Tag: Politics

  • What is Happening in Ah Nyar? August, 2026 [Issue 8/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? August, 2026 [Issue 8/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? August, 2026 [Issue 8/2026]

    ICRC visited State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Photo: internet)

    This Month in Ah Nyar: A Quick Overview

    • Sagaing and Mandalay formally joined SCEF, while coordination among the three federal units and with national-level institutions continued.
    • ICRC Representative of Burma visited State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
    • Resistance forces expanded military coordination, while junta forces continued offensives, reinforcements and airstrikes to regain strategic positions.
    • Airstrikes, village raids, arbitrary arrests, looting and arson continued across Ah Nyar, with civilians bearing the main burden of the conflict. The airstrike on a meditation centre in Myaung killed at least 16 people and injured more than 30, highlighting the continuing vulnerability of civilian spaces
    • Sagaing flood directly affected at least 177,700 people in at least 10 Sagaing townships, while restrictions on relief efforts compounded the crisis.

    Politics

    With the rise of discussions around the Steering Council for the Establishment of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), political debate appears to have become more prominent than institutional building, in contrast to the institution-building processes observed last month across the three units of central Burma. These political developments also coincided with the recent visit by the ICRC Burma representative to State Counsellor and NLD Chair Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, during which the ICRC stated that the visit “included the opportunity to speak with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in private.”

    Following these discussions, Sagaing and Mandalay officially joined SCEF, a political and military alliance involving the NUG, KIO, KNU and their partners. Discussions with Magway remain ongoing.

    This month also saw increased horizontal coordination among the three federal units, alongside greater engagement with the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). This can be understood as complementary to the ongoing discussions on the Division of Competencies (DoC) with the NUG, particularly regarding future administrative transitions. At the same time, the continued negotiations point to unresolved questions over representation, authority, and the relationship between federal-unit institutions and national-level actors.

    More consequential developments, however, may be emerging at the administrative level. In Magway and Sagaing, federal-unit governments continued coordinating with NUG structures and township administrations, while Mandalay openly discussed the division of competencies between the NUG and the region in higher education. These developments suggest that federalism is increasingly being negotiated through everyday governance and the exercise of administrative authority, rather than through constitutional and political declarations alone.

    Magway’s federal-unit government also announced the establishment of a public complaints mechanism and the creation of a human rights department under the Deputy Chief Minister’s Office.

    The central political question emerging from August is therefore not simply whether Ah Nyar is developing alternative institutions, but whether these increasingly numerous institutions can establish a coherent division of authority and a shared federal political framework without reproducing political and institutional fragmentation.

    Security

    The security landscape was characterised by persistent territorial contestation, increasing coordination among resistance forces, and continued military efforts to regain strategically important positions. The coordinated military column operating in Myaing and Pauk townships, led by LID 101 and LID 99, was reportedly reinforced by infantry troops from the 14th Military Operations Command based in Mong Hsat, eastern Shan State. The operation has been heavily supported by airpower, including aerial bombardment and fighter-jet strikes, as explored in our recent analysis of the situation. By 8 August 2026, the military column had reportedly raided at least 31 villages across Myaing and Pauk townships. More recently, reports indicated that a Tatmadaw column was approaching the Well No. 2 Oil Field near Kyauk Khwet village in Myaing Township, suggesting an ongoing effort to regain strategically important economic and territorial positions.

    In response, the resistance alliance’s “Ah Nyar Tamar Operation” has continued to confront military forces in areas under the command of the Magway Federal Unit’s Ministry of Defence. Fighting also continued in Minhla and Mindon townships, where reported military reinforcements point to the strategic importance of the routes connecting Magway and Rakhine. The United States of Burma Army, which is active in the area, also reported armed clashes beginning around 20 August. Beyond these frontline clashes, August also saw targeted killings of resistance-linked actors. A central committee member of the Chinland Defence Force (Kalay, Kabaw and Gangaw), along with two other individuals, was reportedly assassinated by gunmen who subsequently joined a Tatmadaw military base in Gangaw Township. Separately, the commander of the Chin Defence Force–Asho was reportedly killed in an ambush by junta forces in western Magway.

    Sagaing similarly experienced a mixture of resistance advances and increased military pressure. Resistance forces reportedly captured a strategically important military position between Indaw and Katha, while fighting and military restrictions continued in areas including Mingin, Yinmabin and Sagaing. The reported use of airstrikes during flooding, alongside arrests, forced recruitment and movement restrictions, further demonstrates how military pressure continues to extend beyond conventional frontline engagements. In Myaung Township, Sagaing Region, a junta field commander was reportedly assassinated inside the town, and resistance forces subsequently seized his mobile phone, potentially providing intelligence on the junta’s local operations and networks.

    In Mandalay, resistance forces continued to target military positions around Myittha, Meiktila, Myingyan and Kyaukpadaung, including the reported capture of a military outpost in Myingyan. At the same time, military and allied forces continued operations against civilian communities and resistance-held areas.

    On resistance coordination, four resistance groups, including the Rocket Fighter Column of the Magway Regional People’s Security Team under the NUG, formally announced the formation of a military alliance. At the local level, there were also signs of growing operational coordination, including joint operations among resistance groups in Mandalay and increased cooperation between different forces in Magway.

    The overall pattern suggests a protracted contest rather than a clear military turning point. Resistance forces appear increasingly capable of coordinating operations and contesting military positions, but the military continues to compensate for territorial vulnerabilities through reinforcement, airpower and coercive control of civilian movement.

    Human Rights

    The humanitarian situation in Central Burma has further deteriorated as flooding and ongoing military operations place a double burden on conflict-affected and displaced communities. According to our monitoring data regarding floods in Central Burma, over 177,700 people have been directly affected in at least ten townships of Sagaing, including Ye-U, Khin U, Taze, Myaung, and Wetlet townships. However, Tatmadaw authorities have also restricted emergency relief and rescue efforts in flood-affected areas. In Sagaing, for instance, local sources reported that people has been stopped and checked from carrying relief supplies at the Sagaing Bridge (Yadanarpon Bridge), locally known as Hna Pauk. 

    Amid such natural disasters, multiple aerial attacks of Tatmadaw continue against civilians. NUG has stated that, from 8 August to 23 August, over 240 airstrikes occurred nationwide, in which Magway and Sagaing were mostly targeted. In Sagaing, during August, attacks on civilians were recorded in Chaung U, Kani, Khin U and Myaung townships, among others. Among deadly aerial attacks, the massacre case was recorded in Myaung township. Tatmadaw conducted airstrikes twice around 9:00 am on 21 August, targeted at Buddhist meditation centre located in Hswe Lae O village, Myaung township.  Our investigation has recorded that the attack resulted in the deaths of 14 people at the scene, and over 30 were injured. Most are male elderly meditators, according to locals. Two people, including a 16-year-old boy, were dead with heavy injuries after the attacks. The attack may have been retaliatory following the killing of a Tatmadaw officer in Myaung on 17 August, although this connection requires further verification.

    In addition, since early August, Tatmadaw’s on-ground operations have continued to expand in Magway, Sagaing and Mandalay. Common patterns of arrests, torture to death, hostages, looting civilian properties, and burnings are widely seen as junta strategy in frontline battles. Such forms of violations were recorded in villages of Seikphyu,  Chauk and Myaing townships in Magway, the villages of Kani and Yinmarbin townships in Sagaing, as well as the villages of  Nyaung U and Taung Thar townships in Mandalay. 

    In urban areas controlled by the Tatmadaw, local sources reported arbitrary arrests under the pretext of conscription in Kalay, Monywa and Salin. These arrests were followed by extortion, with families asked to pay money for the release of those detained, according to local sources. In Salin township, for example, 16 young men aged 25–35 were arrested on August 16 by Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 253, stationed in Salin. Local sources reported that the junta intensified conscription recruitment for batch 28 that will begin in September.  

  • What is happening in Ah Nyar? July 2026

    What is happening in Ah Nyar? July 2026

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? July, 2026 [Issue 7/2026]

     

    Politics

    During July 2026, political developments in Central Burma were characterised by continued progress in resistance governance and institution-building, particularly in Sagaing and Magway. The Sagaing Federal Unit Parliament enacted the Interim Defence and Security Council Law, which subsequently drew criticism from the Civil Disobedience Movement Council, a representative bloc within the Sagaing Federal Unit Government. The CDM Council argued that the law was inconsistent with federal democratic principles and the interim constitutional framework. During the same period, the parliament confirmed the appointment of the Chief Justice and judges. This marked a further step in establishing the federal unit’s judicial institutions, while the division of authority between the Ministry of Justice of the NUG and the Sagaing Federal Unit Government is gaining momentum. NUG’s justice minister U Thein Oo held a meeting with key political stakeholders from Sagaing on the transition.

    The Deputy Chief Minister of the Sagaing Federal Unit Interim Government conducted a field visit to Khin-U Township, where he met with the Township People’s Administration Team, Township MP Dr Win Aung and sectoral administrative leaders. Although the government did not disclose details of the discussions, the meeting reflected ongoing coordination between the federal unit government and township-level governance structures. In addition, the National League for Democracy convened a working coordination meeting of executive committee members from its township and regional branches across the Sagaing Federal Unit.

    At the political dialogue level, both the Sagaing and Mandalay Federal Units endorsed the first draft of the Common Political Agreement (CPA) of the National Unity Consultative Council.

    In Magway, the interim government expanded its defence structures by establishing additional temporary military columns in response to intensified military offensives. During July, the Magway Federal Unit Government added five new military columns to its existing four. According to official statements, the sub-national government consolidated local defence forces across Magway into military columns under the leadership of former Pa Ka Pha (locally acronym for People’s Security Team of the NUG) leader Bo Let Yar of Myaing Township.

    Meanwhile, the NLD reiterated that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s participation remains indispensable to any political resolution in Burma. In a separate joint statement marking her 81st birthday, political stakeholders from Central Burma urged ASEAN and the international community not to legitimise or prematurely engage with the military junta, warning that such actions would prolong Myanmar’s political crisis and armed conflict. The statement also called for the unconditional release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners as a prerequisite for an inclusive and peaceful political settlement.

    Security

    This month, major battles were reported across north-western Magway (Myaing, Pauk, Saw and Tilin Townships), the Kalay–Kabaw area of Sagaing (Kalay and Tamu Townships) and upper Sagaing (Mingin, Kantbalu, Kawlin and Katha Townships). Meanwhile, frequent aerial bombardments by the Tatmadaw and guerrilla attacks by resistance forces were reported across southern Mandalay (Natogyi, Myingyan and Taungtha Townships), as well as several townships in Sagaing and Magway.

    In north-western Magway, the Tatmadaw infantry columns comprising LID 101 and LID 99, supported by Pyu-Saw-Htee (locally acronym for the paramilitary wing of the Myanmar military), intensified ground offensives in Myaing and Pauk Townships. Several media reports confirmed that at least 26 villagers were killed by the columns during their raids. At least 25 villages were displaced. Resistance forces claimed that a military column became encircled in western Myaing Township, prompting the Tatmadaw to launch more than 120 airstrikes within four days in an apparent effort to support its ground troops. Fighting also intensified around the Myaing oil fields, where resistance groups warned that the military was attempting to destroy oil infrastructure if it could not regain control of the area.

