations against civilian communities and resistance-held areas.

    On resistance coordination, four resistance groups, including the Rocket Fighter Column of the Magway Regional People’s Security Team under the NUG, formally announced the formation of a military alliance. At the local level, there were also signs of growing operational coordination, including joint operations among resistance groups in Mandalay and increased cooperation between different forces in Magway.

    The overall pattern suggests a protracted contest rather than a clear military turning point. Resistance forces appear increasingly capable of coordinating operations and contesting military positions, but the military continues to compensate for territorial vulnerabilities through reinforcement, airpower and coercive control of civilian movement.

    Human Rights

    The humanitarian situation in Central Burma has further deteriorated as flooding and ongoing military operations place a double burden on conflict-affected and displaced communities. According to our monitoring data regarding floods in Central Burma, over 177,700 people have been directly affected in at least ten townships of Sagaing, including Ye-U, Khin U, Taze, Myaung, and Wetlet townships. However, Tatmadaw authorities have also restricted emergency relief and rescue efforts in flood-affected areas. In Sagaing, for instance, local sources reported that people has been stopped and checked from carrying relief supplies at the Sagaing Bridge (Yadanarpon Bridge), locally known as Hna Pauk. 

    Amid such natural disasters, multiple aerial attacks of Tatmadaw continue against civilians. NUG has stated that, from 8 August to 23 August, over 240 airstrikes occurred nationwide, in which Magway and Sagaing were mostly targeted. In Sagaing, during August, attacks on civilians were recorded in Chaung U, Kani, Khin U and Myaung townships, among others. Among deadly aerial attacks, the massacre case was recorded in Myaung township. Tatmadaw conducted airstrikes twice around 9:00 am on 21 August, targeted at Buddhist meditation centre located in Hswe Lae O village, Myaung township.  Our investigation has recorded that the attack resulted in the deaths of 14 people at the scene, and over 30 were injured. Most are male elderly meditators, according to locals. Two people, including a 16-year-old boy, were dead with heavy injuries after the attacks. The attack may have been retaliatory following the killing of a Tatmadaw officer in Myaung on 17 August, although this connection requires further verification.

    In addition, since early August, Tatmadaw’s on-ground operations have continued to expand in Magway, Sagaing and Mandalay. Common patterns of arrests, torture to death, hostages, looting civilian properties, and burnings are widely seen as junta strategy in frontline battles. Such forms of violations were recorded in villages of Seikphyu,  Chauk and Myaing townships in Magway, the villages of Kani and Yinmarbin townships in Sagaing, as well as the villages of  Nyaung U and Taung Thar townships in Mandalay. 

    In urban areas controlled by the Tatmadaw, local sources reported arbitrary arrests under the pretext of conscription in Kalay, Monywa and Salin. These arrests were followed by extortion, with families asked to pay money for the release of those detained, according to local sources. In Salin township, for example, 16 young men aged 25–35 were arrested on August 16 by Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 253, stationed in Salin. Local sources reported that the junta intensified conscription recruitment for batch 28 that will begin in September.  

  • What is happening in Ah Nyar? July 2026

    What is happening in Ah Nyar? July 2026

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? July, 2026 [Issue 7/2026]

     

    နိုင်ငံရေးကဏ္ဍ

    During July 2026, political developments in Central Burma were characterised by continued progress in resistance governance and institution-building, particularly in Sagaing and Magway. The Sagaing Federal Unit Parliament enacted the Interim Defence and Security Council Law, which subsequently drew criticism from the Civil Disobedience Movement Council, a representative bloc within the Sagaing Federal Unit Government. The CDM Council argued that the law was inconsistent with federal democratic principles and the interim constitutional framework. During the same period, the parliament confirmed the appointment of the Chief Justice and judges. This marked a further step in establishing the federal unit’s judicial institutions, while the division of authority between the Ministry of Justice of the NUG and the Sagaing Federal Unit Government is gaining momentum. NUG’s justice minister U Thein Oo held a meeting with key political stakeholders from Sagaing on the transition.

    The Deputy Chief Minister of the Sagaing Federal Unit Interim Government conducted a field visit to Khin-U Township, where he met with the Township People’s Administration Team, Township MP Dr Win Aung and sectoral administrative leaders. Although the government did not disclose details of the discussions, the meeting reflected ongoing coordination between the federal unit government and township-level governance structures. In addition, the National League for Democracy convened a working coordination meeting of executive committee members from its township and regional branches across the Sagaing Federal Unit.

    At the political dialogue level, both the Sagaing and Mandalay Federal Units endorsed the first draft of the Common Political Agreement (CPA) of the National Unity Consultative Council.

    In Magway, the interim government expanded its defence structures by establishing additional temporary military columns in response to intensified military offensives. During July, the Magway Federal Unit Government added five new military columns to its existing four. According to official statements, the sub-national government consolidated local defence forces across Magway into military columns under the leadership of former Pa Ka Pha (locally acronym for People’s Security Team of the NUG) leader Bo Let Yar of Myaing Township.