    The Yaw region (of western Magway) remained another major theatre of conflict. Resistance forces, including the Arakan Army, reportedly coordinated with local resistance groups to repel Tatmadaw offensives in Saw Township. The Magway Regional Military Command of the People’s Defence Force reported capturing nine Tatmadaw soldiers and seizing weapons during the fighting. At the same time, the Tatmadaw relied increasingly on aerial logistics, using transport aircraft to airdrop weapons, ammunition and supplies to forward-deployed troops in Saw and Tilin Townships while conducting aerial reconnaissance over strategic locations.

    In the Kalay–Kabaw corridor, clashes intensified along the Asian Highway linking Kalay and Tamu, prompting resistance authorities to warn civilians to relocate temporarily to safer areas. The Tatmadaw also announced that it had recaptured Kanan Village near Khampat. The contestation continued over strategically important transport routes along the India–Myanmar border.

    Elsewhere, resistance forces continued guerrilla operations targeting military bases, police stations, checkpoints and military convoys across Magway and Mandalay Regions. The attacks were reported in Natmauk township, Chauk township, Min-bu township, Sinbaungwe township, Magway township,  Aunglan township of Magway region and Mahlaing township, Madaya township, Nyaung-U township, Natogyi township of Mandalay region. Several attacks reportedly resulted in casualties among Tatmadaw personnel, the seizure of weapons and ammunition, and the temporary capture or destruction of military and police outposts. In southern Mandalay, resistance forces also targeted military facilities supporting air operations, while clashes continued around Madaya and Malaing Townships.

    Across Sagaing, the Tatmadaw maintained extensive aerial operations and artillery attacks against civilian-populated areas while continuing efforts to regain territory in upper Sagaing. Airstrikes in Sagaing Township, Wetlet Township and other areas reportedly killed civilians and damaged homes, schools and other civilian infrastructure. Simultaneously, the military claimed to have re-established control over several villages in Indaw Township, which reflected ongoing efforts to secure key transport corridors linking Sagaing with Kachin State.

    Human Rights

    The human rights situation in Central Burma has deteriorated further, while civilian casualties and displacement figures have increased due to repeated airstrikes by the Tatmadaw against single targets, in Pauk, Myaing townships among others. It was obvious after the political transition to a new military commander, Ye Win Oo, according to the ACELD report, on 27 July 2026. From mid-June to late July, the diversification strategy of Tatmadaw forces involved using multiple airstrikes and continuous raids in north-western villages of Myaing township resulting in massacres of civilians and torture to death, while five bodies were burnt alive in Baw Ton village.

    In addition to physical violence, military operations continued to rely on tactics intended to terrorise civilian populations, including burning homes, looting civilian properties, as well as destruction of historical religious sites. The attack is no longer confined to active frontlines but increasingly affects civilians in their homes, farms, and public spaces. That was reported in the incident where an elderly man was killed while herding cattle after artillery attacks struck Hta Naung Kaing Lay village, Khin U township, Sagaing, on 30 July.

    Alongside such conventional tools, Tatmadaw continued to expand its use of drones during military operations for aerial surveillance and reconnaissance to monitor the movements of resistance forces and support ground offensives before the forces entered villages. In July, military drone activity was reported in Singu, Chauk, and Saw townships, including drone-delivered attacks. The growing use of drones has increased the risk of civilian casualties, including the death of a three-year-old boy.

    Furthermore, in urban areas controlled by Tatmadaw forces, since 21 July, digital surveillance through the Person Scrutinisation and Monitoring System (PSMS) has been used to verify the identities of persons linked to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), political activists, and those eligible for compulsory military service, thereby restricting freedom of movement. In some cases, local authorities under Tatmadaw engaged in extortion by manipulating conscription lists and demanding payments at checkpoints in Magway further increasing the financial burden of civilians.


  • What is Happening in Ah Nyar? June, 2026 [Issue 6/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? June, 2026 [Issue 6/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? June, 2026 [Issue 6/2026]

    Resistance groups seize Pyu-Saw-Htee post in Pauk Township (Photo: Ah Nyar Myay Military Alliance)

    This month in Ah Nyar: A Quick Overview

    • Ethnic territorial and governance disputes intensified as the Shanni Self-Administered Region proposal drew opposition from the Kuki community, while the NUG and Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay continued negotiations on the division of competencies.
    • Armed conflict escalated across north-western Magway and the Kalay–Kabaw corridor, with the Tatmadaw regaining Khampat and resistance forces sustaining coordinated operations in Magway. Inter-factional tensions among resistance groups also increased in Mandalay and Sagaing.
    • Renewed military offensives along the India–Burma Friendship Road triggered fresh displacement, particularly around Khampat and Yarzagyo in Sagaing Region.
    • Reports documented extrajudicial killings, attacks on civilians, destruction of cultural and religious sites and continued burning of villages, while accountability challenges persisted in conflict-affected areas.
    • Pro-democracy groups renewed calls for proof of life and the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, while peaceful symbolic protests continued across central Burma despite ongoing conflict.

    Politics

    The Shanni Nationalities Army held talks with representatives of the Naypyitaw regime and proposed the establishment of a Shanni Self-Administered Region covering townships in upper Sagaing Region and parts of Kachin State. In response, the United Kuki State Council issued a statement rejecting the proposal, stating that it includes ancestral Kuki territories in Homalin, Hkamti, Kale and Tamu Townships in northern Sagaing Region.

    The Central Committee for Naga Literature and Culture established a Peace, Stability and Negotiation Committee to engage in dialogue with six Naga armed groups operating in the Naga Self-Administered Zone. The groups reportedly include factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, the Naga National Council and the Eastern Naga National Organisation. The initiative is widely interpreted as part of Naypyitaw’s strategy to consolidate stability and pursue negotiated arrangements in the Naga SAZ. However, it excludes the Naga People’s Defence Organisation and the Naga People’s Defence Force. Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay continued discussions with the National Unity Government (NUG) on the division of competencies, reportedly focusing this month on humanitarian affairs. The parties also agreed on a transition plan for governance mechanisms in Sagaing. Pro-democracy groups, including the National League for Democracy, elected parliamentarians and strike committees, renewed calls for the military regime to provide proof that State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi is alive and to secure her immediate release.

    Resistance Movement

    The security landscape this month was characterised by an escalation of armed conflict in north-western Magway Region and the Kalay–Kabaw area of Sagaing Region, alongside increased tensions between National Unity Government security forces and local resistance groups, particularly the People’s Liberation Army in southern Mandalay Region. In Magway Region, sustained pressure on military positions was observed particularly across north-western Magway. The local resistance forces announced Operation Su targeting frontline military posts in Seikpyu, Pauk and Pokokku townships. The resistance groups announced that they had captured Pyu-Saw-Htee militia members and Tatmadaw soldiers while taking control of Kokkosu Village in Pauk Township. Resistance forces also claimed to have shot down a military helicopter during operations in the region. In Pakokku Township, near the Tatmadaw’s Light Infantry Division 101 headquarters, resistance groups reportedly seized the Myit Che Police Station. Similar attacks targeting police station in Saw Township were also reported. In Yesagyo Township, the People’s Defence Team of Yesagyo launched an attack on a Tatmadaw unit on the outskirts of Yesagyo Town. In Natmauk Township, resistance groups reportedly captured the Padauk Ngote Pyu-Saw-Htee outpost. Guerrilla attacks were also reported in Taungdwingyi and Seikphyu townships.

    In the Kalay–Kabaw area of Sagaing Region, Tatmadaw launched a major offensive and reportedly regained control of Khampat Town, which had been under National Unity Government control since 2023. Fighting continued throughout the month as Tatmadaw ground forces advanced along the Kalay–Tamu corridor in an apparent effort to re-establish control over the strategic road linking Kalay to the India–Burma border trade zone at Tamu. The renewed offensive triggered significant displacement, particularly from Yarzagyo Village and Khampat Town along the India–Burma Friendship Road. A Tatmadaw column under the Monywa-based Northwestern Regional Military Command launched operations against resistance strongholds in Chaung-U Township. Clashes were reported as the military advanced through the area. Following the fighting, Tatmadaw forces reportedly burned approximately 250 houses in Sin Myay, Nga Lone Tin and Hman Cho villages after suffering an estimated 20–30 fatalities in engagements with resistance forces. 

    In Mandalay Region, resistance activity remained concentrated in the southern townships of Natogyi, Myingyan and Taungtha. The People’s Defence Team of Natogyi Township announced that it had attacked a Tatmadaw column conducting village raids in Natogyi Township. Inter-factional tensions among resistance forces persisted during the month. In southern Mandalay Region, National Unity Government forces reportedly raided positions held by the People’s Liberation Army in Taungtha Township, in what observers viewed as part of the NUG’s broader effort to consolidate command and control over resistance forces in central Burma. Similar tensions were reported in Sagaing Region, where NUG infantry battalions reportedly raided bases of the People’s Security Team in Monywa. Separately, Pale Maung, a battalion commander of the NUG, was reportedly shot dead by the Personal Assistant to Swan Thu Maung, the District Commander of Yinmarbin District.

    Justice and Human Rights

    In June, Tatmadaw’s atrocity crimes were recorded in several townships, such as Myit Che, Chaung U, and Pakoku among others. In Mandalay, the column of Tatmadaw forces from Infantry Battalion 415 based in Nyaung U has reportedly raided the villages in Myit Che, since May 12, according to local sources. Over 20 people, including women and elderly were extrajudicially killed after being arrested. The dead bodies were found, even hard to identify who they were. In addition, attacks on civilians and religious buildings were reported in Chuang U township, Sagiang in mid-June 2026. After a week of fighting with local resistance forces, the artillery attacks and airstrikes of Tatmadaw forces are continuous and intentional. Our investigation has confirmed four deaths, and twelve injuries. Among the deaths, three are above 58 years old, and sick people who suffer from chronic disease. Last but not least, regardless of international humanitarian law’s provisions, the destruction of a stupa over 200 years old was recorded in Sin Myay village. The patterns of burning houses where resistance stronghold areas are highly targeted in O Yin village, Pakokku township, Magway.

    Amid widespread and systematic conflict-related abuses, women and girls remain highly vulnerable to rape and other forms of sexual violence.

    Access to justice continues to be limited due to insecurity, weak law enforcement, and constraints on judicial institutions. One reported example is the case of a perpetrator accused of raping and murdering a 13-year-old girl in Saw township, who was reportedly convicted and sentenced to death by a National Unity Government administered court but later escaped from detention while authorities were reportedly attempting to secure his custody. This reported escape highlights the ongoing challenges in ensuring accountability and enforcing judicial decisions in conflict-affected areas. On the other hand, civic protests and resistance activities continued in several townships across Central Burma. On 18 June, strike groups in Butalin and Kani launched the “Rose Campaign” to commemorate the 81st birthday of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The initiative encouraged public participation through symbolic acts, including wearing or carrying red roses and engaging in online solidarity campaigns, reflecting the continued use of peaceful forms of political expression despite the ongoing conflict. 

  • Myanmar’s Conflict Is No Longer a 20th-Century Revolution

    Myanmar’s Conflict Is No Longer a 20th-Century Revolution

    Myanmar’s Conflict Is No Longer a 20th-Century Revolution

    Resistance Fighters in Central Burma (Photo: Thanlwin Myanmar Media)

    The recent diplomacy between the United States and China should serve as a wake-up call — particularly for many of Myanmar’s institutionalised political and civil society elites who continue interpreting the country’s crisis through outdated frameworks rooted mainly in identity politics, symbolic advocacy and old political binaries. Myanmar’s conflict has already evolved into something far more complex: a hyper-modern war economy shaped by trade survival, logistics control and technological integration. The battlefield today is no longer determined only by ideology or ethnicity. Increasingly, it is shaped by who controls trade routes, financial circulation, resource corridors, and technological infrastructure. Across Myanmar’s conflict landscape, from EAO and PDF to Pyu-Saw-Htee militias, BGF and the Tatmadaw, the survival and influence of armed actors ultimately depend on their ability to contest and control these key sources.

    A quick examination of the conflict reveals that control over ammunition, medicine, fuel, internet access and food supplies is just as important as control over territory. None of these essentials can be sustained without functioning financial and trade networks operating across multiple levels—from northern Shan to Mandalay and from central Burma to the country’s western frontier. Without these systems, territorial control remains nominal rather than substantive.

    This explains why some of the fiercest battles are fought not merely over symbolic locations but over strategic trade corridors, logistical hubs and resource-rich areas. In contemporary conflicts, authority is measured not only by who holds territory, but by who can govern, supply, finance and connect it. The ability to sustain economic and administrative systems ultimately determines whether military control can be translated into durable political authority. To put it simply, modern revolutions are not won through political narratives alone. They are won through the capacity to govern, mobilise resources and maintain functioning systems that sustain both resistance and society.

    Border Gateways and Resource Corridors

    The fighting across northern Shan, Karen, Kachin, Chin and the borderlands adjoining Thailand, India and China is deeply intertwined with the control of customs gates and cross-border trade routes. Whoever controls these gateways controls taxation, revenue generation and ultimately, political authority. The recent developments in Kutkai illustrate this reality. The MNDAA reportedly moved against its long-standing ally, the TNLA and dismantled the latter’s administrative presence in the town. Kutkai is not merely a military objective; it sits on the strategic trade corridor linking Mandalay, Muse and China.

    The significance of such locations lies in their economic value. Trade flows through these corridors generate substantial revenues that finance administrative structures, public services and military operations. Whether under the control of ethnic armed organisations, resistance actors, or the junta, these revenues provide the resources necessary to sustain governance and project power. In many respects, the struggle for border crossings and trade routes is as consequential as the struggle for territory itself.

    Similarly, many conflict zones overlap directly with strategic resource corridors linked to rare earth mining, crude oil and other critical minerals. The struggle over China-bound supply chains, Thailand-linked trade networks, India-linked illicit economies and extractive zones is not accidental. For example, fierce contestation across Kachin State is closely tied to access to rare earth mining areas that supply China’s high-tech and renewable energy industries. According to Global Witness, Myanmar’s heavy rare earth trade was worth approximately US$1.4 billion in 2023, while exports of heavy rare earth oxides to China more than doubled from 19,500 tonnes in 2021 to 41,700 tonnes in 2023.

    A similar pattern can be observed in central Burma. Recent research by the Centre for Ah Nyar Studies highlights how contestation over oil and gas infrastructure in Magway has become increasingly intertwined with emerging governance arrangements. Petroleum fields, transport routes, taxation systems and local administrative mechanisms have become sites of competition between revolutionary actors and the junta.  Likewise, competition over jade, gold, timber and border trade routes has long shaped the political economy of conflict in northern Myanmar, while battles around key crossings in Karen and Shan States remain inseparable from the revenues generated through formal and informal cross-border commerce. In many cases, the real strategic value lies not in the land being contested, but in the economic infrastructure that runs through it.

    The Digital Frontline

    Ethnic resistance movements have been among the greatest beneficiaries of Generation Z’s efforts to digitalise the revolution, from the use of drones on the battlefield to the mobilisation of financial resources. Like it or not, the Spring Revolution has fundamentally digitised Myanmar’s conflict. At the same time, digital infrastructure has become more critical than ever for the resistance movement, governance and, most importantly, the functioning of the emerging economy in resistance-held areas. Adding to this, Myanmar’s formal banking system has been severely weakened by militarisation, state surveillance, sanctions pressure, economic decline and repeated systemic disruptions. As confidence in formal financial institutions has eroded, communities have increasingly turned to mobile wallets, crypto-linked transfers, informal hundi networks and other decentralised financial mechanisms. Diaspora remittances, humanitarian assistance, procurement financing and even battlefield logistics now flow through hybrid financial ecosystems involving USDT, encrypted communication platforms, digital payment channels and cross-border transfer networks. In many respects, resistance financing has evolved beyond conventional fundraising models. It increasingly resembles a decentralised wartime fintech system, capable of moving resources across borders, circumventing state controls and sustaining both governance and resistance activities in contested territories.

    Likewise, connectivity is increasingly moving beyond the reach of state control. Satellite internet systems such as Starlink enable communities to bypass internet shutdowns, communication blackouts and state surveillance mechanisms. Across Ah Nyar, particularly among displaced populations, connectivity is no longer simply a matter of communication. It has become a critical enabler of education, emergency coordination, access to healthcare, financial inclusion, documentation of human rights abuses and maintaining social ties under wartime conditions. More importantly, connectivity enhances resilience. Communities with access to the outside world are better able to mobilise resources, share information, access services and maintain links with diaspora networks. In this sense, digital connectivity functions as both social infrastructure and a form of civilian protection. A connected village is not only better informed; it is also harder to isolate, intimidate, or control psychologically and politically.

    Beyond Symbolic Politics

    This does not mean that questions of ethnicity, discrimination, gender inequality, or historical injustice have disappeared. They remain deeply embedded in Myanmar’s social and political fabric. Yet much of the country’s political discourse continues to approach these issues through frameworks of representation and recognition inherited from previous decades, often overlooking the profound transformation of the material conditions that shape people’s lives.

    For millions living under protracted conflict, the struggle is increasingly about access rather than symbolism. Access to essential supplies, including energy and finance, has become as consequential as access to political representation itself. Communities are not merely demanding a seat at the table; they are seeking the capabilities necessary to survive, adapt and shape their own futures.

    Beyond symbolic politics, Myanmar’s future will be shaped not only by political settlements, military outcomes, or constitutional arrangements, but by whether emerging systems can genuinely expand human capability. Despite all the discussions about trade corridors, digital finance, AI, drones, crypto systems and geopolitical competition, the central question should never be forgotten: How can human beings live with dignity, safety, and opportunity under rapidly changing realities? Access to education, healthcare, connectivity, finance, energy and security increasingly determines whether people can build meaningful lives. Ultimately, the success of any revolution should be measured not by the power it accumulates, but by the opportunities and dignity it creates for ordinary people.

    Let Pan Ni is an independent researcher specialising in the social dynamics of Myanmar’s central dry zone (Ah Nyar). Her research focuses on bridging the gap between realities on the ground and international policy frameworks.

    The views and analyses presented in this commentary are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Centre for Ah Nyar Studies.

    Cite this Article: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, (2026, June 10). “Myanmar’s Conflict Is No Longer a 20th-Century Revolution”. Op-ed, Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. https://ah-nyarstudies.org/myanmars-conflict-is-no-longer-a-20th-century-revolution/

  • What is Happening in Ah Nyar? May, 2026 [Issue 5/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? May, 2026 [Issue 5/2026]

    What is Happening in Ah Nyar? May, 2026 [Issue 5/2026]

    This month in Ah Nyar: A Quick Overview

    Federal Unit Governments in Ah Nyar continued to consolidate interim governance structures and deepen political coordination amid the re-escalation of conflict in the region. These efforts reflect an ongoing attempt to institutionalise sub-national governance arrangements, enhance policy coherence among resistance-controlled administrations, and strengthen coordination between civilian and security actors. Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann convened a meeting with cabinet ministers at an undisclosed location to review progress on the SCEF, governance and federal units.

    The security and humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate. In western Magway, particularly in resistance-controlled areas west of Pakokku, the Tatmadaw intensified its “four cuts” strategy, restricting civilian access to food, medicine, and other essential supplies while deploying an estimated 2,500–3,500 troops, including newly conscripted recruits, to reassert territorial control. These developments are likely to exacerbate displacement and civilian vulnerability. Concurrently, the World Food Programme warned that 12.4 million people – one in four nationwide – are facing acute hunger, while 3.7 million remain displaced by the ongoing conflict.

    Politics

    Sagaing parliament and government released information on the finalisation of the transfer of administrative mechanisms from the NUG to the Sagaing Federal Unit Government. The process was presented by the President, Prime Minister, cabinet members, including Union Minister for HomeAffairs Lwin Ko Latt, as well as the Chief Minister and cabinet of the Sagaing government. The development marks a significant step towards operationalising devolved governance at the federal unit level. At the administrative level, the Sagaing government convened district and township administration teams to introduce the new governance structure and discuss implementation plans. Meanwhile, the Sagaing parliament continued deliberations on federal unit legislation and reviewed judicial appointments as part of efforts to establish the institutional foundations of the unit’s judiciary. Sagaing Parliament and Government engaged with the SCEF Secretariat, led by Dr Zaw Wai Soe and Salai Ram Kulh Cung, to explore avenues for Sagaing’s participation in the State/Federal Unit/ERO Representative Pillar of the SCEF. The discussions reflect broader efforts to integrate emerging federal units into national-level revolutionary coordination mechanisms. Sagaing parliament also announced the completion of a Security Council Bill, which signals continued efforts to formalise governance and security arrangements within the federal unit framework. 

    Magway parliament held talks with the CRPH on the evolving federal unit political landscape. Separately, the Magway Federal Unit Government engaged the NUG in Division of Competencies (DoC) discussions, with particular attention to the transfer of Magway administrative mechanisms from the NUG to the federal unit government. Magway Federal Unit met with the SCEF Secretariat team, led by Dr Zaw Wai Soe of the NUG Prime Minister’s Office, to discuss its representation in the State/Federal Unit/ERO Representative Pillar, one of the three pillars of the SCEF.

    Mandalay parliament and the governing council held discussions with the SCEF Secretariat, led by Dr Zaw Wai Soe and Salai Ram Kulh Cung, on potential avenues for Mandalay’s participation in the State/Federal Unit/ERO Representative Pillar of the SCEF. The engagement reflects ongoing efforts to position emerging sub-national institutions within broader revolutionary coordination mechanisms and federal political structures. Separately, the Coordination Platform of Revolutionary Forces, commonly referred to as the “Mandalay Platform,” convened with representatives from the seven constituent blocs that form the MIGC, alongside members of the Mandalay Parliament and the governing council. The meeting is a political coordination room created by the Mandalay Interim Political Arrangement and serves as a forum for political coordination and consensus-building among diverse revolutionary stakeholders.