    Meanwhile, the NLD reiterated that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s participation remains indispensable to any political resolution in Burma. In a separate joint statement marking her 81st birthday, political stakeholders from Central Burma urged ASEAN and the international community not to legitimise or prematurely engage with the military junta, warning that such actions would prolong Myanmar’s political crisis and armed conflict. The statement also called for the unconditional release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners as a prerequisite for an inclusive and peaceful political settlement.

    Security

    This month, major battles were reported across north-western Magway (Myaing, Pauk, Saw and Tilin Townships), the Kalay–Kabaw area of Sagaing (Kalay and Tamu Townships) and upper Sagaing (Mingin, Kantbalu, Kawlin and Katha Townships). Meanwhile, frequent aerial bombardments by the Tatmadaw and guerrilla attacks by resistance forces were reported across southern Mandalay (Natogyi, Myingyan and Taungtha Townships), as well as several townships in Sagaing and Magway.

    In north-western Magway, the Tatmadaw infantry columns comprising LID 101 and LID 99, supported by Pyu-Saw-Htee (locally acronym for the paramilitary wing of the Myanmar military), intensified ground offensives in Myaing and Pauk Townships. Several media reports confirmed that at least 26 villagers were killed by the columns during their raids. At least 25 villages were displaced. Resistance forces claimed that a military column became encircled in western Myaing Township, prompting the Tatmadaw to launch more than 120 airstrikes within four days in an apparent effort to support its ground troops. Fighting also intensified around the Myaing oil fields, where resistance groups warned that the military was attempting to destroy oil infrastructure if it could not regain control of the area.

    The Yaw region (of western Magway) remained another major theatre of conflict. Resistance forces, including the Arakan Army, reportedly coordinated with local resistance groups to repel Tatmadaw offensives in Saw Township. The Magway Regional Military Command of the People’s Defence Force reported capturing nine Tatmadaw soldiers and seizing weapons during the fighting. At the same time, the Tatmadaw relied increasingly on aerial logistics, using transport aircraft to airdrop weapons, ammunition and supplies to forward-deployed troops in Saw and Tilin Townships while conducting aerial reconnaissance over strategic locations.

    In the Kalay–Kabaw corridor, clashes intensified along the Asian Highway linking Kalay and Tamu, prompting resistance authorities to warn civilians to relocate temporarily to safer areas. The Tatmadaw also announced that it had recaptured Kanan Village near Khampat. The contestation continued over strategically important transport routes along the India–Myanmar border.

    Elsewhere, resistance forces continued guerrilla operations targeting military bases, police stations, checkpoints and military convoys across Magway and Mandalay Regions. The attacks were reported in Natmauk township, Chauk township, Min-bu township, Sinbaungwe township, Magway township,  Aunglan township of Magway region and Mahlaing township, Madaya township, Nyaung-U township, Natogyi township of Mandalay region. Several attacks reportedly resulted in casualties among Tatmadaw personnel, the seizure of weapons and ammunition, and the temporary capture or destruction of military and police outposts. In southern Mandalay, resistance forces also targeted military facilities supporting air operations, while clashes continued around Madaya and Malaing Townships.

    Across Sagaing, the Tatmadaw maintained extensive aerial operations and artillery attacks against civilian-populated areas while continuing efforts to regain territory in upper Sagaing. Airstrikes in Sagaing Township, Wetlet Township and other areas reportedly killed civilians and damaged homes, schools and other civilian infrastructure. Simultaneously, the military claimed to have re-established control over several villages in Indaw Township, which reflected ongoing efforts to secure key transport corridors linking Sagaing with Kachin State.

    Human Rights

    The human rights situation in Central Burma has deteriorated further, while civilian casualties and displacement figures have increased due to repeated airstrikes by the Tatmadaw against single targets, in Pauk, Myaing townships among others. It was obvious after the political transition to a new military commander, Ye Win Oo, according to the ACELD report, on 27 July 2026. From mid-June to late July, the diversification strategy of Tatmadaw forces involved using multiple airstrikes and continuous raids in north-western villages of Myaing township resulting in massacres of civilians and torture to death, while five bodies were burnt alive in Baw Ton village.

    In addition to physical violence, military operations continued to rely on tactics intended to terrorise civilian populations, including burning homes, looting civilian properties, as well as destruction of historical religious sites. The attack is no longer confined to active frontlines but increasingly affects civilians in their homes, farms, and public spaces. That was reported in the incident where an elderly man was killed while herding cattle after artillery attacks struck Hta Naung Kaing Lay village, Khin U township, Sagaing, on 30 July.

    Alongside such conventional tools, Tatmadaw continued to expand its use of drones during military operations for aerial surveillance and reconnaissance to monitor the movements of resistance forces and support ground offensives before the forces entered villages. In July, military drone activity was reported in Singu, Chauk, and Saw townships, including drone-delivered attacks. The growing use of drones has increased the risk of civilian casualties, including the death of a three-year-old boy.

    Furthermore, in urban areas controlled by Tatmadaw forces, since 21 July, digital surveillance through the Person Scrutinisation and Monitoring System (PSMS) has been used to verify the identities of persons linked to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), political activists, and those eligible for compulsory military service, thereby restricting freedom of movement. In some cases, local authorities under Tatmadaw engaged in extortion by manipulating conscription lists and demanding payments at checkpoints in Magway further increasing the financial burden of civilians.


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