    NUG announced, on May 21, that Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann held an in-person meeting, at an undisclosed location, with several union ministers and deputy ministers on key political and military developments.According to the statement, the meeting focused on seven major areas, including the implementation status of the SCEF, interim public administration among federal units, strategic military operations, international relations, healthcare, education, and humanitarian affairs. The SCEF was formed on 30 March through coordination between the NUG, the CRPH, and several major ethnic armed organisations, including the KNU, KNPP, CNF,and KIO.

    Resistance Movement

    The resistance landscape during May 2026 reflected continuing territorial contestation and intensified military consolidation efforts by both Tatmadaw and resistance forces across Ah Nyar and the Magway–Chin corridor.  Resistance forces captured Thayetkan village in Myaing Township, Magway Region, on 23 May 2026. The village, reportedly a stronghold of the pro-junta Pyu-Saw-Htee militia, is located approximately 13 miles from Myaing town. Meanwhile, resistance groups expanded offensive operations in Sagaing Region. The PDF Shwebo District Battalion No. 1 announced the capture of the Saing-Pyin police station in Depayin Township as part of Operation OTT. According to the statement, 11 Tatmadaw soldiers died in the battle.

    On the other hand, Tatmadaw forces expanded continuous military operations following control over northern Chin towns, including Tonzang on May 19. Tatmadaw increased troop mobilisation, aerial logistical operations, and military reinforcements in western Magway, particularly around Saw and Kyaukhtu townships. On May 14, a column of more than 350 troops of Tatmadaw reportedly entered Saw town, where soldiers established positions in public buildings and monasteries, conducted inspections, and arbitrarily detained civilians, particularly young residents. The major expansion of troop deployment was observed on the main roads across western Magway connecting Chin and Rakhine. In Sagaing, Tatmadaw continued military operations across Salingyi, Yinmarbin, and Kani townships. On 17 May, junta troops reportedly launched an offensive along the road linking the Myanmar Yang Tse Copper Company Limited mining project in Salingyi Township and Yinmarbin town.The operation triggered the displacement of approximately 1,000 civilians from nearby communities. 

    Justice and Human Rights

    Humanitarian conditions across Myanmar continue to deteriorate. An estimated 12.4 million people—roughly one in four of the population—are experiencing acute food insecurity, while 3.7 million people remain displaced by ongoing conflict. Against this backdrop, local sources reported that transportation routes from Pakokku to western Magway townships, including Pauk, Myaing, Myit Chay, and the Yaw region, have been tightly restricted. The restrictions have reportedly disrupted the flow of basic commodities and humanitarian supplies. This exacerbates existing vulnerabilities in conflict affected communities and further constrains access to essential goods and services. Local sources indicated that even small household items, such as bottled water, have been blocked by the Tatmadaw. Local sources reported that, during the first week of May 2026, Tatmadaw soldiers allegedly raped four women in MaYoe Kone and TheinYwar villages in Myingyan Township. According to local reports, the survivors have since fled their communities due to concerns over stigma, social pressure, and continued insecurity. In addition, the mentally disabled woman, about 34 years old from Ta Pyin village, Saw township, is reportedly raped and killed by the column of Tatmadaw that raided on 15 May, according to local sources. 

     

  • Ah Nyar’s Big Questions in 2026: Where Are We Headed?

    Ah Nyar’s Big Questions in 2026: Where Are We Headed?

    Ah Nyar’s Big Questions in 2026: Where Are We Headed?

    Photo: Villagers from Pauk Township, Magway Region, fleeing their homes. (Credit: Khit Thit Media)

    Six years into Burma’s Spring Revolution, the political landscape is shifting once again and not always in ways the resistance had imagined. National Unity Government has declared a multi-stage reform process in response to escalating public frustration from its own support base. Questions about effectiveness, coordination, and accountability are no longer whispered concerns; they are openly debated online and across liberated areas. At the same time, Operation 1027 of the three Brotherhood Alliance (MNDAA, AA and TNLA) has effectively stalled. Beijing’s mounting pressure on the alliance has altered battlefield calculations and reminded all actors that geopolitics remains a determining force in Burma’s conflict. Adding to this fragile equation, the junta’s renewed push for general elections has been widely dismissed as a political manoeuvre rather than a genuine democratic transition. Labelled a “sham” by much of the international community, including ASEAN, the elections underscore the regime’s attempt to repackage military rule in civilian clothing. These events emerged as defining features of Burma’s political landscape in late 2025. Amid these developments, central Burma — known locally as Ah Nyar — has quietly become one of the most consequential political arenas of 2026.

    Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway have announced the formation of federal unit governments. This signals a significant shift from resistance mobilisation to sub-national political structuring. Since the coup d’état in 2021, the central dry zone has been more than a resistance stronghold; it has served as the backbone of the NUG’s de facto authority. The formation of federal unit governments was welcomed by the NUG, states and regional parliaments, and non-violent movement coalitions such as CDM and People’s Strike Groups. Somewhat unexpectedly, ethnic revolutionary organisations refrained from expressing their positions or formally acknowledging the establishment of the federal unit governments. NUG Acting President stated, “to establish a better system of governance for the Sagaing region” in his speech during the seventh regular meeting of Sagaing Federal Unit Hluttaw, introducing the cabinet.

    Federal Foundations or Parallel Power Centres?

    The newly emerged federal unit governments in Ah Nyar raise two fundamental questions. Are these sub-national governments creating parallel power centres? Or are they laying the foundations of a future federal union?

    The revolution may have achieved its immediate objective of removing the Naypyitaw regime over the past five years if the major groups had reached a consensus and formed a unified military alliance. However, it failed to bring smaller factions together under a coherent strategic direction. This means that the Spring Revolution has developed within a fragmented reality. That said, the reason why the federal units in central Burma emerged can generally be conceptualised in three ways. First, resistance forces in the region spread across villages and townships (around 87 townships), which makes collective actions challenging. Politically, the movement lacked a coherent central nucleus to provide unified strategic direction. In the past five years, the NUG has struggled to bring these dispersed forces under a coherent organisational framework. Second, a political foundation was already in place. The Federal Democracy Charter, NLD’s federal principles (Suu’s six principles) and the continuing legitimacy of 2020 elected MPs provided both normative and institutional grounding. Many of these MPs remained active in Ah Nyar and liberated areas. Taken together, these reinforce the case for formalised federal units. Third, perceived shortcomings of the NUG in Ah Nyar accelerated local initiatives. Weak coordination with emerging grassroots leaders, ineffective rebel governance and concerns over resource distribution contributed to demands for more autonomous regional structures.

    The federal units have formally recognised the NUG as the central authority of the revolution and the interim federal government. In military affairs, their mandate is limited to unit-level security forces to effectively function as unit guard forces, while PDFs remain under the existing NUG command. Section 139 of the Sagaing Constitution states, “The following armed forces may be established in consultation with the National Unity Government: (a) the Defence Force of the Unit; and (b) the Security Force/Police Force of the Unit.” Section 114 of the Magway Interim Arrangement reflects a similar provision, while the Mandalay Interim Arrangement does not mention any security arrangements. Foreign affairs are fully vested in the centre and reaffirm the NUG’s exclusive diplomatic role. Provisions in Chapter 17 of the Magway Interim Arrangement, Chapter 18 of the Sagaing Constitution, and Annexe I of the Mandalay Interim Arrangement outline power-sharing between the NUG and the units. However, the division of competency still requires careful negotiation.

    These developments could, in principle, reinforce the NUG rather than weaken it. Yet this outcome is not automatic. Critical conditions remain. Clear and durable understandings must be made, particularly on sensitive issues such as military coordination and foreign relations. The division of competencies between the centre and emerging federal units cannot be left ambiguous; it requires deliberate and structured negotiation. Given the political weight of these matters, authority must be exercised with restraint, caution, and strategic foresight.

    Governing Priorities?

    Sub-national governments are primarily functional in nature, widely described as mechanisms to deliver public services and coordinate with key stakeholders at the regional level. Their formation and structure are not unitary; rather, they are coalition-based. In Sagaing, the unit government comprises five representative blocs, while in both Magway and Mandalay, the respective unit governments are composed of seven representative blocs each. That said, and with the fragmented reality of the revolutionary landscape, the basic question arises. Can they truly make these governments work effectively? They must juggle competing priorities: confronting intensifying military pressure from the junta, navigating complex relationships with neighbouring ethnic organisations (KIO in Sagaing, AA in Magway, and TNLA/MNDAA in Mandalay) and sustaining alignment with the NUG and at the same time, building functioning sub-national governments.

    Within this reality, two priorities stand out for 2026.

    First, upper-layer political stability must be deliberately constructed. This requires stabilising the internal balance of power within the unit governments, particularly among the representative blocs, while also managing relationships with the NUG and neighbouring ethnic revolutionary organisations. Without cohesion at this level, effective governance on the ground will remain fragile and contested. To sustain this equilibrium, structured communication channels and agreed decision-making procedures must be institutionalised between representative blocs, the NUG, and neighbouring ethnic organisations. Clear mechanisms for dispute resolution should also be established to manage inevitable tensions before they escalate into political rifts. Without such frameworks, internal competition, mistrust, or overlapping claims to legitimacy will erode administrative effectiveness and weaken public confidence.

    Second, an administrative framework at the federal unit level must be clearly defined, not in rhetoric, but in practice. The 2020 electoral mandate and revolutionary legitimacy, while powerful, cannot by themselves sustain governance. Authority must be translated into systems. Federal units need functioning structures for administration, budgeting, taxation, public service delivery, dispute resolution, and coordination with security actors. Lines of authority must be codified. The boundaries between civilian leadership and armed forces must be clearly drawn. Without institutional discipline, coalition-based governments risk becoming symbolic rather than functional. Equally important is a smooth and orderly transition from the NUG’s Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration administration to the emerging sub-national governments. This transition is not merely technical; it is political.

    The success of Ah Nyar’s sub-national governments will depend less on how broadly they are composed and more on how effectively they are structured and managed.

    Cite this article: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. (2026, February 15). Ah Nyar’s Big Questions in 2026: Where Are We Headed? [Op-ed]. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. https://ah-nyarstudies.org/ah-nyars-big-questions-in-2026-where-are-we-headed/ 


  • Analysis of the Evolving Power Structure of Federal Units in Central Burma

    Analysis of the Evolving Power Structure of Federal Units in Central Burma

    Analysis of the Evolving Power Structure of Federal Units in Central Burma

    Photo: People of Sagaing Show Their Support for Operation 1027 and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (Photo: Sagaing Region Strike Forces’ Facebook Page)

    Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma (part 2)

    The emergence of federal units in central Burma marks a major shift in the country’s revolutionary politics, shaped by the political dynamics of the Spring Revolution. Although this development has been influenced to some extent by the federal principles articulated by actors involved in the NCA process before the coup, as well as by the longstanding principles of ethnic revolutionary groups, the formation of federal units has been driven primarily by the latest discussions after the coup. In the meantime, central Burma has become a testing ground for revolutionary governance, shaped by various armed and political actors working towards a common goal.

    While Part (1) of this series traced the origins and formation of these federal units, Part II examines the power structures within the three units. The analysis aims to uncover how central authority is organised, distributed, and contested, and to offer insights into the political struggles at the regional (federal unit) level amid growing calls for NUG reform.

    Constituent Base of Power

    The power structure of the federal units is shaped by three overlapping sources of legitimacy: electoral, revolutionary, and civil. These cores altogether create a hybrid political order that is neither traditionally parliamentary nor purely revolutionary. This hybrid nature is still a new concept in the political history of Burma.

    Sources of Legitimacy

    Electoral legitimacy derives from the 2020 elected MPs who constitute the unit parliaments. The 2020 General Elections were an electoral process established under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. Under that Constitution, the terms of the parliaments were set at five years (see Sections 119, 151 and 168[1]). However, the Constitution was completely abolished by the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw on 31 March 2021[2]. Since then, the new terms of the unit parliaments have been defined as lasting until the emergence of new parliaments under a permanent constitution developed for each region (see Section 58 of the Magway Interim Arrangements; Section 65 of the Mandalay Interim Arrangements; and Section 51 of the Sagaing Constitution).

    Unit parliaments have very limited capacity to exercise territorial authority due to displacement, weak administrative structures, and the complex dynamics of post-coup actors. Nevertheless, their presence provides continuity with pre-coup democratic mandates and offers both local and international legitimacy. The unit parliaments also confer legality on the interim arrangements and serve as the principal bodies for legislative oversight during wartime.

    Revolutionary legitimacy arises from resistance groups that have gained authority through territorial control or influence within the units. These groups include the “3-Ps” (People’s Defence Team, People’s Administration Team, and People’s Security Team) of NUG and the Local People’s Defence Forces (LPDF). Their legitimacy is grounded in the practical authority they exercise through on-the-ground governance and the provision of security. A closer look at the leadership and the composition of resistance groups, four broad community clusters can be identified: youth groups, political parties (primarily the NLD), students’ unions, and local labour and peasant communities. Youth groups involved in national and regional youth policy processes between 2015 and 2020 now form the core of youth-led resistance groups in the region, while the NLD youth wings in the three regions (now federal units) and other democratic political parties have also joined the armed resistance. In central Burma, the Myay-Latt and upper Burma divisions of the All Burma Federation of Students’ Unions, along with several university students’ unions, joined various armed organisations after the coup. In addition, local labour and peasant communities also stepped forward to take up arms and fight against the military junta following the coup.

    Despite differing levels of participation in the political process surrounding the interim arrangements, no direct involvement of resistance groups was found in Sagaing, whereas such involvement was evident in Magway and Mandalay (as reflected in categories 6 and 4 of their respective drafting bodies). In Magway, 14% of the members of the drafting commission were representatives of armed resistance groups, compared with 9% in Mandalay.

    Civic–stakeholder legitimacy comes from women’s organisations, labour groups, peasants, ethnic/minority groups, students’ unions, strike groups, youth networks, and CDM civil servants. Although this category represents very diverse organs, three major groups significantly influence this layer: ethnic minorities, CDM participants, and strike groups. These three groups have demonstrated a relatively higher level of dominance over the political process, beginning with the drafting phase and continuing to the current stage of executive formation. Local bodies representing each group have emerged alongside the drafting process. These include the Sagaing Region Strike Forces[3], formed by strike groups in the Sagaing Region; the Sagaing Federal Unit CDM Civil Servants Council[4] and the Chin Ethnic Groups[5] of the Magway Federal Unit.

    Yinmarbin-Salingyi Strike of Sagaing Region Strike Forces [6]

    This inclusion reflects the social character of the Spring Revolution and broadens political participation beyond armed actors and elected officials. However, their roles often lack a clear constituency and accountability mechanisms, leading to overlapping mandates and the potential duplication of functions.

    These sources of legitimacy combine and create a power structure characterised by negotiation, decentralisation, and collective decision-making. Clearly, the term “consensus” is frequently described in the interim arrangements (in Sagaing, it is the constitution) of three units.

    Varied Models of Executive Power

    The three units share common goals and similar political origins, but they adopt different models of executive power to adapt to the need to balance local power and drive the resistance movement forward.

    Sagaing adopts a highly collectivised executive structure. The five groups responsible for drafting the Sagaing Constitution have significant influence over executive authority, as Section 67 empowers them to scrutinise and select members of the executive. Their influence is further reinforced by Section 66, which permits only individuals belonging to the representative groups involved in the constitution-drafting commission to serve as cabinet members. The Chief Minister has very limited unilateral power, and the government operates through consensus among representative blocs. The Chief Minister does not have the executive authority to appoint or remove any cabinet members, including the Chief Administrator of the Naga Self-Administered Zone. Nor does the Chief Minister have the power to restructure the executive body under the constitution.

    Process Diagram of Cabinet Formation in Sagaing

    This model strictly prevents the concentration of power in any single actor but risks policy paralysis under collective leadership.

    Magway presents the most codified and legally formalised model of executive formation among the federal units. Law No. 1/2023 of the Federal Unit Parliament institutionalises the drafting commission as a body composed of seven representative blocs, and these blocs subsequently become embedded as core political actors within the executive architecture. Their influence is structurally established through Sections 12(d), 61–63, and 152–154 of the Magway Interim Arrangement.

    Process Diagram of Cabinet Formation in Magway

    Section 12(d) predetermines the composition of the cabinet by limiting eligibility to members of these seven blocs, effectively transforming the drafting commission into a gatekeeping mechanism for executive authority. Sections 61–63 further empower the blocs to constitute the Selection Commission responsible for appointing cabinet members, including the Chief Minister. Each bloc nominates one candidate for Chief Minister, and the Selection Commission—comprised of representatives from these same blocs under Sections 153 and 154 determines the executive leadership. Although the Chief Minister is nominally authorised to nominate ministers, cabinet formation remains contingent on the collective consent of the seven blocs and subsequent parliamentary approval. In effect, the Magway model reflects the Sagaing protocol: the Chief Minister lacks unilateral authority to appoint, dismiss, or restructure the cabinet. Executive authority is instead dispersed across the seven blocs and the parliament. Consequently, Magway’s executive structure operates as a hybrid parliamentary model in which executive leadership is balanced, and at times constrained, by institutionalised checks from both parliamentary institutions and civil–political groups.

    Mandalay adopts the least formalised and most centralised model, built around the Coordination Platform of revolutionary forces (the Mandalay Platform). Its Interim Governing Council is selected by the 11–15 representative blocs from the Mandalay Platform, followed by parliamentary approval. Unlike Sagaing and Magway, the Mandalay Executive Head is authorised to appoint, dismiss, or restructure the cabinet.

    Process Diagram of Council Formation in Mandalay

    However, there are no provisions in the arrangement guiding the accountability mechanisms of executive members. It remains unclear whether executive members will be held accountable to the parliament or to the Mandalay Platform. Mandalay has not yet published the members of the Mandalay Platform. The absence of detailed legal provisions on accountability reflects the politically sensitive security environment, where coordination takes precedence over legal precision.

    Reference

    [1] Section 119. The term of the Pyithu Hluttaw is five years from the day of its first session. Section 151. The term of the Amyotha Hluttaw is the same as the term of the Pyithu Hluttaw. The term of the Amyotha Hluttaw expires on the day of the expiry of the Pyithu Hluttaw. Section 168. The term of the Region or State Hluttaw is the same as the term of the Pyithu Hluttaw. The term of the Region or State Hluttaw expires on the day of the expiry of the Pyithu Hluttaw.

    [2] CRPH, “Declaration on the Complete Abolition of the 2008 Constitution” [31 March 2021]. Available here: https://crphmyanmar.org/publications/statements/crph3103212/

    [3] https://www.facebook.com/Sggstrike

    [4] https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091451325717

    [5] https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580838481806

    [6] https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=122196780116063633&set=pb.61551909016018.-2207520000&type=3

    Read part (1) of the briefing paper here.


  • အညာကို လျှော့တွက်ခဲ့ခြင်း အမှား

    အညာကို လျှော့တွက်ခဲ့ခြင်း အမှား

    အညာကိုလျှော့တွက်ခဲ့ခြင်း အမှား

    မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး ၅နှစ်ပြည့်ပါတော့မည်။ ကချင်ခေါင်းဆောင်တစ်ဦး ပြောခဲ့ဖူးသည့် “တော်လှန်ရေးတစ်ခုက ၅နှစ်ထက်ပိုမကြာသင့်ဘူး” ဆိုသည့် စကားကို ပြန်လည် သတိရမိသည်။ ထိုအတိုင်းဆို နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အဆုံးသတ်ခါနီးနေပြီလား။ သို့မဟုတ် လက်ရှိကြုံတွေ့နေရသည့်အရာတွေကရော ဘာတွေပါလဲ။

    စစ်တပ်၏ အပ်ကြောင်းထပ် နိုင်ငံရေးကစားကွက်အတိုင်း မြန်မာစစ်တပ်က အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမည့် နိုင်ငံရေးလမ်းကြောင်းကို စတင် ပုံဖော်နေခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအလယ်ပိုင်း (ဒေသအခေါ် အညာ) တစ်ဝိုက်နှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားဒေသရှိနယ်မြေများကို စစ်တပ်၏ စစ်ဆင်ရေးဗျူဟာ နှင့်အတူ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိသည်။ ဥပမာ-စစ်ကိုင်း ကလေး-ကဘော်ဒေသ၊ ဟားခါး (ချင်းပြည်နယ်) ၊ ပေါက်၊ ကျောက်ထု (မကွေး)၊ မင်းတပ် (ချင်းပြည်နယ်)၊ မတ္တရာ၊ မိုးကုတ် (မန္တလေး)နှင့် ရွှေဘို (စစ်ကိုင်း) စသည့် နေရာအနှံ့အပြားတွင် စစ်ဆင်ရေးများ လုပ်ဆောင်လာသည်။ တချို့နယ်မြေများကို အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်က ပြန်လည်နေရာယူထားပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်က နိုင်ငံ၏ အရှေ့ပိုင်းမှသည် အနောက်ပိုင်းဒေသနယ်မြေများအထိ တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များ၏ ထောက်ပံ့ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းများကို ဖြတ်တောက်ရန် လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပြီး အဓိက စစ်ဆင်ရေးများအတွက် ပြင်ဆင်လျက်ရှိသည်။

    ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ် နောက်ပိုင်းနှင့် ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် အခြေအနေများကို ပြန်ကြည့်ပါက အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်အတွက် လုံးဝ အထိနာခဲ့သည်။ စစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းထုတ်လုပ်ရေးစက်ရုံများ တည်ရှိရာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအလယ်ပိုင်း တွင်ပင် ထိုကဲ့သို့စစ်ဆင်ရေးများ လုပ်နိုင်ရန် ကျန်ခဲ့သောနှစ်ဆန်းကအထိ မျှော်လင့်ဝံ့မည်မဟုတ်ပေ။ ထိုသို့ဆိုလျှင် ယခုအခြေအနေက ဘာကြောင့်ဖြစ်လာပါသနည်း။

    မည်သို့သောအချက်အလက်များကစစ်အာဏာရှင်ကိုစစ်ဆင်ရေးလုပ်ဆောင်ရန်တွန်းအားဖြစ်စေခဲ့သနည်း။ နိုင်ငံရေးလေ့လာသုံးသပ်သူ အချို့က စစ်ဆင်ရေးများတွင် စစ်မှုထမ်းအင်အား အများအပြားသုံးစွဲလာခြင်း နှင့် တရုတ်၏ ကြားဝင်စေ့စပ်ညှိနှိုင်းသည့်ကိစ္စရပ်များကို ပြောဆိုကြသည်။ အခြားရော ဘာတွေရှိနေနိုင်သနည်း။ မိမိတို့ကတော့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးတပ်များအနေဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ မဟာဗျူဟာဆိုင်ရာ တွက်ချက်မှုထဲတွင် အညာကို လျှော့တွက်ခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့်ဟု သုံးသပ်ချင်ပါသည်။

    အညာက ဘာကြောင့်အရေးကြီးတာလဲ

    စစ်တပ်သည် ၁၉၆၀ ကာလများဆီက ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သော စစ်ဆင်ရေးကြီးများအပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအလယ်ပိုင်းကို မဟာဗျူဟာအရ ဘူမိနတ်သန်ဒေသ၊ တစ်နည်းအားဖြင့် “အဖြူရောင်နယ်မြေ” ဟု သတ်မှတ်ထားခဲ့သည်။ စစ်တပ်အမြင်အရ အညာကို ထိန်းချုပ်ထားခြင်းသည် နိုင်ငံတော်လုံခြုံရေး၊ ကွန်မြူနစ် နှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်ရေးများကို တားဆီးဖိနှိပ်ရန်အတွက် အရေးပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ် အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက် စစ်တပ်၏အာဏာစက်ဝန်း ထိန်းချုပ်မှုအောက်မှလွတ်မြောက်ရန် လက်နက်ကိုင် တော်လှန်ရေးကြီး ထွက်ပေါ်လာနိုင်ခြေကိုမူ လျော့တွက်ထားခဲ့ပုံပင်။

    စစ်တပ်၏ အဖွဲ့အစည်းတည်ဆောက်ထားပုံနှင့် စစ်ရေးပြင်ဆင်မှုများသည် တောင်တန်းဒေသများရှိ ၎င်း၏ ရန်သူ တိုင်းရင်းသားတပ်ဖွဲ့များအား တိုက်ခိုက်ရန် အလေးထားဆောင်ရွက်ထားခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး၊ အညာကို စစ်ရေးစမ်းသပ်ဧရိယာတစ်ခု အဖြစ်သာ ယေဘုယျ သတ်မှတ်ထားခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ မကွေးတိုင်းတွင် အဓိကလက်နက်ထုတ်လုပ်ရေးစက်ရုံများ ရှိသည်။ တိုင်စစ်ဌာချုပ်များကို နယ်စပ်ဒေသများတစ်ကြော ထိန်းချုပ်ရန် ဖြန့်ကျက်ထားပြီး အလယ်ပိုင်းဒေသများရှိ တပ်မ အသီးသီးက ကျားကန်ပေးထားသည်။ ဒုတိယအချက်အနေဖြင့် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်က ဖီးနစ် တီဗီနှင့် အင်တာဗျူးတစ်ခုတွင် “ပြောရရင်တော့ဗျာ … ဟို ပြောရလို့ရှိရင်တော့ အဲလောက်ထိတော့များလိမ့်မယ်လို့ ကျွန်တော်မထင်ခဲ့ဘူး” ဟု ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် အာဏာသိမ်းမှု ဆန့်ကျင်ရေးများနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ၎င်းအနေဖြင့် အတွက်အချက်မှားခဲ့ကြောင်း ဝန်ခံထားသည်။ ထိုအချက်က စစ်တပ်အနေနဲ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအလယ်ပိုင်းတွင် လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေး တစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်လာနိုင်ခြေကို အကြီးအကျယ် လျှော့တွက်ခဲ့ကြောင်း ထင်ရှားသည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုအလွန် ၅နှစ်နီးပါးတွင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ ဗဟိုချက် ထိန်းချုပ်ရာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအလယ်ပိုင်း အညာမှာ စစ်တပ်၏ အဓိကနယ်မြေအများအပြား ဆုံးရှုံးနေခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။

    ထို့အပြင် အညာသည် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ ပြယုဂ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်လို့နေသည်။ အညာ လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေးက နေပြည်တော်အာဏာအဆောက်အဦကို တိုက်ရိုက် ခြိမ်းခြောက်နေသည်။ တစ်နည်းအားဖြင့် အညာစစ်မျက်နှာသည် နိုင်ငံအနှံ့ လူမျိုးစုလွတ်မြောက်ရေး တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲများအတွက် အလှည့်အပြောင်း တစ်ခုလည်း ဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်တပ်၏ ဗဟိုအာဏာစက် ပျက်သုဥ်းနေကြောင်း အညာက မီးမောင်းထိုးပြနေသည်။

    နိုင်ငံရေးအရဆိုလျှင် အညာတော်လှန်ရေးအရွေ့ကို ဒေသတွင်းမြို့နယ်အသီးသီးရှိ မြေပြင်ခေါင်းဆောင်များက ဦးဆောင်နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ဤအချက်က လူမျိုးစုနိုင်ငံရေး နှင့် အဝေးရောက် (ပြည်ပရောက်) နိုင်ငံရေးခေါင်းဆောင်မှုပုံစံများနှင့် ဆန့်ကျင်ဘက်ဖြစ်နေသည်။ လူမျိုးစုနိုင်ငံရေးဦးဆောင်မှုနှင့် အဝေးရောက်နိုင်ငံရေးဦးဆောင်မှု အခန်းကဏ္ဍတွင်ရှိသော ခေါင်းဆောင်အများစုမှာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားမဟုတ်တော့သူများ (နိုင်ငံခြားသားများ) သို့မဟုတ် နိုင်ငံခြားတိုင်းပြည်တစ်ခုခုတွင် အမြဲတမ်းနေထိုင်ခွင့်ကတ်ကိုင်ဆောင်ထားသူများဖြစ်သည်။ အဓိပ္ပါယ်မှာ ခေါင်းဆောင်မှုသည် ထွက်ပေါက်သို့ ဦးတည်နေပြီး သို့မဟုတ် ၎င်းတို့နောက်လိုက်ငယ်သားများထက် အလွန်သာလွန်သော ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်ရေးလုံခြုံမှုအစီအမံများရှိထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များ နှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ နိုင်ငံရေးဘက်တော်သားများသည် ပြည်ပရောက် နိုင်ငံရေးသမားများ၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ကျွမ်းကျင်ပိုင်နိုင်စွာ ကိုယ်တွယ်ခဲ့သည့် နှစ်ရှည်အတွေ့အကြုံများရှိခဲ့သောကြောင့် ၎င်းတို့အတွက် ခေါင်းခဲစရာကိစ္စကြီးမဟုတ်ပေ။ ဆန့်ကျင်ဘက်အားဖြင့် ၁၉၈၈ ကာလများအလွန်ကတည်းက လူထုခေါင်းဆောင် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်က မြန်မာပြည်တွင်းတွင် မြန်မာလူထုနှင့်အတူရှိနေခဲ့၊ ခေါင်းဆောင်မှုပေးနေခဲ့သည်။ ပို၍ အရေးကြီးသည်မှာ ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား မှတ်ပုံတင်ကို မြဲမြဲကိုင်ထားဆဲပင်။ ထိုအချက်က စစ်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များအတွက် အလွန်ကြီးမားသော ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုနောက်ခံအခြေအနေဖြင့် မှန်းဆကြည့်ပါက အညာဒေသမှ ပြည်တွင်းခေါင်းဆောင်မှု အားကောင်းလာခြင်းမှာ စစ်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များအတွက် နိုင်ငံရေးအရ ခေါင်းကိုက် စရာ ဖြစ်လာပါတော့သည်။

    မတူညီသော ဦးစားပေးမှု၊ ကွဲပြားသော နည်းဗျူဟာ

    ပြီးခဲ့သည့် ၄နှစ်အတွင်း NUG သည် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးတပ်များနှင့် ပူးတွဲ၍ စစ်ဆင်ရေးများဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်း နှင့် ဗဟိုအမိန့်ပေးကွပ်ကဲမှုတည်ဆောက်ခြင်းများကို ကြိုးပမ်းနေ ခဲ့သည်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် အသစ်ဖွဲ့စည်းထားသော တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်များသည်လည်း ပုံစံတူနည်းကို လိုက်ခဲ့သည်။ တိုင်းရင်းသားလွတ်မြောက်နယ်မြေများတွင် ဦးစွာလေ့ကျင့်ပြီးမှ အလယ်ပိုင်းနှင့် အောက်ပိုင်းသို့ တဖြည်းဖြည်းရွေ့သည့်ဗျူဟာပင်။ ကနဦးတွင် ဗျူဟာအရ တူညီမှုများတွေ့ရသော်လည်း NUG၊ ERO နှင့် အသစ်ဖွဲ့စည်းထားသော တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်များအကြား ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုသည် အလွန်ကျဉ်းမြောင်းသောဘောင်တစ်ခုထဲတွင်သာ ရှိနေခဲ့ကြောင်းကို နောက်ပိုင်းတော့ ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်းသိလာရသည်။ ကွဲပြားသော မဟာဗျူဟာများနှင့် မတူညီသော ဦးစားပေးမှုများကို မြင်တွေ့လာရသည်။

    ERO များက သူတို့၏ကိုယ်ပိုင်နယ်မြေများကို ခိုင်မာစေရန် ဒေသဆိုင်ရာဗျူဟာများကို အလယ်ပိုင်းဒေသ အင်အားစုများနှင့် ဗျူဟာအရချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်မှုထက် သူတို့၏ သြဇာလွှမ်းမိုးမှုကို အခိုင်အမာသေချာစေရေးနှင့် ချဲ့ထွင်ရေးတို့ကိုသာ အလေးထားပြီး လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့သည်။ မိမိတို့ဒေသတွင်း မဟာဗျူဟာများကို အလယ်ပိုင်းဒေသနှင့်ချိတ်ဆက်ရေးထက် ERO များက ၎င်းတို့၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်နယ်မြေများကို ထိန်းချုပ်မှုအားကောင်းလာစေရန်နှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေးစိုးမိုးမှုကို ခိုင်မာစွာချဲ့ထွင်ရေးကိုသာ ဦးစားပေးနေခဲ့သည်။ အလားတူပင် NUG ဘက်မှာလည်း ERO များအပေါ် အလွန်အမင်းအားပြုပြီး အလယ်ပိုင်းဒေသကို အာရုံသိပ်မထားခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့် အခွင့်အလမ်းကောင်းများ လွတ်သွားခဲ့သည်ပင်။ သေချာသည့်အချက်မှာ ဗဟိုကွပ်ကဲမှုတည်ဆောက်ခြင်း၊ ERO များနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းများသည် မျှော်လင့်ထားသည့်အတိုင်း ဖြစ်မလာသေး။

    သို့သော် အညာတော်လှန်ရေးအရွေ့သည် လက်လုပ်များနှင့် မြေမြှုပ်မိုင်းများမှတစ်ဆင့် ညှိနှိုင်း စစ်ဆင်ရေးများအထိ အဆင့်ဆင့် ကြီးထွားလာနေခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအလယ်ပိုင်း အညာတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစု အဖွဲ့ငယ်လေးများသည် ကျေးလက်နယ်မြေများနှင့် စစ်ရေးအရဗျူဟာကျသော လမ်းမကြီးများကို ထိန်းချုပ်နိုင်သည်အထိ စိုးမိုးမှုရရှိလာသည်။ အညာတော်လှန်ရေး၏ အစိတ်အပိုင်းကြီးတစ်ခုအဖြစ် ပါဝင်နေသော်လည်း NUG က မဟာဗျူဟာမြောက် ခေါင်းဆောင်မှုအခန်းကဏ္ဍကို ယူရန် ပျက်ကွက်နေခဲ့သည်။ ထိုအချက်က အညာဒေသတွင် အပေါ်လွှာခေါင်းဆောင်မှုလေဟာနယ် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာစေသည်။ နယ်မြေထိန်းချုပ်မှုအရ အောင်မြင်မှုများ ရှိသော်လည်း အညာတော်လှန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုသည် များပြားလွန်းသော ကျေးရွာအခြေပြု တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများကို စုစည်းရန် ရုန်းကန်နေရသည်။ ၂၀၂၅ ခုနှစ် ဒုတိယနှစ်ဝက်မှစ၍ အညာတော်လှန်ရေး တပ်များကြားတွင် စီမံချက်အခြေပြု နှင့် ဇုန်အခြေပြု စစ်ရေးပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ ခပ်စိပ်စိပ် မြင်တွေ့လာရပါသည်။ failed experiments များမှ သင်ခန်းစာယူ၍ ဗျူဟာအသစ်များကို လိုက်လျောညီထွေချမှတ်နေသည်ဟု နားလည်ရပါသည်။ ယခုထိတိုင် အညာတွင် စနစ်ကျသော ညှိနှိုင်းကွပ်ကဲမှုနှင့် အမိန့်ပေးမှုပုံစံကို တည်ဆောက်ရန် အခက်အခဲများရှိနေဆဲပင်။

    ဘာတွေမှားခဲ့သလဲ

    NUG ရဲ့ ပသုံးလုံး ဗျူဟာ (ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့၊ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့နှင့် ပြည်သူ့လုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့)က အညာမြေပြင်မှာ ဖြစ်ပျက်နေသော ပကတိအခြေအနေများကို ထည့်တွက်ရန်၊ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုရေချိန်နှင့် ချိန်သားကိုက်ဖြစ်ရန်တို့ကို ထည့်တွက်ရန် ပျက်ကွက် ခဲ့သည်။ လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေး အရှိန်အဟုန်မြင့်လာနေဆဲကာလ၊ တစ်နည်းအားဖြင့် နယ်မြေထိန်းချုပ်မှု မသေချာသေးသည့်အချိန်တွင် NUG က ဗျူရိုကရေစီယန္တရားများကို တည်ဆောက်လိုက်သည်။ ထိုအချက်က မြေပြင်လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများအတွက် ရှုပ်ထွေးစေသကဲသို့ အညာတစ်ခွင်မှ တက်သစ်စ ခေါင်းဆောင်မှုကြားရှိ အက်ကြောင်းများကို ပိုမိုနက်ရှိုင်းစေသည်။ ၎င်းနည်းဖြင့်ပင် တော်လှန်ရေးဗျူရိုကရေစီအတွင်းမှ ယန္တရားအချင်းချင်းကြားပဋိပက္ခမီး စတင်လာခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။ NUG ဗျူရိုကရေစီအတွင်းမှ ခေါင်းဆောင်များသည်လည်း အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်ကို တိုက်ခိုက်ဖို့ထက် ၎င်းတို့အတွက် လုပ်သာကိုင်သာ ရှိစေမည့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွင်း ဝန်ထမ်းစနစ်များ နှင့် နေရာချထားမှုများပြုလုပ်ရန် ပိုမိုအာရုံစိုက်နေခဲ့ဟန်တူပါသည်။

    နောက်တစ်ချက်မှာ NUG သည် တိုင်းရင်းသားတပ်များနှင့် စစ်ရေးပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှု နှင့် ဗဟိုအမိန့်ပေးကွပ်ကဲမှုတည်ဆောက်ခြင်းတို့ကို အလွန်အမင်းအာရုံစိုက်နေခဲ့ပြီး အညာဒေသရှိ ၎င်း၏တပ်များကို လေ့ကျင့်၊ စုဖွဲ့၍ လက်နက်တပ်ဆင်ရန် ပျက်ကွက်နေခဲ့သည့်အမှားဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုအချက်ကို အတိုချုပ်ပြောရလျင် အညာသားများနှင့် မြေပြင်တွင် အတူတူရှိနေရန် ပျက်ကွက်နေ ခဲ့ခြင်းပင်။ အရင်းအမြစ်ခွဲဝေမှုနှင့် စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုများသည်လည်း အညာကို ဦးစားပေးရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့သည်။ NUG ရဲ့ ရန်ပုံငွေရှာဖွေမှုက ပြည်ပရောက်နိုင်ငံသားများနှင့် အွန်လိုင်းမှ စည်းရုံးရေးပေါ်တွင်သာ အဓိက မှီခိုခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး စစ်ကိုင်း၊ မကွေးနှင့် မန္တလေးတို့ကို ဗျူဟာမြောက်ရန်ပုံငွေရှာဖွေရေးအတွက် အားသိပ်မစိုက်ခဲ့ပေ။ သယံဇာတ ခွဲဝေရေးတွင်လည်း အညာအတွက် ဦးစားမပေးခဲ့ပေ။

    အရေးအကြီးဆုံးကတော့ အညာတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် ယုံကြည်မှုတည်ဆောက်ဖို့၊ အတူတူလက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်ဖို့ ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ နိုင်ငံခြားရေး နှင့် သံတမန် ဆက်ဆံရေး ကိစ္စရပ်များမှာလည်း အညာလူထုကြုံတွေ့နေရသည့်အကြောင်းအရာများကို ဘေးဖယ်ထားခဲ့သည်။ အညာဒေသတွင်း ခေါင်းဆောင်သစ်များနှင့် ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုကိုလည်း လျစ်လျူရှုခဲ့ကြသည်။

    ပြင်ဆင်ဖို့ အချိန်ရှိသေးလား

    ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ သတိမမူမိသော အရာများမှ သင်ခန်းစာမယူနိုင်ပါက စစ်တပ်သည် နောက်ထပ် ရာစုနှစ်တစ်ခုအထိ တိုင်းပြည်၏ နယ်စပ်တစ်လျှောက်တွင် စစ်ပွဲများ ဆက်လက်ဆင်နွှဲနေနိုင်ပါသည်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် အညာကို လျစ်လျူရှုထားသည့် မအောင်မြင်သော စမ်းသပ်ချက်ကို ပြင်ဆင်ရန် အချိန်မနှောင်းသေးပါ။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ အောင်မြင်မှုသည် ပြင်ပအကြောင်းအရာများ တွင်သာမက အညာအင်အားစုများ နှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားများ၏တော်လှန်ရေးဟူသည့် ဗျူဟာ ၂ခုကို မည်သို့ပေါင်းကူးချိတ်ဆက်မလဲ ဆိုသည့် အပေါ်တွင်လည်း မူတည်ပါသည်။

    ဟေမာန်သည် စစ်ကိုင်းအခြေစိုက် နိုင်ငံရေးလေ့လာသူတစ်ဦးဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုဆောင်းပါးသည် Myanmar Pressphoto Agency သတင်းဌာနတွင်ဖော်ပြထားသော ဘာသာပြန်ဆောင်းပါးကို ပြန်လည်ဖော်ပြခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အင်္ဂလိပ်ဘာသာစကားဖြင့် ဖော်ပြထားသော မူရင်းဆောင်းပါးကို ဖတ်ရန် ား


  • Myanmar’s Spring Revolution: Paying the Price for What We Overlooked?

    Myanmar’s Spring Revolution: Paying the Price for What We Overlooked?

    Myanmar’s Spring Revolution: Paying the Price for What We Overlooked?

    Photo: CAS

    Spring Revolution approaches its fifth anniversary. It reminds the timeline that was initially pronounced by a prominent Kachin figure. He once said, “Revolution should not take longer than five years”. Are we approaching an end? Or what are we experiencing now?

    The military regime is on its political pathway to transition, dictated by its repeated political playbook. The elections are coming, along with massive military operations across tactical spots connecting central Burma (locally known as Ah Nyar) and neighbouring ethnic states. They include operations in the Kalay-Kabaw area of Sagaing and Hakha of Chin state, Pauk, Kyauk-Htu of Magway and Mindat of Chin State and Madaya, Moegot of Mandalay and Shwe Bo of Sagaing. Tatmadaw is clearly cutting the supply chain from the eastern to the western corner of the country in preparation for its major operations. Looking back to the situation in late 2023 and 2024, it was a complete disaster for the junta. It cannot expect such huge military operations, even in central Burma, where its major weapon manufacturing factories exist. Having said that, why that turn? What has empowered the military junta for such operations? Several analytical reports have pointed out the conscription and China factors. What else could it be? I would argue that the National Unity Government and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations mistook their strategic positions by overlooking Ah Nyar.

    Why Ah Nyar?

    Tatmadaw has regarded central Burma as its strategic heartland and a historic “white area” after its major operations in the 1960s. For the Tatmadaw, securing Ah Nyar is essential to protect the state and suppress communist and ethnic insurgencies. That said, the possibility that major armed resistance could emerge from its power centre after the 2021 coup d’état has been relatively underestimated. Two theories resonate that claim. Firstly, its structure and tactical preparations are primarily emphasised on fighting against its enemies in the mountains and positioning Ah Nyar as a test ground. Major weapon manufacturing factories are in Magway. Its regional bases are spread across peripheral states – backed by infantry battalions in the central regions. Secondly, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s rare confession in his Phoenix TV interview – “To be honest … I didn’t think it would go that far” — exposes the Tatmadaw’s strategic miscalculation. His remark underscores how deeply the military underestimated the potential for armed resistance in its heartland, where it has now lost major territorial control within five years of the coup.

    In addition, Ah Nyar has become the spark of the Spring Revolution. The armed resistance in the Ah Nyar region now poses a direct threat to Naypyitaw. The Ah Nyar front marks a turning point in Myanmar’s liberation struggle. It represents the collapse of the Tatmadaw central authority in the heartland. Without the support of Ah Nyar and its people, the regime risks becoming a regime without backbone.

    Politically speaking, the resistance movement in Ah Nyar is still led by local leadership grounded in different townships across the region. This stands in contrast to exile and ethnic politics, where leadership is largely dominated by foreign citizens or permanent residents of foreign countries. The military generals and their political wings have long experience manoeuvring around exile politicians and institutions, so such actors pose relatively little challenge to them. However, when Aung San Suu Kyi chose to remain inside the country and, more importantly, to remain a Burmese citizen, it became a major threat to them. That said, the emergence of domestic leadership in Ah Nyar is likely to become a political headache for the military generals. The revolution in Ah Nyar is a clear existential threat to Tatmadaw.

    Different Priorities, Divergent Strategies

    Over the last four years, NUG sought to build military cooperation and central command with Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (ERO). Newly established revolutionary armies follow the same idea – building the armed institution first in ethnic-liberated areas, then moving to central and lower regions. Although strategic similarities were observed in the beginning, it has later become clear that the cooperation between NUG, EROs and newly established revolutionary armies is still functional. Divergent Strategies and different priorities were seen. EROs prioritised consolidating their own territories, focusing heavily on securing and expanding their influence rather than linking their regional strategies to the central regions. Likewise, certain opportunities were missed within NUG by over-emphasising EROs but paying relatively little attention to the movement in the centre. Clearly, the central command and cooperation with EROs still do not function as expected.

    In Ah Nyar, however, the resistance movement evolved progressively—from homemade weapons and landmines to coordinated operations. Several tiny factions of resistance groups in central Burma have obtained major influence over rural territories and strategic roads. Despite being a part of Ah Nyar, NUG has failed to take a strategic leadership role – leaving a leadership vacuum. Yet, despite this territorial success, the movement struggled to unify its numerous, village-based resistance groups. Ah Nyar is facing obstacles to building a coherent command and coordination structure.

    What Went Wrong?

    The 3-Ps strategy of NUG (People Administration Team, People Defence Team, People Security Team) in Ah Nyar failed to account for the realities on the ground and the timing of the revolutionary movement. While territorial control remained uncertain amid a surge of armed resistance, NUG established bureaucratic mechanisms. This not only created operational complexities but also deepened divisions within the emerging local leadership across central Burma. In this way, inter-mechanism conflict arose within the revolutionary bureaucracy. Leaders within the NUG bureaucracy appeared more focused on creating structures that favoured themselves rather than on fighting the military junta.

    NUG focused excessively on coordinating militarily with ethnic armed groups and on establishing a centralised command system, while failing to train, arm, or organise the Ah Nyar forces. In short, it failed to operate alongside Ah Nyar on the ground.

    Resource allocation and management also failed to prioritise Ah Nyar. NUG’s fundraising relied heavily on diaspora communities and online, while it left Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay out of strategic mobilisation. Resource distribution did not prioritise Ah Nyar either.

    Most importantly, it failed to build trust with Ah Nyar and to stay present alongside them. In matters of foreign affairs and diplomatic relations, the Ah Nyar communities were sidelined. Coordination with new local leaders in Ah Nyar was also neglected.

    Time to re-direct?

    Tatmadaw can keep fighting wars on the periphery for another century — unless we finally learn from what we overlooked. It is not yet too late for the Spring Revolution to correct the failed experiment of neglecting Ah Nyar. The success of the Spring Revolution depends not only on external factors but also on how we bridge the two strategies — Ah Nyar and the ethnic revolution.


  • Understanding Federal Units in Central Burma (part 1)

    Understanding Federal Units in Central Burma (part 1)

    Understanding Federal Units in Central Burma

    Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma (part 1)

    Introduction

     

    The dry zone or Central Burma is locally known as Ah Nyar (or Anyar). The central plain where Burmese majority lives was once politically referred to as the heartland of the Myanmar military (or Tatmadaw). It could be due to some demographic and geographic strategy of the Tatmadaw. Firstly, Tatmadaw is the state military, and it is formed by the Burmese majority, and the founding father General Aung San is from Natmauk of Ah Nyar. On the second, and more importantly, the tactical formation of Tatmadaw was strategically built on fighting against its domestic enemies in the periphery states. Tatmadaw has been a central figure of the decade-long civil war with ethnic liberation movement, particularly Karen, Mon of southern Burma, Kachin of northern Burma, Shan of Eastern Burma and Rakhine and Chin of western Burma. In light of this peripheral warfare in the mountainous regions, its major supply bases were heavily located in the central plain areas of Ah Nyar, mostly in Magway region. Out of 25 Weapon Manufacturing Industries of Directorate of Defence Industries of Tatmadaw, 68% of industries manufacturing major weapon supplies are situated in Ah Nyar alone, while the remaining 32% are in Bago and Yangon. Additionally, its human resource pool has long been filled by unemployed young men from central Burma. It was not an unfounded hypothesis for the Tatmadaw’s military strategists to view Ah Nyar as a strategic and secure position from which to counter and contain its enemies in the peripheral states. Who would have imagined the rise of a revolutionary movement in Ah Nyar? Neither the Tatmadaw nor its opposition groups, including Burma’s ethnic revolutionary organisations, could have foreseen it.

     

    The 2021 military coup d’état became a miracle in the history of revolution in Burma. The people of Ah Nyar became a central figure of the prominent Spring Revolution in Burma since the early days of 2021. Despite the tragedies on the frontlines and the fragmented structure of the resistance groups, their guerrilla campaigns have, at times, demonstrated efforts to evolve into conventional warfare, most notably marked by the launch of Operation 1027. This has also led to re-framing revolutionary strategies in Ah Nyar.

     

    Nearly five years into the Spring Revolution, with Ah Nyar at its heart, the movement now confronts escalating threats from the Tatmadaw. This raises a critical question: what direction is the revolution in Ah Nyar now taking?

     

    Contextual origins

     

    Across central Burma, the emergence of federal units was not from the prior constitutional design but a response to the evolving dynamics of the Spring Revolution. As resistance forces gained territorial control across Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay alongside advances in northern Shan, Chin, Kachin and Rakhine, the need for structured governance became increasingly urgent. Beginning in early 2023, consultations among local revolutionary actors, 2020 elected representatives and community networks led to the creation of drafting bodies for interim arrangements. These interim frameworks opened political space for decentralised regional federal governments that complement, coordinate with and strengthen the broader federal-democratic movement led by the National Unity Government.

     

    The three regions of central Burma are currently in the process of establishing federal units; most notably Sagaing, which many diplomats and scholars see pioneer of federal units. All three regions of central Burma have now enacted legal arrangements for forming federal unit governments. These interim arrangements form the core of the regional political framework and are key to understanding the direction in which the revolution in Ah Nyar is heading, despite the presence of several tiny factions of resistance groups in each region.

     

    Drafting and Approval Framework

     

    The drafting processes were led by the drafting bodies established by the respective regional parliaments. In Magway and Sagaing, the interim arrangements drafting processes began following the enactment of Laws No. 1/2023 in both regions, dated 17 November 2023. In contrast to these two regions, the Mandalay interim arrangements drafting process commenced through an agreement between the Mandalay parliament (Committee Representing Mandalay Hluttaw) and revolutionary groups in Mandalay. Unlike Sagaing and Magway, Mandalay deliberately avoided using the term “law”; instead, it adopted the “Plan for Coordination and Drafting of Interim Political Arrangements in Mandalay”. The plan was officially approved on 12 July 2024. Nevertheless, the principles and drafting processes across all three regions are largely similar.

     

    Drafting Bodies

    Approval Process

    Unit parliaments hold the sole authority to approve the interim arrangements in Sagaing and Magway. Mandalay follows a two-step approval process: first, the interim arrangements must be approved by the Mandalay Region People’s Revolutionary Forces Coordination Platform, which comprises seven groups representing revolutionary forces; and second, the Mandalay Parliament (in Burmese, မန္တလေးဒေသလွှတ်တော်) approves and announces the arrangements to the public.

    Executive

    Despite differences in terminology, the structure and functions of unit governments in central Burma are largely similar.

    Structure

    Who Forms the Cabinet?

    Sagaing

    Constituting the Sagaing Cabinet is based on selection, as defined in Chapter 5 of the constitution, rather than appointment. Section 67 requires the parliament (Sagaing Federal Unit Hluttaw) to form a Scrutiny and Selection Commission (SSC) for the Interim Sagaing Federal Unit Government. By structure, the SSC comprises representatives similar to those in the drafting commission (for the interim arrangement), together with representatives from the People’s Administration Team in Sagaing. The SSC plays a crucial role in selecting candidates for the position of Chief Minister, and the parliament elects the Chief Minister through a secret ballot system.

    Once the Chief Minister is confirmed and formally appointed by the parliament, the Chief Minister joins the SSC to select and nominate the remaining members of the cabinet for parliamentary approval.

    Magway

    The Magway Interim Cabinet is constituted through a selection-based system, rather than an appointment system. Under Section 61 of the interim arrangement, the Selection Commission is required to nominate candidates for the position of Chief Minister for approval by the parliament. Once the parliament confirms the Chief Minister, the CM, upon the agreement of the seven parties represented in the Interim Drafting Commission, may nominate the remaining members of the cabinet. These nominations must then be submitted to the parliament for final approval.

    Mandalay

    The Mandalay Region People’s Revolutionary Forces Coordination Platform serves as the key body responsible for forming the Selection Commission for members of the Mandalay Interim Governing Council (MIGC), in accordance with Section 67 of the interim arrangement. The Mandalay parliament is then required to approve the Commission’s selections and formally announce the formation of the MIGC.

    Political Leadership

    Defence and Security

    Sagaing

    Sagaing Federal Unit establishes a federalised, civilian-led, and NUG-coordinated security architecture. The constitution allows Sagaing to form two types of armed forces — the People’s Security Team and the People’s Defence Team (the “2-Ps”), excluding the People’s Defence Force. Although NUG may deploy the 2-Ps with the agreement of the Unit Government, these forces remain under the authority and control of the Unit Government. In accordance with Section 142, the Unit Government is required to establish a Defence and Security Council to oversee the security governance of the Unit.

    Magway

    Magway interim arrangement sets out a civilian-led, locally grounded, and revolutionary-aligned security architecture. Section 114 establishes that security and defence functions fall under the authority of the Magway Interim Government. To support this, the Magway Federal Unit Parliament is mandated to enact laws governing the Unit’s security and defence forces (Section 123). An additional provision is also included that the Unit’s Ministry of Defence must form a preparatory committee to organise the Unit’s security and defence force in coordination with the armed revolutionary actors operating within the region.

    Mandalay

    The interim arrangement does not contain any provisions on this matter.

    Terms of Government

    Photos: Internet


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